Opinion
Civil Action No. 04-1182, Section "K"(1).
July 8, 2004
Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted (Rec. Doc. 3) filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) by defendant New Orleans Real Estate Investors Association, Inc. ("Association"). The Court has reviewed the pleadings, memoranda, and relevant law in detail. Upon studying plaintiff Crane's Petition for Damages, the Court has ascertained, sua sponte, that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking and remand is appropriate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Thus, for reasons stated below, the Court REMANDS this case to state court and DENIES defendant's motion as moot.
1. BACKGROUND
Defendant Association is a non-profit corporation organized to educate, motivate, and otherwise support its members and their real estate investments. Plaintiff Allen Crane served as a volunteer member of the Association Board of Directors. However, in February of 2004, Amendments to the Association Bylaws took effect that enabled the Board of Directors, rather than the general membership to select members of the Board. Thereafter, at the March 7, 2004 Board meeting, the members of the Board of Directors were selected and plaintiff was not reappointed.
On March 19, 2004, plaintiff filed the instant suit in the 24th Judicial Court for the Parish of Jefferson, State of Louisiana. Defendants removed this action on April 26, 2004 on the grounds that plaintiff's Petition alleges claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. ("ADA"). See Rec. Doc. 1. Defendants' Notice of Removal alleged that this Court has original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 because although plaintiff's Petition for Damages did not specifically reference the ADA, "Plaintiff's Petition alleges that Defendants unlawfully discriminated against him based on his disability." Id. at ¶ III.
Thereafter, on June 9, 2004, defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted (Rec. Doc. 3) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Upon considering that motion, the Court reviewed plaintiff's Petition for Damages in detail and discerned, sua sponte, that this case has been improperly removed to this Court despite the absence of original subject matter jurisdiction.
II. LAW ANALYSIS
In cases removed from state court, the removing party has the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction over the controversy. Vasquez v. Alto Bonito Gravel Plant Corp., 56 F.3d 689, 692 (5th Cir. 1995); Dodson v. Spiliada Maritime Corp., 951 F.2d 40, 42 (5th Cir. 1992); Kidd v. Southwest Airlines Co., 891 F.2d 540, 543 (5th Cir. 1990); see also Wright, Miller Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 3739, at 470 (noting that it "is well-settled . . . [that] the removing party bears the burden of proof as to all elements of the removal's propriety"). Furthermore, federal courts have been directed to construe the removal statute against removal and in favor of remand to state court. Shamrock Oil Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100 (1941); City of New Orleans v. Illinois Central Railroad Company, 804 F. Supp. 873 (E.D.La. 1992). This rule of strict construction is "consistent with the notion that the federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction." Wright Miller, § 3721 at 348-51. Finally, all disputed questions of fact and all ambiguities in the controlling state law must be resolved in favor of the plaintiff. Burden v. General Dynamics Corp., 60 F.3d 213, 216 (5th Cir. 1995); B Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 663 F.2d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 1981).
"Generally, the remand of a case that has been removed to federal court is governed by statutory provisions found at 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) and 1447(c)." Buchner v. F.D.I.C., 981 F.2d 816, 819 (5th Cir. 1993). Section 1441(c) provides:
Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action within the jurisdiction conferred by section 1331 of this title [federal question jurisdiction], is joined with one or more otherwise non-removable claims or causes of action, the entire case may be removed and the district court may determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion, may remand all matters in which state law predominates. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c). Section 1447(c) provides in pertinent part:
A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect in removal procedure must be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal under section 1446(a). If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). These two sections provide that district courts with the general authority to remand a case over which it has no subject matter jurisdiction. See Buchner, 981 F.2d at 819. Furthermore, a federal district court may assert lack of subject matter jurisdiction, sua sponte, at any time. See Russell v. Choicepoint Servs. Inc., 302 F. Supp.2d 654 (E.D.La. 2004); Patterson v. Hamrick, 885 F. Supp. 145 (E.D.La. 1995); Wright Miller, § 1350.
In order to determine whether a case was properly removed to federal court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction, the court must examine plaintiff's complaint under the well-pleaded complaint rule. Rivet v. Regions Bank of Louisiana, 522 U.S. 470 (1998). Under that doctrine, "federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint." Id. (quoting Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)). Yet, the plaintiff may choose to forgo the federal claims in order to prevent removal. "The [well-pleaded complaint] rule makes the plaintiff master of the claim; he or she may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law." Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392. "When a plaintiff has a choice between federal and state law claims, she may proceed in state court on the exclusive basis of state law, thus defeating the defendant's opportunity to remove." Medina v. Ramsey Steel Co., 238 F.3d 674, 680 (5th Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted).
A corollary to the well-pleaded complaint doctrine "is that Congress may so completely preempt a particular area that any civil complaint raising this select group of claims is necessarily federal in character." Heimann v. National Elevator Indus. Pension Fund, 187 F.3d 493, 499 (5th Cir. 1999). (quoting Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 95 L.Ed.2d 55 (1987)); see Johnson v. Baylor University, 214 F.3d 630 (5th Cir. 2000). "Complete preemption," which creates federal removal jurisdiction, differs from more common "ordinary preemption" (also known as "conflict preemption"), which does not. Johnson v. Baylor University, 214 F.3d at 632. "Complete preemption is a narrow exception." Id. at 633.
28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) clearly allows a district court to remand a removed case if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the case. See Buchner, 981 F.2d at 819. In the instant matter, the Court has examined plaintiff's state court Petition for Damages, sua sponte, and determined that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Furthermore, the ADA is clearly not covered by the complete preemption doctrine. See Flowerette v. Heartland Healthcare Center, 903 F. Supp. 1042 (N.D.Tex. 1995) ("[T]he ADA is cumulative of state laws and plaintiff was entitled to avoid federal court by the claims she chose to litigate."). Thus, this case should be remanded back to state court.
Defendants aver that plaintiff's Petition for Damages alleges unlawful disability discrimination under the ADA in ¶¶ 31-35 Petition for Damages. See Rec. Doc. 1 at 2. The gravamen of defendants' argument is the charge that plaintiff has alleged facts which implicated the ADA and, consequently, invoke federal question jurisdiction. This argument is without merit.
The conclusory mention that a private actor's conduct violates civil and constitutional rights does not satisfy the well-pleaded complaint rule. Such a statement documents an effect or injury; it does not state a cause of action. "The court is not bound by the stray labels placed on plaintiff's claims." Smith v. Bank One Corp., 2004 WL 1274480 (E.D. La. 2004) (quoting Matthews v. Stewart, 207 F. Supp.2d 496, 498 (M.D.La. 2001)). An incidental reference to a federal law violation does not "convert a state law complaint into a federal cause of action if the federal statute is not a necessary element of the state law claim and no preemption exists." Id. (quoting Easton v. Crossland Mortgage Corp., 114 F.3d 979, 982 (9th Cir. 1997)).
The well-pleaded complaint rule requires the Court to determine federal jurisdiction from the plaintiff's allegations in his state court petition. Plaintiff's Petition cites no federal statute, nor does she allege any facts to support an ADA claim that would not also support a claim under the Louisiana Civil Rights Act for Handicapped Persons, La.Rev.Stat. 30:2251 et seq ("LCRAHP"). The Court finds any reference to federal law to be perfunctory and inadvertent.
Although the Court recognizes that plaintiff Crane makes reference to his disability in the aforementioned portion of his Petition for Damages and prays for judgment declaring that defendants violated state and federal law, the Court nevertheless finds that plaintiff's Petition stopped short of invoking the ADA on its face. Although the facts alleged in plaintiff's Petition for Damages could possibly give rise to federal ADA claims, plaintiff Crane, as "master of the claim," has chosen to proceed in state court on the exclusive basis of state law, thereby depriving defendants of an opportunity to remove this suit. Medina, 238 F.3d at 680.
Furthermore, despite its reference to "Louisiana law and Federal law," the prayer portion of plaintiff's Petition does not seek relief exclusively provided for by the ADA. Each element of damages prayed for by plaintiff — compensatory damages, costs, attorneys' fees — is available under the LCRAHP as well as the ADA. In fact, plaintiff conspicuously avoided praying for punitive damages, which are recoverable under the ADA but not the LCRAHP. Thus, for reasons stated above,
The absence here of a prayer for damages available only under federal law distinguishes the instant matter from cases in which federal questions included in the state court complaint or petition merit removal to federal court. See, e.g. Perkins v. Alamo Heights Independent School District, 204 F. Supp.2d 991 (W.D. Tex. 2002).
IT IS ORDERED that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) this action is hereby REMANDED to 24th Judicial Court for the Parish of Jefferson, State of Louisiana.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted (Rec. Doc. 3) is hereby DENIED AS MOOT.