Opinion
Civil Action No. 1:08-CV-0620 (DEP).
March 2, 2009
FOR PLAINTIFF, PETER M. MARGOLIUS, ESQ., OFFICE OF MARGOLIUS, Catskill, New York, BY: JANICE CAMMARATO, Paralegal.
FOR DEFENDANT, MARIA P. SANTANGELO, ESQ., OFFICE OF REGIONAL GENERAL COUNSEL, Social Security Administration, New York, NY, BY: MARIA P. FRAGASSI SANTANGELO, ESQ., NEIL ABRAHAM, ESQ.
ORDER
Currently pending in this action, in which plaintiff seeks judicial review of an adverse administrative determination by the Commissioner, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), are cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings. Oral argument was conducted in connection with those motions on February 11, 2009 during a telephone conference which was both digitally recorded, and at which a court reporter was also present. At the close of argument I issued a bench decision in which, after applying the requisite deferential review standard, I found that the Commissioner's determination resulted from the application of proper legal principles and is supported by substantial evidence, providing further detail regarding my reasoning and addressing the specific issues raised by the plaintiff in his appeal.
This matter, which is before me on consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), has been treated in accordance with the procedures set forth in General Order No. 18 (formerly, General Order No. 43) which was issued by the Hon. Ralph W. Smith, Jr., Chief United States Magistrate Judge, on January 28, 1998, and subsequently amended and reissued by Chief District Judge Frederick J. Scullin, Jr., on September 12, 2003. Under that General Order an action such as this is considered procedurally, once issue has been joined, as if cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings had been filed pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
After due deliberation, and based upon the court's oral bench decision, which has been transcribed, is attached to this order, and is incorporated herein by reference, it is hereby
ORDERED, as follows:
1) Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED.
2) The Commissioner's determination that plaintiff was not disabled at the relevant times, and thus is not entitled to benefits under the Social Security Act, is AFFIRMED.
3) The clerk is directed to enter judgment, based upon this determination, dismissing plaintiffs complaint in its entirety.
Transcript of Telephone Conference (Decision) held on February 11, 2009, at the James Hanley Federal Building, 100 South Clinton Street, Syracuse, New York, the HONORABLE DAVID E. PEEBLES, Presiding.
THE COURT: All right. I'll let that be the last word. Let me express my appreciation for excellent written and oral presentations.
Ms. Cammarato, I would caution, I think your employer has put you in a potentially precarious situation by having you appear. This is a court appearance, even though you're probably sitting in your office, and I would be a little concerned about unauthorized practice of law by a paralegal. But I certainly understand that you have the capability, I'm not questioning that, and you certainly have a full understanding of the facts of the case, and I appreciated your insights and I have considered them carefully.
The issue that faces me is determining whether the plaintiff was disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act at any time from the alleged onset date specified in his application for benefits through the end of his insured status, which was December 31, 2001. I've applied the requisite standard, which is significantly deferential, and my charge is to determine whether the appropriate legal principles were applied by the Administrative Law Judge and whether his result is supported by substantial evidence.
The Administrative Law Judge embarked upon the requisite five-step process to determine disability and appropriately allocated the burden of proof at the first four steps to the claimant. There is no question that in April of 1996, based upon concerns voiced by co-workers, the plaintiff was examined psychiatrically, tested psychologically, and determined to suffer from a recognized diagnosed disorder. It has been referred to by some as hypomania, personality order, NOS, not otherwise specified, including by Dr. John Wapner, and bipolar disorder, NOS, by Dr. Shin.
I note that the definition, Dorland's definition of hypomania, a term that I was not entirely familiar with, is an abnormality of mood resembling mania (persistent elevated or expansive mood, hyperactivity, inflated self-esteem) but of lesser intensity. That appears at Dorland's Medical Dictionary at page 916.
In September of 1996 plaintiff was cleared for work. At that point Dr. Nieves determined that plaintiff's bipolar disorder was in remission, and Dr. Shin concluded that plaintiff seems ready for work under close supervision. He returned to work and by all accounts was, as counsel has stated, disgruntled over his assignment, unable to complete work, he left, did not seek work elsewhere, did not seek treatment until October of 2002, but instead chose to move to Georgia and live off his savings.
I agree with defendant's counsel that although plaintiff may have been diagnosed with potentially disabling mental conditions such as bipolar disorder, it is his burden to prove that those — that the limitations associated with that disorder precluded him from performing basic work activities.
I've reviewed carefully the records from subsequent treatment at Columbia Memorial Hospital and at Albany Medical Center. It appears clear to me that the incident in October of 2002 was precipitated by stressors, which included his mother's death which occurred in March of 2001, I believe, the selling of his home in Georgia, and his job search, significantly in connection with that hospitalization. Plaintiff stated that he had been depressed over the past four weeks, which would not take us back to anywhere near the disability, the insured period.
So, given all of that, I find that the determination of the Administrative Law Judge is supported by substantial evidence and that he was not required to proceed further and that the finding of no disability should be affirmed.
So, on that basis I will grant defendant's motion for judgment on the pleading, dismiss plaintiff's complaint and affirm the Commissioner's determination.
I will be issuing a written short form order to which I will attach a transcript of my oral determination. You, obviously, then can appeal within thirty days from the entry of judgment.
Again, I express appreciation to both sides for excellent presentations and I hope you have a good day.
MS. CAMMARATO: Thank you, Judge.
MS. FRAGASSI: Thank you.