The point has never been decided in California as to section 6129 of the Business and Professions Code, because in the few cases in which it was involved the plaintiff prevailed on the ground that the particular transaction did not violate the statute. ( Bulkeley v. Bank of California, 68 Cal. 80 [8 P. 643]; Tuller v. Arnold, 98 Cal. 522 [33 P. 445]; Crawford v. Engler, 131 Cal.App. 374 [ 21 P.2d 460].) [1b] It seems, however, from the manner in which the defense in those cases was considered by the courts, the defense would have been regarded an available and valid one had it been sustained by the evidence.
However, "the kind of transaction which is punishable as a misdemeanor is one in which there is a purchase in the ordinary sense of the word, and not the discharge of an antecedent debt. There is nothing wrong, in itself, about an attorney's suing upon an assigned debt." See Martin v. Freeman, 216 Cal.App.2d 639, 642-43, 31 Cal.Rptr. 217 (Cal.App. 1963), citing Tuller v. Arnold, 98 Cal. 522, 33 P. 445 (1893); Crawford v. Engler, 131 Cal.App. 374, 21 P.2d 460 (1933).) While the FDCPA prohibits abusive collection practices, it does not forbid collection of a valid debt.
It is here contended that by these statutes defendant credit corporation is precluded from taking these assignments. If the requisite intent may be established (in this connection compare Moses v. McDivitt, 88 N.Y. 62, Starke v. Wannemacher, 32 N.D. 617, 156 N.W. 494, 4 A.L.R. 167, Bulkeley v. Bank of California, 68 Cal. 80, 8 P. 643, Tuller v. Arnold, 98 Cal. 522, 33 P. 445, and Crawford v. Engler, 131 Cal.App. 374, 21 P.2d 460), then that would be a defense to the action brought by the assignee ( Strever v. Sinclier, 66 Mont. 258, 213 P. 253; but it would not be a reason for holding that the assignee is practicing law, and hence in contempt of this court. The mere fact that an action was commenced does not prove the requisite intent.