In this case, even though the statement which appellant complains of was made in the context of the agent's description of the interview process which yielded the four page written statement, which the trial court had already found voluntary, when confronted with the motion for mistrial, the trial court made further inquiry by way of a second Jackson v. Denno hearing regarding the specific statement. Upon hearing the circumstances surrounding the statement, the trial court then made specific, appropriate findings regarding the admissibility of the statement, going a step farther than was required in Craver v. State, 246 Ga. 467(1) ( 271 S.E.2d 862) (1980), where this Court held that "[a] requirement for a hearing on the issue of voluntariness applies only if the evidence presents a fair question as to its voluntariness." No such "fair question" regarding voluntariness was raised with regard to the statement under discussion here.

There was no error in admitting appellant's statement into evidence over the objection that the officer's testimony was insufficient to lay the foundation therefor. Craver v. State, 246 Ga. 467 (1) ( 271 S.E.2d 862) (1980). Judgments affirmed.

However, the trial court properly ruled that this questioning was not reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response so as to constitute police interrogation as contemplated by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 ( 86 S.C. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694) (1966). See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 302 ( 100 S.C. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297) (1980); Perry v. State, 255 Ga. 490, 492 (2) ( 339 S.E.2d 922) (1986); Craver v. State, 246 Ga. 467 (1) ( 271 S.E.2d 862) (1980); Shy v. State, 234 Ga. 816 (1) ( 218 S.E.2d 599) (1975); Loftin v. State, 180 Ga. App. 613 (5) ( 349 S.E.2d 777) (1986), cert. den.; Lester v. State, 174 Ga. App. 886 (2) ( 331 S.E.2d 31) (1985); White v. State, 168 Ga. App. 794, 796 ( 310 S.E.2d 540) (1983); Chester v. State, 157 Ga. App. 191 ( 276 S.E.2d 684) (1981); Jenkins v. State, 123 Ga. App. 822 ( 182 S.E.2d 542) (1971). Moreover, the appellant thoroughly questioned the witness outside the jury's presence as to all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the statement.

Moreover, appellant's allegedly inculpatory statement, that he had not meant to shoot his wife, takes on a less condemning air when it is understood that he never denied the shooting, but defended himself instead on the grounds that he had no memory of the incident and was insane at the time of the crime's commission. Cf. Craver v. State, 246 Ga. 467 ( 271 S.E.2d 862) (1980). 3. Appellant requested the trial court to charge on the presumption of good character.

Cf. Parker v. State, 255 Ga. 167, 168 (1) ( 336 SE2d 242) (1985) (remanding the case for further proceedings after the trial court denied the motion to suppress appellant's confession without first determining whether the statement was made voluntarily). Compare Bryant v. State, 268 Ga. 664, 666-667 (6) ( 492 SE2d 868) (1997) (finding no error in the trial court's failure to include necessary findings of fact "where there [was] no evidence which would authorize the grant" of appellant's motion to suppress her custodial statement); Craver v. State, 246 Ga. 467, 467-468 (1) ( 271 SE2d 862) (1980); Nelson v. State, 208 Ga. App. 686, 686-687 (1) ( 431 SE2d 464) (1993). At the hearing, "[t]he threshold inquiry [shall be] whether the identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive."

Carswell is correct that, "where the voluntariness of a confession is questioned it is necessary under the decision of Jackson v. Denno, supra, to have a separate hearing as to the voluntariness before it is finally presented to the jury for consideration." Craver v. State, 246 Ga. 467, 468 ( 271 S.E.2d 862) (1980). Here, however, Carswell denied making the statement, did not request a Jackson v. Denno hearing, and did not object to the introduction of that portion of the statement which related to the crimes charged. Under these circumstances, "[d]ue process does not require a voluntariness hearing absent some contemporaneous challenge to the use of the confession.

A Jackson-Denno hearing provides a mechanism for a defendant to challenge the voluntariness of a confession. See Craver v. State, 246 Ga. 467, 468 (1) ( 271 S.E.2d 862) (1980). However, "a requirement for a hearing on the issue of voluntariness applies only if the evidence presents a fair question as to its voluntariness.

Hart v. State, 193 Ga. App. 834, 835-836 ( 389 S.E.2d 400) (1989). See also Craver v. State, 246 Ga. 467 (1) ( 271 S.E.2d 862) (1980), in which the Supreme Court even found no error in the failure to conduct a Jackson v. Denno hearing where the defendant presented no evidence or offer of proof that his statement was not voluntary. In the instant case, the testimony of the interrogating officer during the Jackson v. Denno hearing showed Nelson's statement to be voluntary, and Nelson presented no evidence whatsoever regarding the voluntariness of her statement. Under these circumstances, there was no error in the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress without explanation.

No such question is presented in this case: There is no evidence whatsoever in the record and no offer of proof that appellant's statements ... were anything but voluntary." Craver v. State, 246 Ga. 467, 468 (1) ( 271 S.E.2d 862) (1980). Since no harm has been shown, we find no error in the termination of the hearing.

Such roadside questioning does not constitute a custodial setting so as to trigger the applicability of Miranda. Lebrun v. State, 255 Ga. 406, 407 (3) ( 339 S.E.2d 227) (1986). Since no "fair question" as to the voluntariness of appellant's statements was presented, the trial court did not commit reversible error in failing to conduct a Jackson v. Denno hearing. Craver v. State, 246 Ga. 467, 468 (1) ( 271 S.E.2d 862) (1980). 6. The trial court did not err in refusing to permit appellant's expert to examine the intoximeter machine that had been used to determine appellant's blood-alcohol level.