Are Smith's traffic citations for speeding, running a red light, driving with no turn signal, traveling the wrong way on a one-way street, and possession of alcohol on a public beach inseparably connected with the charges of first degree assault, reckless murder, manslaughter, criminally negligent homicide, and vehicular homicide or with the events leading to those charges? In its unpublished memorandum, the Court of Criminal Appeals cited Crauswell v. State, 638 So.2d 11, 14-15 (Ala.Cr.App. 1993), to support its holding that Smith's driving history was relevant to demonstrate a disregard for the probable consequences of his actions and for the safety of others. We disagree.

Howard argues that Judge White usurped his jurisdiction when he denied the motion to transfer the case to the juvenile court because Howard had been indicted for a misdemeanor, not a felony, and, according to § 12-15-34.1, Ala. Code 1975, he is subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. He cites Crauswell v. State, 638 So.2d 11 (Ala.Crim.App. 1993), for the proposition that this Court has held that subsection (c) of § 13A-6-4, Ala. Code 1975, is a sentence-enhancement provision and does not state a substantive offense. Section 12-15-34.

See HRE Rule 401 (2002) ("`Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." (Emphasis added.)); see also United States v. Tan, 254 F.3d 1204, 1211 (10th Cir. 2001) ("A jury could infer from Defendant's prior drunk driving convictions that he is especially aware of the problems and risks associated with drunk driving" and "that Defendant does not care about the risk he poses to himself and others since he continues to drink and drive."); United States v. Fleming, 739 F.2d 945, 949 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding that "defendant's driving record[,] which showed previous convictions for driving while intoxicated[,]" was "relevant to establish that defendant had grounds to be aware of the risk his drinking and driving while intoxicated presented to others"); Crauswell v. State, 638 So.2d 11, 14 (Ala.Crim.App. 1993) (holding that "[i]n a prosecution for vehicular homicide, evidence of the defendant's prior history regarding drugs, alcohol, and driving may be admissible in order to prove . . . the defendant's reckless indifference to the probable consequences of his acts, regardless of whether the prior arrests resulted in convictions"); State v. Woody, 845 P.2d 487, 489 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1991) (holding that, in a prosecution arising from a vehicular homicide, evidence of prior DUI convictions was relevant to "the issue of whether [defendant's] mental state reflected a reckless indifference to human life"); State v. Dushame, 616 A.2d 469, 473 (N.H. 1992) (holding that "evidence of the defendant's driving record showing his past experience of repeated arrests, convictions and punishment for [DUI] may be deemed relevant to the question of whether the defendant acted recklessly when he subsequently drove his vehicle in an intoxicated condition"). Thus, St. Clair's contention that the evidence was merely

`This is but common fairness and an application of the rule permitting the admission of evidence by reason of the admission of similar evidence of the adverse party.' White v. State, 344 So.2d 1270, 1273 (Ala.Cr.App. 1977)."Crauswell v. State, 638 So.2d 11, 14 (Ala.Crim.App. 1993). Because Moss first elicited testimony regarding the circumstances surrounding the prior search, the State was properly allowed to elicit further evidence on that same subject.

Reeves v. State, 580 So.2d 49 (Ala.Crim.App. 1990). In Crauswell v. State, 638 So.2d 11 (Ala.Crim.App. 1993), we upheld a verdict of criminally negligent homicide when a defendant who had ingested alcohol and narcotics was speeding and ran a red light, causing him to collide with another vehicle. A comparison to those and similar cases demonstrates that the facts presented in this case would not support even a criminal-negligence conviction.

Although subsection (c) of § 13A-6-4 provides that criminally negligent "is a Class C felony" where a defendant was also violating the DUI statute — as opposed to providing that criminally negligent homicide "shall be punished as a Class C felony" — this court has held that subsection (c) is a sentence enhancement provision, which does not involve a question of proof to the jury. Crauswell v. State, 638 So.2d 11, 15 (Ala.Cr.App. 1993). Similarly, I do not find the fact that subsection (f) of § 13-5A-191 states that the defendant shall be "guilty" of a Class C felony upon conviction to require the conclusion that subsection (f) is a substantive offense and not a sentence enhancement provision.