1925 Okla. Sess. Laws, ch. 124, p. 176, § 1. The case of Crane v. Howard, 206 Okla. 447, 244 P.2d 559 (1952) is on point. In Crane the widow appealed the decree of distribution.

. . . make provision for a widow out of the deceased husband's estate until such time as the widow has . . . received the possession and use of her share of the estate so that she may apply the same to her needs.Crane v. Howard, 206 Okla. 447, 244 P.2d 559 (1952). Appellant had already received the possession and use of her share of the estate at the time the trial court ordered her widow's allowance discontinued.

Under Oklahoma law, this action is basically one to construe the decree of the County Court of Grant County in the probate proceedings rather than to construe the will of the decedent. Riddle v. Jay, 356 P.2d 1074 (Okla.); Crane v. Howard, 206 Okla. 447, 244 P.2d 559. However, this presents no particular problem as there is no fundamental inconsistency between the will and the decree.

The case law interpreting this provision of the Oklahoma Statutes has set forth that this section is intended to "make a provision for the widow out of the deceased husband's estate until such time as the widow has in due course of law, received possession and use of her share of the estate so she may apply the same to her needs." Barry v. Phillips, 329 P.2d 1046 (Okla. 1958); Crane v. Howard, 206 Okla. 447, 244 P.2d 559 (1952). B. The first question this Court must address is whether the Widow's Allowance established pursuant to the Oklahoma Statutes is in fact property of this bankruptcy estate.

The case law interpreting this provision of the Oklahoma Statutes has interpreted this section to "make a provision for the widow out of the deceased husband's estate until such time as the widow has in due course of law, received possession and use of her share of the estate so she may apply the same to her needs." (emphasis added) Barry v. Phillips, 329 P.2d 1046 (Okla. 1958); Crane v. Howard, 206 Okla. 447, 244 P.2d 559 (1952). Thus, a clear reading of this section demonstrates that the Widow's Allowance is in fact an advance upon her inheritance in the decedent's estate until such time as the probate proceeding may be finalized and the widow receive distribution pursuant to the Last Will and Testament of her spouse.

"An order for a widow's allowance is a final order that stands until it expires by its own terms, or if not limited, until vacated upon proper proceedings, unless it is apparent from the administration proceedings that the estate is insolvent at the time the order is made, in which case it is limited to one year by 58 O.S. 1941 § 314[ 58-314]." Also see Barry v. Phillips, Admx. (Okla.), 329 P.2d 1046; Martin v. Blasingame (Okla.), 289 P.2d 381; Crane v. Howard et al., 206 Okla. 447, 244 P.2d 559. The rule above announced disposes of the argument advanced relative to termination of the trial court's order. The order granting the widow's allowance is affirmed in all respects.

See Title 58 O.S. 1951 § 314[ 58-314]. We think plaintiff in error's contention is foreclosed by our decision in Martin v. Blasingame, Okla., 289 P.2d 381, and Crane v. Howard, 206 Okla. 447, 244 P.2d 559. The principle announced in the foregoing cases is that legislative intent, as expressed in Title 58 O.S. 1951 § 314[ 58-314], providing for a widow's allowance, was to make provision for the widow out of the deceased husband's estate until such time as the widow has in due course of law, received the possession and use of her share of the estate so she may apply the same to her needs. We are not advised by the briefs or petition in error (this being an appeal upon the original record), whether the order of allowance specified that the said payments continue until said estate is closed, or until the further order of the court.

In Salter v. Continental Casualty Co., 194 Okla. 26, 146 P.2d 824, we held that an order for widow's allowance is a final order that stands until it expires by its own terms, or if not limited, until vacated upon proper proceedings. While we held in Crane v. Howard, 206 Okla. 447, 244 P.2d 559, 561, that an order for a widow's allowance made to run "`until said estate is closed'" does not ipso facto terminate with the entry of a decree of distribution of the estate, the facts in that case and the wording of that order clearly distinguish the case from the instant one. In that case the widow had not received into her possession and for her use the share of the estate to which she was entitled.

We have consistently adhered to the rule that where a probate court having jurisdiction of settlement of an estate enters a decree of distribution, such decree is conclusive as to the rights of the parties interested, unless same is reversed or modified on appeal, and such decree is not subject to collateral attack. Wisel v. Terhune, 201 Okla. 231, 204 P.2d 286; Crane v. Howard, 206 Okla. 447, 244 P.2d 559. Upon consideration of the entire record we necessarily conclude that the judgment of the trial court is not clearly against the weight of the evidence, and the judgment therefore is affirmed.

00, no part of which has been paid, and she is hereby authorized to pay said balance out of any available funds on hand. In Crane v. Howard, 206 Okla. 447, 244 P.2d 559 (1952), the opinion reads: As above noted, the order for widow's allowance to Birdie Crane was for a sum certain per month "until said estate is closed."