Opinion
Civil Action H-24-4748
12-11-2024
Kamara Jenae Tierney Crawford, Plaintiff, v. BMW Financial Services NA, LLC, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Peter Bray, United States Magistrate Judge
Pending before the court is Plaintiffs Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. ECF No. 5. Plaintiff Kamara Jenae Tierney Crawford filed this lawsuit against BMW Financial Services NA, LLC (BMW) on November 8, 2024, in Harris County State Court. ECF No. 1 at 9. According to the Original Petition, Crawford entered into a vehicle financing agreement with BMW on April 27, 2024. Id. at 10. Crawford alleges numerous irregularities during and after the transaction, including:
• The finance manager prevented Crawford from reviewing the contract;
• The sales manager offered Crawford money to purchase insurance and instructed her to cancel it later;
• Crawford tried to cancel the financing arrangement within a legally allowed three-day period, but BMW failed to do so;
• BMW failed to return Crawford's trade-in;
• BMW sent a tow truck to repossess Crawford's vehicle;
• BMW did not respond to Crawford's correspondence;
• BMW placed various listening devices throughout the vehicle;
• BMW's sales staff displayed aggressive and discriminatory behavior toward Crawford.ECF No. 1 at 10.
Crawford seeks many forms of relief under various state and federal statutes. Among other things, she claims that BMW breached its contract with her; violated various parts of the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code; disturbed the peace; violated the Texas Debt Collection Practices Act; violated the Federal Truth in Lending Act; and violated the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. ECF No. 1 at 11. She seeks monetary damages, punitive damages, and attorney's fees. Id. at 12. Relevant here, she also seeks a temporary restraining order. ECF No. 1 at 12; ECF No. 5. She seeks to prevent BMW from repossessing her vehicle, and an order that BMW stop all unlawful actions, including the unauthorized disclosure of her personal information.
A party seeking a temporary restraining order must demonstrate: “(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat that the movant will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is denied; (3) that the threatened injury outweighs any damage that the injunction might cause the defendant; and (4) that the injunction will not disserve the public interest.” Greenway v. Wilkie, No. H-18-CV-3776, 2018 WL 5921224, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 13, 2018) (quoting Jackson Women's Health Org. v. Currier, 760 F.3d 448, 452 (5th Cir. 2014)). Such an order is an “extraordinary remedy which should not be granted unless the party seeking it has clearly carried the burden of persuasion on all four requirements.” Id. (alterations in the original) (quoting PCI Transp., Inc. v. Fort Worth & W. R.R. Co., 418 F.3d 535, 545 (5th Cir. 2005)).
Plaintiff has failed to show potential irreparable injury. She has not shown that an award of money damages, should she prevail, would not adequately redress the harm she alleges. See Janvey v. Alguire, 647 F.3d 585, 600 (5th Cir. 2011) (“In general, a harm is irreparable where there is no adequate remedy at law, such as monetary damages.”) In her motion for temporary restraining order filed in federal court, Crawford states “Plaintiff will suffer immediate and irreparable harm if [BMW] is not restrained from repossessing the vehicle and continuing their unlawful practices,” but does not explain why. In her state court filings, Crawford states with respect to irreparable harm that “Loss of her vehicle, essential for her livelihood and family responsibilities, would inflict severe financial hardship, jeopardizing her ability to meet essential financial obligations. The negative impact on her credit score, resulting from the repossession, would have far-reaching and detrimental consequences, hindering her future financial endeavors.” ECF No. 1 at 16. Plaintiff does not state what she does for a living, or what family responsibilities would be made impossible were her vehicle to be repossessed. With respect to her desire to have BMW stop disclosing hex1 personal information, the court does not see any evidence that such a risk even exists. Crawford has failed to show that an award of damages, were she to prevail on the merits, would not make her whole. Crawford has thus failed to show that she is entitled to the extraordinary remedy of a TRO. See Greenway, 2018 WL 5921224, at *3 (stating that the movant must prevail on all four TRO requirements).
The court also notes that the events giving rise to Crawford's complaints all took place during April and May of 2024. ECF No. 1 at 14-17. Crawford did not file her state court case until November 8, 2024. ECF No. 1 at 9. A plaintiffs long delay after learning of the threatened harm may be taken as an indication that the harm is not serious enough to justify a temporary restraining order, which, again, is an extraordinary remedy. See Crossover Market LLC v. Newell, No. A-21-CV-640-JRN, 2022 WL 1797359, at *1 (W.D. Tex. January 12, 2022) (so holding in the context of a preliminary injunction).
Fox' these reasons, the court recommends that Crawford's Emergency Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order, ECF No. 5, be DENIED.
The parties have fourteen days from service of this Memorandum and Recommendation to file written objections. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72. Failure to timely file objections will preclude appellate review of factual findings or legal conclusions, except for plain error. See Thomas v. Am, 474 U.S. 140, 147-49 (1985); Rodriguez v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 275, 276-77 (5th Cir. 1988).