Opinion
C080709
02-22-2017
STEVEN A. CRANER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. IMAGENE LAVERNE PEHRSON, Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 176463)
Plaintiff Steven A. Craner, a prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the judgment entered in favor of defendant Imagene Laverne Pehrson after a court trial.
BACKGROUND AND CLAIMS ON APPEAL
Craner filed this lawsuit against Pehrson (his mother) alleging that she converted certain property belonging to him while he was incarcerated, including a 1971 Harley Davidson motorcycle. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Pehrson after concluding that Craner had failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that Pehrson had converted any of the property at issue.
On appeal, Craner contends he is unable to properly present his appeal because the trial court failed to provide a court reporter to transcribe the court trial proceedings. He asserts that the absence of a reporter's transcript compels reversal of the judgment for retrial. He further contends the trial court erred in failing to ensure his judicial disqualification motion was decided by a judge other than the judge he sought to disqualify. Pehrson did not file a respondent's brief.
We conclude that Craner's contentions lack merit. As a consequence, we affirm the judgment.
DISCUSSION
I
Right to Have Proceedings Transcribed
Official court reporters are not required in civil cases. (In re Christina P. (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 115, 129 ["Court reporters for civil proceedings function on a demand basis"]; Code Civ. Proc., § 269, subd. (a).) When, as here, a court reporter is not available in a civil case, it is the responsibility of a party to arrange for a court reporter if one is desired. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.956(c).) We are unpersuaded by Craner's contention that he did not have a means of presenting an effective appeal without a transcript of the court trial proceedings. Even without a court reporter, Craner was not without a remedy to provide a more complete record on appeal. He had the option to file an agreed statement (rule 8.134(a)) or a settled statement (rule 8.137(a)), but failed to do so.
The Superior Court of Shasta County, Local Rules, rule 2.06 provides, in relevant part: "Official court reporters are not available in civil cases. In accordance with California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956, parties who desire a reporter in such cases must arrange for a certified shorthand reporter to serve as an official pro tempore reporter at their own expense."
Further rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
Nothing in the record supports Craner's assertion that the trial court misrepresented to him that he would be provided a transcript of the court trial proceedings for purposes of appeal. To the extent Craner's brief can be construed as arguing that the Shasta County Superior Court failed to comply with rule 2.956, this contention is not cognizable on appeal because Craner failed to raise it below. (In re Carrie W. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 746, 755 [an appellate court will ordinarily not consider procedural defects in connection with relief sought where an objection could have been but was not presented to the trial court by some appropriate method].) --------
Notwithstanding Craner's failure to provide us with a complete record, we conclude that the record we have is sufficient to address the only substantive contention on appeal; namely, that a letter written by Pehrson in 2011 definitively reveals that she stole and sold his 1971 Harley Davidson motorcycle without his permission. The tort of conversion has been described as " 'the wrongful exercise of dominion over the property of another.' " (Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Zerin (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 445, 451.) "The elements of a conversion [cause of action] are the plaintiff's ownership or right to possession of the property at the time of the conversion; the defendant's conversion by a wrongful act or disposition of property rights; and damages. It is not necessary that there be a manual taking of the property; it is only necessary to show an assumption of control or ownership over the property, or that the alleged converter has applied the property to his [or her] own use." (Oakdale Village Group v. Fong (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 539, 543-544.)
Our review of the record reveals that the letter identified by Craner was filed as an exhibit to his trial brief. Nothing in the letter demonstrates that Pehrson stole or sold Craner's motorcycle. The letter merely indicates that an individual was interested in buying "the bike" but did not have enough money to do so. The letter further indicates that the bike would not be given to the individual until he came up with "the rest of the money." Accordingly, the letter does not show that the trial court erred in entering judgment in favor of Pehrson. Indeed, there is no evidence in the record supporting the conclusion that Pehrson converted any of Craner's property.
II
Judicial Disqualification Motion
Craner's challenge to the trial court's ruling on his judicial disqualification motion is not cognizable on appeal. Code of Civil Procedure section 170.3, subdivision (d) provides, in relevant part: "The determination of the question of the disqualification of a judge is not an appealable order and may be reviewed only by a writ of mandate from the appropriate court of appeal sought only by the parties to the proceeding. The petition for the writ shall be filed and served within 10 days after service of written notice of entry of the court's order determining the question of disqualification." Our Supreme Court has repeatedly held that "Code of Civil Procedure section 170.3, subdivision (d) provides the exclusive means for seeking review of a ruling on a challenge to a judge, whether the challenge is for cause or peremptory." (See, e.g., People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 444; People v. Hull (1991) 1 Cal.4th 266, 275-276.)
Defendant's failure to seek writ review of the ruling on his judicial disqualification motion forfeits his claim on appeal. (People v. Freeman (2010) 47 Cal.4th 993, 1000 [" 'a petition for writ of mandate is the exclusive method for obtaining review of a denial of a judicial qualification motion' "].) Further, we note that, contrary to Craner's contention, the judicial disqualification motion was decided by a different judge than the judge Craner sought to disqualify. Accordingly, the trial court did not violate the relevant statute. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 170.3, subd. (c)(5) ["A judge who refuses to recuse himself or herself shall not pass upon his or her own disqualification or upon the sufficiency in law, fact, or otherwise, of the statement of disqualification filed by a party"].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Pehrson shall recover her costs of this appeal, if any. (See rule 8.278(a)(1), (2).)
/s/_________
Duarte, J. We concur: /s/_________
Nicholson, Acting P. J. /s/_________
Mauro, J.