(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Crawford v. Commissioner of Correction , 294 Conn. 165, 191, 982 A.2d 620 (2009). The procedural default doctrine is a prudential limitation on the right to raise constitutional claims in collateral proceedings that vindicates the interests of finality of judgments and uniformity.
(Citations omitted.) Crawford v. Commissioner of Correction , 294 Conn. 165, 180–81, 982 A.2d 620 (2009). For example, in 1977, in Wainwright v. Sykes , 433 U.S. 72, 97 S. Ct. 2497, 53 L. Ed. 2d 594 (1977), the United States Supreme Court rejected "the sweeping language of Fay "; id., at 87, 97 S. Ct. 2497 ; which, "going far beyond the facts of the case"; id., at 87–88, 97 S. Ct. 2497 ; "would make federal habeas review generally available to state convicts absent a knowing and deliberate waiver of the federal constitutional contention."
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Crawford v. Commissioner of Correction, 294 Conn. 165, 174, 982 A.2d 620 (2009). Except as otherwise noted, the issues in the present case are subject to plenary review.
(Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Crawford v. Commissioner of Correction , 294 Conn. 165, 175–76, 982 A.2d 620 (2009). "[T]he existence of cause for a procedural default must ordinarily turn on whether the [petitioner] can show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the [s]tate's procedural rule."
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Crawford v. Commissioner of Correction, 294 Conn. 165, 174, 982 A.2d 620 (2009). Because the certified appeals do not involve challenges to facts found, we apply plenary review.
(Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Crawford v. Commissioner of Correction , 294 Conn. 165, 177, 982 A.2d 620 (2009). "A reviewing court will not consider claims not raised in the habeas petition or decided by the habeas court."
In determining whether a habeas petitioner's claims of constitutional error are excused from procedural default, Connecticut courts apply the “cause and prejudice” standard of reviewability articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977). See, e.g., Crawford v. Commissioner of Correction, 294 Conn. 165, 179–89, 982 A.2d 620 (2009); Council v. Commissioner of Correction, 286 Conn. 477, 489, 944 A.2d 340 (2008); Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, 285 Conn. 556, 567–68, 941 A.2d 248 (2008); Correia v. Rowland, 263 Conn. 453, 462, 820 A.2d 1009 (2003); Jackson v. Commissioner of Correction, 227 Conn. 124, 135–36, 629 A.2d 413 (1993); Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, 218 Conn. 403, 408–409, 589 A.2d 1214 (1991). “The cause and prejudice standard is designed to prevent full review of issues in habeas corpus proceedings that counsel did not raise at trial or on appeal for rea sons of tactics, [inadvertence] or ignorance....” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Because [a] party cannot prevail under plain error unless it has demonstrated that the failure to grant relief will result in manifest injustice ... under the second prong of the analysis we must determine whether the consequences of the error are so grievous as to be fundamentally unfair or manifestly unjust.... Only if both prongs of the analysis are satisfied can the appealing party obtain relief.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Crawford v. Commissioner of Correction, 294 Conn. 165, 204–205, 982 A.2d 620 (2009). Section 52–80 provides in relevant part: “The plaintiff may withdraw any action ... before the commencement of a hearing on the merits thereof.
In Connecticut, when a petitioner “has failed to follow the proper procedures by which to correct his sentence or to preserve his challenge to the sentence before having filed this petition . . . his petition is procedurally defaulted.” Crawford v. Comm'r of Corr., 294 Conn. 165, 186 (2009) (quoting Cobham v. Comm'r of Corr., 258 Conn. 30, 39-40 (2001)). “Dismissal for a procedural default is regarded as a disposition of the habeas claim on the merits, ” and so “any future presentation of the claim would be a second or successive habeas petition, ” which Despres could file only with authorization from the Second Circuit.
Moreover, " ‘we will not review a claim unless it was distinctly raised at trial.’ Crawford v. Commissioner of Correction , 294 Conn. 165, 203, 982 A.2d 620 (2009) ; [see] id., at 202–204, 982 A.2d 620 (declining to review petitioner's claim that habeas court improperly failed to apply due process analysis to his claim of right to appeal); see also Practice Book § 60-5 (‘[t]he court shall not be bound to consider a claim unless it was distinctly raised at the trial or arose subsequent to the trial’)." Eubanks v. Commissioner of Correction , 329 Conn. 584, 597, 188 A.3d 702 (2018).