The plaintiff next argues that the defendants cannot prove that they obstructed the plaintiff's easement under "a claim of right" because the defendants knew that they were encroaching. Even assuming the factual predicate on which the claim is based, the court disagrees with the plaintiff's conclusion. What the Supreme Court stated in Crandall v. Gould, 244 Conn. 583, 590-91, 711 A.2d 682 (1998), is applicable here by analogy: "Use made under a claim of right means use that is made without recognition of the rights of the owner of the servient tenement . . . To establish an easement by prescription it is absolutely essential that the use be adverse. It must be such as to give a right of action in favor of the party against whom it has been exercised . . . The use must occur without license or permission and must be unaccompanied by any recognition of [the right of the owner of the servient estate] to stop such use . . . "The claim of right requirement serves to ensure that permissive uses will not ripen into easements by prescription by requiring that the disputed use be adverse to the rights of the owner of the servient tenement.
Contrary to the defendant's argument, the plaintiff and its predecessors in interest did not have to be aware that they were using the North Main property and did not have to make “an overt claim to any ownership.” See Crandall v. Gould, 244 Conn. 583, 591 and n. 6, 711 A.2d 682 (1998). The trial court's finding that the plaintiff and its predecessors in interest used the driveway “as if they had the ‘right’ to use it” is adequately supported by the evidence.
Segueing into this case, here the defendants clearly do have a right to seek to prevent the plaintiff’s usage and have done so- that is the essence of their defense. The issue as presented by the defendants is whether the plaintiff’s use is "unaccompanied by any recognition of [the right of the owner of the servient tenement] to stop such use," (citing Crandall v. Gould, 244 Conn. 583, 590-91, 711 A.2d 682, 686 (1998). The defendants cite additional appellate authority for variations and expansion of this legal principle.
Ruick v. Twankins, Supra, p. 149 The principles were recently reaffirmed by our appeals court in Crandall v. Gould, 244 Conn. 583 (1998). Hence a "claim of right" does not require that the possessor have a good faith belief of having title or a legal right to occupy in the sense of title or tenancy. That proposition, though seemingly harsh, is understandable in the context of the common law priority that land be placed to some use and be not subject to a "dead hand", through non use and tax insulation.
The land trust defendants argue that the trial court improperly failed to recognize that the agreement constituted notice, under § 47-38, of the land trust's intention to prevent the airport defendants from acquiring a prescriptive easement. In support of this argument, they rely primarily on this court's decision in Crandall v. Gould, 244 Conn. 583, 711 A.2d 682 (1998). In that case, "[t]he plaintiffs . . . [owned] property located at 283 River Road in the town of Stonington. The defendants . . . [owned] property, including a [private way], that [abutted] the property owned by the plaintiffs.
In applying that section, this court repeatedly has explained that `[a] party claiming to have acquired an easement by prescription must demonstrate that the use [of the property] has been open, visible, continuous and uninterrupted for fifteen years and made under a claim of right.' Westchester v. Greenwich, 227 Conn. 495, 501, 629 A.2d 1084 (1993)." Crandall v. Gould, 244 Conn. 583, 590-91, 711 A.2d 682 (1998). The purpose of the open and visible requirement is to give "the owner of the servient land knowledge and full opportunity to assert his own rights."
The determination of the requirements of the HIA is a matter of statutory construction and, therefore, a matter of law over which this court's review is plenary. Crandall v. Gould, 244 Conn. 583, 590, 711 A.2d 682 (1998). "[T]he process of statutory interpretation involves a reasoned search for the intention of the legislature."
Statutory interpretation constitutes a matter of law; Jenkins v. Jenkins, 243 Conn. 584, 588, 704 A.2d 231 (1998); over which this court's review is plenary. Crandall v. Gould, 244 Conn. 583, 590, 711 A.2d 682 (1998). "[T]he process of statutory interpretation involves a reasoned search for the intention of the legislature.
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Crandall v. Gould , 244 Conn. 583, 590–91, 711 A.2d 682 (1998). "The requirement that the [use] must be exercised under a claim of right does not necessitate proof of a claim actually made and brought to the attention of the owner ....
The defendants maintain that the trial court improperly concluded that (1) the contract between the parties complied with § 20-429 and (2) the defendants' statutory claim under § 20-429 was, in effect, an election of remedies that precluded their pursuit of their statutory counterclaim under CUTPA, § 42-110g, made applicable to violations of the Home Improvement Act by § 20-427 (c). Both of the issues raised by the defendants concern issues of statutory interpretation and our review of their merits, therefore, is plenary. Crandall v. Gould, 244 Conn. 583, 590, 711 A.2d 682 (1998). Because we agree with the defendants' interpretation of the applicable statutes, we reverse the judgment of the court.