Crawford v. Brown

10 Citing cases

  1. Spencer v. Lee

    864 F.2d 1376 (7th Cir. 1989)   Cited 100 times
    Holding that private facilities and their employees do not engage in state action by virtue of participating in Illinois process for involuntary commitment

    And long before the passage of the 1945 statute, the law of Illinois authorized the confinement of an insane person by private persons, for up to ten days, if he was a danger to himself or others. See Crawford v. Brown, 321 Ill. 305, 316, 151 N.E. 911, 915 (1926), interpreting the Act to Revise the Law in Relation to the Commitment and Detention of Lunatics, § 2, 1893 Ill. Laws 141. Private commitment was not novel in 1893; nor was it invented in Illinois.

  2. Belger v. Arnot

    344 Mass. 679 (Mass. 1962)   Cited 13 times
    In Belger v. Arnot, 344 Mass. 679, 183 N.E.2d 866 (1962), plaintiff claimed that certain involuntary electroshock treatments she received while hospitalized pursuant to a temporary ten day paper amounted to a battery.

    While much often turns upon local statutes, we believe that the majority of the cases elsewhere recognize the requirement that there be danger to the patient or others before summary restraint outside any statutory procedure is justified. Crawford v. Brown, 321 Ill. 305, 316-318. Maxwell v. Maxwell, 189 Iowa, 7, 12-14.

  3. People ex Rel. Elliott v. Juergens

    95 N.E.2d 602 (Ill. 1950)   Cited 9 times

    The act treats a criminal sexual psychopath as suffering from a type of mental illness. Under the lunacy statute it has been held an insane person may be detained for a limited time, where such restraint is necessary for his protection or the protection of others. ( Crawford v. Brown, 321 Ill. 305; Maxwell v. Maxwell, 189 Iowa, 7, 177 N.W. 541; Look v. Dean, 108 Mass. 116.) If a person is a criminal sexual psychopath he is undoubtedly dangerous to others. The law provides he shall be examined by physicians while he is still in confinement in the penitentiary, and it is after his term of imprisonment has expired that he is delivered to the Department of Public Welfare. He has no ground to complain of the examination during the time he is in prison, and after the term of his imprisonment ends he is entitled to demand a hearing before a jury on the question of whether he is actually a criminal sexual psychopath, as found by the commission.

  4. Warner v. State of New York

    297 N.Y. 395 (N.Y. 1948)   Cited 57 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Recognizing common-law authority to detain a mentally ill individual based on immediate necessity under New York law, but finding that such authority may be exercised only "in emergencies beyond" the type of emergency covered by the statutory provisions authorizing emergency commitment

    ) And upon one who did the restraining rested the burden of showing, in order to justify it, the urgency and necessity for the immediate restraint. (See Scott v. Wakem, supra; Emmerich v. Thorley, 35 App. Div. 452, 456; Crawford v. Brown, 321 Ill. 305, 316-318; Maxwell v. Maxwell, 189 Iowa 7, 13; Boesch v. Kick, 97 N.J.L. 92, 96-97.) Emmerich v. Thorley ( supra) — relied upon by Judge DESMOND in his dissenting opinion — is a striking illustration of the sort of case wherein summary restraint is justifiable.

  5. Ex Parte Romero

    181 P.2d 811 (N.M. 1947)   Cited 4 times

    The order for his discharge, however, will not be effective until two days after its issuance in order that those responsible for his care and safety may institute proper legal proceedings if they are thought necessary, for we approve the rule that an insane person may be temporarily restrained without legal process, if his being at large would be dangerous to himself or others, preliminary to the institution of judicial proceedings for the determination of his mental condition. Ex parte Allen, supra; Maxwell v. Maxwell, 189 Iowa 7, 177 N.W. 541, 10 A.L.R. 482; Crawford v. Brown, 321 Ill. 305, 151 N.E. 911, 45 A.L.R. 1457. Subject to the opportunity to file proper legal proceedings as above provided, we direct that the petitioner be released, and it is so ordered.

  6. In re Cash

    383 Ill. 409 (Ill. 1943)   Cited 12 times

    While she testified that she was unable to communicate with her attorney, there is no proof of anyone interfering with her liberty in contacting friends or her attorney. If she had felt aggrieved at being detained, she was entitled to a hearing for her release by a habeas corpus proceeding. The proof fails to show any state of facts comparable to the circumstances in the case of Crawford v. Brown, 321 Ill. 305, where the woman who was placed in an asylum was not proved to be insane or dangerous to herself or others. In that case the doctor and nurse forcibly administered morphine so that the woman could be taken to the institution against her will. It is apparent, in the instant case, that efforts were being made for the welfare of appellant and that the proof fails to establish the charges of fraud or duress in bringing appellant into Kane county.

  7. Renker v. Brooklyn

    40 N.E.2d 925 (Ohio 1942)   Cited 8 times

    Personal liberty which includes the right of a citizen to choose his place of abode is one of the natural rights which has been protected by its inclusion as a guarantee in all the constitutions of this country. Crawford v. Brown, 321 Ill. 305, 151 N.E. 911, 45 A. L. R., 1457; Brett v. Building Commr. of Brookline, 250 Mass. 73, 145 N.E. 269; Bamel v. Building Commr. of Brookline, 250 Mass. 82, 145 N.E. 272. The right of personal liberty includes the power of locomotion, of changing situation, or removing one's person to whatever place one's inclination may direct without any restraint except by due process of law. 16 Corpus Juris Secundum, 585, Section 202; Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 27 L.Ed., 835; Pinkerton v. Verberg, 78 Mich. 573, 44 N.W. 579, 7 L.R.A., 507; State v. Austin, 114 N.C. 855, 19 S.E. 919, 25 L.R.A., 283; City of Watertown v. Christnacht, 39 S.D. 290, 164 N.W. 62, L.R.A. 1917F, 903; Ex parte Hudgins, 86 W. Va. 526, 103 S.E. 327, 9 A. L. R., 1361.

  8. Sayih v. Perlmutter

    561 So. 2d 309 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)   Cited 10 times

    See Snook v. Firestone Fire Rubber Co., 485 So.2d 496 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); Edelstein v. Roskin, 356 So.2d 38 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). It is generally reversible error to deliver to the jury room any materials which have not been admitted into evidence where the materials are of such character as to influence the jury. See Walker v. Sparkling Pools, Inc., 171 So.2d 205 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965) (jury should not have been permitted to take into jury room, in negligence case, a mechanical jack which had never been introduced into evidence); Crawford v. Brown, 321 Ill. 305, 151 N.E. 911 (1926) (error to allow jury to take with them to the jury room the letters of plaintiff's children commenting on his mental condition); Dartnell v. Bidwell, 115 Me. 227, 98 A. 743 (1916) (permitting photographs which have been excluded from evidence to go into jury room is reversible error if they were of such a character as to influence the jury). Unquestionably, the extraneous contents of the two records given the Sayih jury by mistake were of such character as to improperly influence.

  9. Furrh v. Arizona Bd. of Regents

    139 Ariz. 83 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984)   Cited 2 times

    177 N.W. at 542.And see Crawford v. Brown, 321 Ill. 305, 151 N.E. 911, 45 A.L.R. 1457 (1926). And Appeal of Sleeper, 147 Me. 302, 87 A.2d 115 (1952); Stizza v. Essex County Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, 132 N.J.L. 406, 40 A.2d 567 (1945); Re Allen, 82 Vt. 365, 73 A. 1078, 26 L.R.A., N.S., 232 (1909).

  10. Gertz v. Bass

    208 N.E.2d 113 (Ill. App. Ct. 1965)   Cited 19 times
    In Gertz, the court decided it was prejudicial error for the jury to obtain a dictionary which was not in evidence and which defined terms differently than did the jury instructions.

    [1, 2] It is well settled, and the defendants do not deny, that it is error to permit the jury to take with them into the jury room, during deliberations, matter which was not admitted into evidence. Crawford v. Brown, 321 Ill. 305, 151 N.E. 911; Trohey v. Chicago City Railway Co., 168 Ill. App. 1. However, it is also clear that not all errors committed at trial constitute grounds for reversal. Only those errors which are prejudicial to the rights of the complaining party are reversible.