Crandall v. Gould

42 Citing cases

  1. Boccanfuso v. Conner

    2003 Ct. Sup. 8176 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2003)

    The plaintiff next argues that the defendants cannot prove that they obstructed the plaintiff's easement under "a claim of right" because the defendants knew that they were encroaching. Even assuming the factual predicate on which the claim is based, the court disagrees with the plaintiff's conclusion. What the Supreme Court stated in Crandall v. Gould, 244 Conn. 583, 590-91, 711 A.2d 682 (1998), is applicable here by analogy: "Use made under a claim of right means use that is made without recognition of the rights of the owner of the servient tenement . . . To establish an easement by prescription it is absolutely essential that the use be adverse. It must be such as to give a right of action in favor of the party against whom it has been exercised . . . The use must occur without license or permission and must be unaccompanied by any recognition of [the right of the owner of the servient estate] to stop such use . . . "The claim of right requirement serves to ensure that permissive uses will not ripen into easements by prescription by requiring that the disputed use be adverse to the rights of the owner of the servient tenement.

  2. Chase & Chase, LLC v. Waterbury Realty, LLC

    138 Conn. App. 289 (Conn. App. Ct. 2012)   Cited 10 times
    Determining that trial court's factual findings that alleged spite fence was useless to defendant and did not negatively affect defendant's property were not clearly erroneous

    Contrary to the defendant's argument, the plaintiff and its predecessors in interest did not have to be aware that they were using the North Main property and did not have to make “an overt claim to any ownership.” See Crandall v. Gould, 244 Conn. 583, 591 and n. 6, 711 A.2d 682 (1998). The trial court's finding that the plaintiff and its predecessors in interest used the driveway “as if they had the ‘right’ to use it” is adequately supported by the evidence.

  3. Atlantic St. Heritage Associates, LLC v. Atlantic Realty Co.

    No. FSTCV166029295S (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 15, 2020)

    Segueing into this case, here the defendants clearly do have a right to seek to prevent the plaintiff’s usage and have done so- that is the essence of their defense. The issue as presented by the defendants is whether the plaintiff’s use is "unaccompanied by any recognition of [the right of the owner of the servient tenement] to stop such use," (citing Crandall v. Gould, 244 Conn. 583, 590-91, 711 A.2d 682, 686 (1998). The defendants cite additional appellate authority for variations and expansion of this legal principle.

  4. Roman v. Julian

    1998 Ct. Sup. 10570 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1998)   Cited 1 times

    Ruick v. Twankins, Supra, p. 149 The principles were recently reaffirmed by our appeals court in Crandall v. Gould, 244 Conn. 583 (1998). Hence a "claim of right" does not require that the possessor have a good faith belief of having title or a legal right to occupy in the sense of title or tenancy. That proposition, though seemingly harsh, is understandable in the context of the common law priority that land be placed to some use and be not subject to a "dead hand", through non use and tax insulation.

  5. Ventres v. Goodspeed Airport

    275 Conn. 105 (Conn. 2005)   Cited 270 times
    Holding that Connecticut's LLC statute “merely codifies” established liability principles of corporate law

    The land trust defendants argue that the trial court improperly failed to recognize that the agreement constituted notice, under § 47-38, of the land trust's intention to prevent the airport defendants from acquiring a prescriptive easement. In support of this argument, they rely primarily on this court's decision in Crandall v. Gould, 244 Conn. 583, 711 A.2d 682 (1998). In that case, "[t]he plaintiffs . . . [owned] property located at 283 River Road in the town of Stonington. The defendants . . . [owned] property, including a [private way], that [abutted] the property owned by the plaintiffs.

  6. Waterbury v. Washington

    260 Conn. 506 (Conn. 2002)   Cited 234 times
    Concluding that legislature intended to “supplant the exhaustion doctrine and to permit courts to hear environmental claims, even where an administrative agency is available to hear the claim,” but remanding case to trial court to determine whether, consistent with doctrine of primary jurisdiction, matter concerning compliance with minimum flow standards should be remanded to Department of Environmental Protection pursuant to General Statutes § 22a–18 [b]

    In applying that section, this court repeatedly has explained that `[a] party claiming to have acquired an easement by prescription must demonstrate that the use [of the property] has been open, visible, continuous and uninterrupted for fifteen years and made under a claim of right.' Westchester v. Greenwich, 227 Conn. 495, 501, 629 A.2d 1084 (1993)." Crandall v. Gould, 244 Conn. 583, 590-91, 711 A.2d 682 (1998). The purpose of the open and visible requirement is to give "the owner of the servient land knowledge and full opportunity to assert his own rights."

  7. Wright Brothers Builders, Inc. v. Dowling

    247 Conn. 218 (Conn. 1998)   Cited 99 times
    Concluding that the contract was legal and enforceable and therefore not addressing the issue of whether plaintiff was entitled to recover under its claim of unjust enrichment

    The determination of the requirements of the HIA is a matter of statutory construction and, therefore, a matter of law over which this court's review is plenary. Crandall v. Gould, 244 Conn. 583, 590, 711 A.2d 682 (1998). "[T]he process of statutory interpretation involves a reasoned search for the intention of the legislature."

  8. State v. Cardwell

    246 Conn. 721 (Conn. 1998)   Cited 28 times
    Observing "that the legislature has the authority to enact criminal statutes that have an extraterritorial effect"

    Statutory interpretation constitutes a matter of law; Jenkins v. Jenkins, 243 Conn. 584, 588, 704 A.2d 231 (1998); over which this court's review is plenary. Crandall v. Gould, 244 Conn. 583, 590, 711 A.2d 682 (1998). "[T]he process of statutory interpretation involves a reasoned search for the intention of the legislature.

  9. Atl. St. Heritage Assocs. v. Atl. Realty Co.

    216 Conn. App. 530 (Conn. App. Ct. 2022)   Cited 10 times

    (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Crandall v. Gould , 244 Conn. 583, 590–91, 711 A.2d 682 (1998). "The requirement that the [use] must be exercised under a claim of right does not necessitate proof of a claim actually made and brought to the attention of the owner ....

  10. New England Custom Concrete, LLC v. Carbone

    102 Conn. App. 652 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007)   Cited 47 times
    Noting that trial court made no finding of fact with respect to contractor's bad faith claim and calling it "doubtful" that finding could be sustained when "[a]t best, the record demonstrates vigorous disagreement about the quality of the plaintiff's workmanship in performing the contract"

    The defendants maintain that the trial court improperly concluded that (1) the contract between the parties complied with § 20-429 and (2) the defendants' statutory claim under § 20-429 was, in effect, an election of remedies that precluded their pursuit of their statutory counterclaim under CUTPA, § 42-110g, made applicable to violations of the Home Improvement Act by § 20-427 (c). Both of the issues raised by the defendants concern issues of statutory interpretation and our review of their merits, therefore, is plenary. Crandall v. Gould, 244 Conn. 583, 590, 711 A.2d 682 (1998). Because we agree with the defendants' interpretation of the applicable statutes, we reverse the judgment of the court.