Crapp v. Elberta Crate c. Co.

5 Citing cases

  1. Fields v. Rainbow Cmty. Ctr.

    No. A23A1009 (Ga. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2023)

    Tomsic v. Marriott Intl., 321 Ga.App. 374, 385 (4) (739 S.E.2d 521) (2013). See also Lau's Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491 (405 S.E.2d 474) (1991) (analyzing claim of failure to warn within framework of premises liability cause of action); Benson-Jones v. Sysco Food Svcs. of Atlanta, 287 Ga.App. 579, 584 (3) (651 S.E.2d 839) (2007) (noting, in analysis of premises liability claim, that "[a]s a general rule, an owner or occupier of land is liable to invitees for injuries they sustain as a result of his failure to warn them of dangers which he was aware of, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known") (citation and punctuation omitted); Crapp v. Elberta Crate &Box Co., 223 Ga.App. 902, 904-905 (479 S.E.2d 101) (1996) (describing defendant's failure to warn as breach of its duty of ordinary care in premises liability action). 5. Breach of contract.

  2. Tomsic v. Marriott Int'l, Inc.

    A12A1919 (Ga. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2013)

    But the failure to warn that Tomsic alleged in her complaint was not a separate basis for liability but rather a means by which Marriott might have breached a duty of care it owed under a theory of premises liability. See Crapp v. Elberta Crate & Box Co., 223 Ga. App. 902, 904-905 (479 SE2d 101) (1996) (describing defendant's failure to warn as breach of its duty of ordinary care in premises liability action); see also Lau's Corp., 261 Ga. at 492-493 (1), (2) (analyzing claim of failure to warn within framework of premises liability cause of action); Benson-Jones v. Sysco Food Svcs. of Atlanta, 287 Ga. App. 579, 584 (3) (651 SE2d 839) (2007) (noting, in analysis of premises liability claim, that "[a]s a general rule, an owner or occupier of land is liable to invitees for injuries they sustain as a result of his failure to warn them of dangers which he was aware of, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known") (citation and punctuation omitted). Given that the failure to warn claim is subsumed within the premises liability claim, which proceeded to trial, we find no error in the trial court's pre-trial dismissal of the failure to warn claim.

  3. Wade v. Findlay Management, Inc.

    253 Ga. App. 688 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002)   Cited 9 times
    Explaining the necessity that the "prior incident be sufficient to attract the landlord's attention to the dangerous condition which resulted in the litigated incident."

    ]" (Citation omitted.) Crapp v. Elberta Crate c. Co., 223 Ga. App. 902, 905 ( 479 S.E.2d 101) (1996). In this case, in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, plaintiff introduced evidence that not only contradicted the material factual statement of the defendant, impeaching her, i.e., no prior similar assault on an adult, but also gave evidence of a prior similar criminal assault that had occurred in the restaurant of an assault by a teenager on an adult after a child had been bullied and the adult sought to stop the bullying during a week night at approximately the same time.

  4. FPI Atlanta, L.P. v. Seaton

    240 Ga. App. 880 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 22 times
    Holding that security service hired by residential housing complex had tort duty under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 stemming from both O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 and contract with property manager to protect tenants

    See Sturbridge Partners, Ltd. v. Walker, supra at 786. See also Crapp v. Elberta Crate c. Co., 223 Ga. App. 902, 905 ( 479 S.E.2d 101) (1996). Clearly, 59 burglaries, not even considering the murders, aggravated assaults, robberies, and armed robberies, indicated that there was a substantial likelihood that someone would enter an occupied apartment to commit a felony and that the felony would be violent.

  5. Tomsic v. Marriott Int'l, Inc.

    321 Ga. App. 374 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013)   Cited 11 times
    Recognizing that affidavits which fail to address the issue at hand are insufficient

    But the failure to warn that Tomsic alleged in her complaint was not a separate basis for liability but rather a means by which Marriott might have breached a duty of care it owed under a theory of premises liability. See Crapp v. Elberta Crate & Box Co., 223 Ga.App. 902, 904–905, 479 S.E.2d 101 (1996) (describing defendant's failure to warn as breach of its duty of ordinary care in premises liability action); see also Lau's Corp., 261 Ga. at 492–493(1), (2), 405 S.E.2d 474 (analyzing claim of failure to warn within framework of premises liability cause of action); Benson–Jones v. Sysco Food Svcs. of Atlanta, 287 Ga.App. 579, 584(3), 651 S.E.2d 839 (2007) (noting, in analysis of premises liability claim, that “[a]s a general rule, an owner or occupier of land is liable to invitees for injuries they sustain as a result of his failure to warn them of dangers which he was aware of, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known”) (citation and punctuation omitted). Given that the failure to warn claim is subsumed within the premises liability claim, which proceeded to trial, we find no error in the trial court's pre-trial dismissal of the failure to warn claim.