See Exhibit 4 to the affidavit of plaintiff's counsel. In Crawford v. McLaughlin, 109 U.S.App.D.C. 264, 286 F.2d 821 (1960), the Court of Appeals emphasized that the evidence in such a case as the present one be considered in the light of the "humane purpose of such retirement laws." 109 U.S.App.D.C. at 265 and 286 F.2d at 822; see also Hyde v. Tobriner, 117 U.S.App.D.C. 311, 329 F.2d 879 (1965).

As appellant's history shows, policemen must of necessity engage in hazardous work as a part of their regular duties, and Congress has amply manifested a distaste for the resolution of doubts against them in the administration of laws passed for their protection. See Hyde v. Tobriner, supra, note 1; Crawford v. McLaughlin, 109 U.S.App.D.C. 264, 286 F.2d 821 (1960). We are of the view that this record gave no clear warrant for separating appellant's accident from his later ills, however much it may be thought to afford adequate support for the determination that appellant could no longer perform his duties — an issue which, in any event, is not before us on this appeal. Different considerations, in terms of evidentiary standards, perhaps underlie the question of whether a policeman is no longer qualified to serve as such, as opposed to whether the claimed disability is or is not to be attributed to the performance of official duties. If the Department elects not only to force his retirement but also at the lower classification, we think Congress intended that it be required to make a convincing showing of non-service-connected disability, at least in the face, as here, of a recent service injury of a serious and apparently relevant nature, the treatment of the subsequent disability by the Department as service-connected for many purposes, and

Accordingly the evidence must be viewed in a light more favorable to the applicant seeking relief than in the usual type of civil action. See Crawford v. McLaughlin, 109 U.S.App.D.C. 264, 286 F.2d 821 (1960). This view received the apparent approval of Congress with the passage of Public Law 87-857 referred to above, which provides that where the proximate cause of the disabling injury or disease is doubtful it shall be construed to have been incurred in the performance of duty.

The humane purpose of the retirement laws would fail of accomplishment were the evidence in this case held to be insufficient to support a retirement under Title 4, Sec. 527. See Crawford v. McLaughlin, 109 U.S.App.D.C. 264, 286 F.2d 821. Counsel for the plaintiff will prepare the appropriate order not inconsistent with this opinion.

We are guided towards this conclusion by the public policy which requires us to construe the retirement statute liberally in light of its humane purpose. Roberts, supra note 1, 412 A.2d at 51; Hyde v. Tobriner, 117 U.S.App.D.C. 311, 313, 329 F.2d 879, 881 (1964); Crawford v. McLaughlin, 109 U.S.App.D.C. 264, 265, 286 F.2d 821, 822 (1960); Lynch v. Tobriner, 237 F. Supp. 313, 316 (D.D.C. 1965). We are also mindful of the fact, already noted, that petitioner's property interest in his disability annuity is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. McNeal v. Police Firefighters Retirement Relief Board, supra, 488 A.2d at 935.

Since the statute expressly delays termination for one year, the effect of the Board's construction would delay the reestablishment of an annuity for two years. Given the humane purpose of the retirement laws, Hyde v. Tobriner, 117 U.S.App.D.C. 311, 313, 329 F.2d 879, 881 (1964); Crawford v. McLaughlin, 109 U.S.App.D.C. 264, 265, 286 F.2d 821, 822 (1960), this construction would seem to contravene the language and spirit of the statute. In the instant case, the construction urged by the Board could result in an annuitant having to subsist upon a restricted income for one full year following the termination of his annuity payments, prior to his being able to petition the Board for reinstatement of his annuity.