Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. 07CV00438
BUTZ , J.In what is essentially a boundary dispute arising from an attempt to subdivide property, plaintiff Thad Crannell appeals from a judgment that dismissed, without prejudice, his petition for writ of administrative mandate (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5) against defendants and respondents Glenn County and its Board of Supervisors (collectively, County). The trial court found that certain landowners in the area were indispensable and could no longer be made parties to the petition proceeding. (§ 389.) We shall affirm the judgment.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Pursuant to an administrative hearing process in late 2006, County conditionally approved Crannell’s application for a tentative parcel map to subdivide a lot he owns. One of the conditions of approval, “Condition No. 5,” requires “[t]hat [Crannell’s] vesting Tentative Parcel Map shall conform to the previously recorded parcel map at the project site, filed October 2, 1990 in Book 10 of Parcel Maps at Page 57.”
Crannell claims that the October 2, 1990 parcel map incorrectly sets one of his property lines, which is actually 19 feet farther south, as demonstrated by a recent survey that Crannell obtained for his proposed property subdivision.
Crannell petitioned for a writ of administrative mandate (§ 1094.5) to have County remove Condition No. 5 from its tentative parcel map approval.
After requesting supplemental briefing, the trial court dismissed Crannell’s petition, without prejudice. The trial court found that the property owners to the south of Crannell’s property were indispensable and could not be joined (§ 389), noting that Crannell had an existing quiet title action that could provide an adequate remedy.
DISCUSSION
In addition to disputing the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for writ of administrative mandate for failure to join indispensable parties, Crannell on appeal claims that his proposed property subdivision implicates a fundamental vested property right on which County acted arbitrarily and capriciously and therefore Condition No. 5 to the tentative parcel map approval must be removed. But there is only one indispensable issue before us on appeal, and that is the trial court’s decision to dismiss Crannell’s petition based solely on the legal principle of indispensable parties.
Where a plaintiff seeks some type of affirmative relief which, if granted, would injure or affect the interest of a third person not joined, the trial court must decide how to proceed, using section 389. (§ 389; Sierra Club, Inc. v. California Coastal Com. (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 495, 500-501.) Under section 389, if such a third person “cannot be made a party, the court shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed without prejudice, the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court include: (1) to what extent a judgment rendered in the person’s absence might be prejudicial to him or those already parties; (2) the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; (3) whether a judgment rendered in the person’s absence will be adequate; [and] (4) whether the plaintiff or cross-complainant will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.” (§ 389, subd. (b).) “[T]he decision whether to proceed [or not] with the action in the absence of a particular party is one within the [trial] court’s discretion, as governed by [these] factors.” (Sierra Club, supra,95 Cal.App.3d at p. 500.)
Here, the trial court found that it was too late to make adjacent property owners (to the south of Crannell’s property) parties to Crannell’s petition proceeding (an issue not disputed on appeal), that these nonparty property owners were indispensable, and that dismissal of the petition without prejudice under section 389 was therefore appropriate. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision.
The trial court found that complete relief on Crannell’s petition could not be granted without the nonparty property owners. This is because if the court were to grant the petition and invalidate Condition No. 5, this decision would impinge on the property lines of the nonparty property owners to the prejudice of both them and County by effectively setting aside the boundary established in the previously recorded October 2, 1990 parcel map (without any input from these nonparty property owners). The trial court could not see a way to mold the judgment to avoid this. Neither can we. In addition, noted the trial court, Crannell has filed a quiet title action to determine the correct boundary, and he therefore has an adequate remedy in that forum.
As he did in the trial court, Crannell on appeal tries to avoid the problem of indispensable parties by arguing that the nonparty property owners would not be impacted because the court need not determine which boundary is correct (i.e., the October 2, 1990 parcel map or Crannell’s recent survey), but only whether Condition No. 5 is appropriate. The problem is, as the trial court recognized, that it is impossible to determine whether Condition No. 5 is appropriate without first determining which boundary is correct.
The question of which boundary is correct is a question for a proper quiet title action.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent County shall recover costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), (2).)
We concur: BLEASE, Acting P. J., HULL, J.