Opinion
CV156057426S
11-30-2016
Doreen Cran et al. v. Mylaiah Talora Rankins et al
Filed December 1, 2016
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION OBJECTION TO REQUEST TO AMEND (#142) MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO FILE ADDITIONAL DISCOVERY (#140)
Robin L. Wilson, J.
STATEMENT OF CASE AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The plaintiffs, Doreen Cran and Dorothy Buonanni (plaintiffs) commenced the present action by service of writ, summons and complaint against the defendants, Mylaiah Talora Rankins (Rankins), Eustaquio Montalvo (Montalvo) and Transportation General, Inc. (Transportation General). The return date is November 3, 2015, and the case was returned to court on September 28, 2015. The case involves a three car accident which occurred on September 22, 2013, on Lewis Avenue in Meriden, Connecticut. The order of the vehicles were allegedly as follows: Montalvo's taxi cab was traveling in front of the plaintiff Cran's vehicle, and the plaintiff's vehicle was traveling in front of Rankin's vehicle. The plaintiff Buonnani was a passenger in the vehicle operated by the plaintiff Cran. The plaintiffs were struck from behind by defendant Rankin's vehicle which then caused plaintiff Cran to be pushed into the defendant Montalvo's taxi cab. The plaintiffs' theory of liability against both defendants Rankin and Montalvo is based upon the defendants negligent operation of their respective vehicles. The plaintiffs allege a number of ways in which defendants Rankin and Montalvo were negligent, which include common law and statutory negligence. The plaintiffs' theory of liability against Transportation General is based on vicarious liability. The plaintiffs specifically allege in counts three and six of the original complaint that: " 11. At all times mentioned herein, the defendant Eustaquio Montalvo, was operating the truck as an employee, officer, agent, servant and/or employee of the defendant, Transportation General, Inc., and the defendant, Eustaquio Montalvo, was operating said vehicle within the scope of his authority or employment. 12. At all times mentioned herein, said vehicle was owned by the defendant, Transportation General, Inc., and was being operated by defendant, Eustaquio Montalvo, who had the authority to operate said vehicle." Pl. Compl., pp. 5, 10. As just noted, the plaintiffs' theory of liability against the defendant Transportation General as alleged in the original complaint is based upon vicarious liability. Thus, the liability of Transportation General is based upon the conduct of Montalvo, its alleged agent, servant and/or employee. Nowhere in the original complaint do the plaintiffs allege a direct claim of negligence against Transportation General.
The plaintiffs have filed a request to amend the original complaint to include counts seven and eight as to Cran and Buonanni respectively. Counts seven and eight allege that Transportation General was negligent in that: " a. It failed to conduct a proper background check before hiring the Defendant, Eustaquio Montalvo; b. It failed to provide proper training to the Defendant, Eustaquio Montalvo; c. It allowed its driver, the Defendant, Eustaquio Montalvo to work more hours than it is reasonably safe." Pl. Amend Compl. p. 19.
The defendants have objected to the plaintiffs' request to amend on grounds that the amendment does not relate back because the allegations are of new claims of negligence against Transportation General which are beyond the two-year statute of limitations. The plaintiffs argue that the " transaction or occurrence" was the motor vehicle accident involving these parties that occurred on September 22, 2013. The plaintiffs further claim that they are merely expanding the basis for liability of this accident, but do not add additional parties to the action. The plaintiffs claim that the defendants had sufficient notice as to the basis of the claims and thus, they are not required to defend against stale claims.
The matter appeared on this court's November 21, 2016, individual short calendar as take papers.
DISCUSSION
A
Legal Standard
There is no dispute here, that the accident occurred on September 22, 2013. Likewise, there is no dispute that the applicable statute of limitations is § 52-584. Thus, if the amended complaint does not relate back to the original complaint, then, the cause of action alleged in the amended complaint is barred by the statute of limitations.
" Our relation back doctrine provides that an amendment relates back when the original complaint has given the party fair notice that a claim is being asserted stemming from a particular transaction or occurrence, thereby serving the objectives of our statute of limitations, namely, to protect parties from having to defend against stale claims . . . To relate back to an earlier complaint, the amendment must arise from a single group of facts . . . In determining whether an amendment relates back to an earlier pleading, we construe pleadings broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically . . . [T]he complaint must be read in its entirety in such a way as to give effect to the pleading with reference to the general theory upon which it proceeded, and do substantial justice between the parties . . . Our reading of pleadings in a manner that advances substantial justice means that a pleading must be construed reasonably, to contain all that it fairly means, but carries with it the related proposition that it must not be contorted in such a way so as to strain the bounds of rational comprehension . . . Finally, in the cases in which we have determined that an amendment does not relate back to an earlier pleading, the amendment presented different issues or depended on different factual circumstances rather than merely amplifying or expanding upon previous allegations." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Grenier v. Commissioner of Transportation, 306 Conn. 523, 559-60, 51 A.3d 367 (2012).
" With reference to the original complaint, [the court's] inquiry as to whether the plaintiffs' proposed amendment relate[s] back centers on whether the proposed amendment set[s] forth new causes of action . . . A cause of action is that single group of facts which is claimed to have brought about an unlawful injury to the plaintiff and which entitles the plaintiff to relief . . . A right of action at law arises from the existence of a primary right in the plaintiff, and an invasion of that right by some delict on the part of the defendant. The facts which establish the existence of that right and that delict constitute a cause of action . . . A change in, or an addition to, a ground of negligence or an act of negligence arising out of the single group of facts which was originally claimed to have brought about the unlawful injury to the plaintiff does not change the cause of action . . . It is proper to amplify or expand what has already been alleged in support of a cause of action, provided the identity of the cause of action remains substantially the same, but where an entirely new and different factual situation is presented, a new and different cause of action is stated." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Miller v. Fishman, 102 Conn.App. 286, 299, 925 A.2d 441 (2007), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 905, 942 A.2d 414 (2008).
" Examples of what constitutes a new and different factual situation as opposed to an amplification or expansion abound. In Sandvig v. A. Dubreuil & Sons, Inc., 68 Conn.App. 79, 85-86, 789 A.2d 1012 (2002), it was held that an allegation of negligence claiming that a defendant actively damaged a tiled floor required a 'different factual predicate' than an allegation that a defendant failed to repair already defective tiles. See Sharp v. Mitchell, 209 Conn. 59, 73, 546 A.2d 846 (1988). In Feisted v. Kimberly Auto Services, Inc., 25 Conn.App. 665, 596 A.2d 14, the Appellate Court held that an allegation that a defendant was the lessor of a motor vehicle pursuant to § 14-154a of the General Statutes did not relate back to prior allegations that the defendant was a 'principal or employer.'" Kolek v. Welch Enterprises, Inc., Superior Court of Connecticut, Docket No. CV-980584406-S (June 18, 2002, Beach, J.) [32 Conn.L.Rptr. 459, ].
With these legal principles in mind, the court must first examine the allegations in the original complaint. The plaintiffs' theory of liability alleged against Transportation General is set forth in counts three and six in the original complaint which allege the following: " 11. At all times mentioned herein, the defendant Eustaquio Montalvo, was operating the truck as an employee, officer, agent, servant and/or employee of the defendant, Transportation General, Inc., and the defendant, Eustaquio Montalvo, was operating said vehicle within the scope of his authority or employment. 12. At all times mentioned herein, said vehicle was owned by the defendant, Transportation General, Inc., and was being operated by defendant, Eustaquio Montalvo, who had the authority to operate said vehicle." Pl. Compl., pp. 5, 10. Thus, the original complaint alleges vicarious liability on the part of Transportation General. Transportation General would therefore be liable only if the driver Montalvo were liable and the necessary relationship between Transportation General and Montalvo were proved. No independent negligence on the part of Transportation General is alleged.
Counts seven and eight of the amended complaint which are as to Cran and Buonanni, respectively, allege that Transportation General acted negligently in several different ways: " a. In failing to conduct a proper background check before hiring the defendant Montalvo; b. In failing to provide proper training to the defendant Montalvo; [and] c. In allowing the defendant Montalvo to work more hours than it is reasonably safe." Pl. Amend Compl., p. 19.
A review of the case law convinces this court that the allegations in the proposed amended complaint, that the defendant Transportation General was negligent itself in various ways, is 'new and different' from the prior allegation that Transportation General was a principal of the allegedly negligent driver. To prove liability under the prior complaint, the plaintiffs presumably would introduce evidence to show only the negligence of the driver and the status relationship between the two; to prove liability under the proposed amendment, the plaintiffs would presumably have to show negligence of some sort on the part of Transportation General. The original claim brought by the plaintiffs against Transportation General is based on vicarious liability, where the focus centers on the conduct of another party, namely, Montalvo. The new claims, negligent supervision and/or training and/or hiring shifts the focus to the actions of Transportation General, i.e., whether Transportation General failed to supervise and/or train Montalvo, whom Transportation General had [a] duty to supervise and/or train that resulted in injury to the plaintiffs; whether Transportation General failed to select an employee fit or competent to perform the services of employment in failing to conduct a proper background check before hiring Montalvo; and whether Transportation General, when it hired Montalvo, knew or should have had reason to know of Montalvo's propensity to engage in the alleged harmful conduct which resulted in injury to the plaintiffs. See Dumas v. Price Chopper Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Windham, Docket No. CV-095004896S, (March 31, 2010, Riley, J.) (Court in deciding motion to strike addressed required allegations for claims of negligent supervision and negligent training); Morillo v. Georges, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-15-6058761S (December 31, 2015, Peck, J.) [61 Conn.L.Rptr. 541, ] (court in deciding motion to strike addressed required allegations for negligent hiring claim). The plaintiffs have set forth new claims of negligent hiring and/or supervision and/or training without any fair notice to Transportation General that it would have to investigate and defend claims of this nature. These new allegations involve different sets of circumstances and depend on entirely different facts. As such, the new claims of negligent hiring and/or supervision and/or training do not relate back to the original complaint, and are therefore barred by the statute of limitations. See Mesner v. Cheap Auto Rental, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-075009039-S, (February 13, 2008, Bellis, J.) (court granted motion for summary judgment concluding that claim of negligent entrustment was a new claim against the defendant and did not relate back to claim of vicarious liability under § 14-154a alleged in the original complaint); Kolek v. Welch Enterprises, Inc., supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-980584406-S [32 Conn.L.Rptr. 459, ] (court sustained defendant's objection to request to amend complaint to include new claim that defendant " was negligent in that it negligently 'allowed' its [agent, servant or employee] to operate the vehicle in various ways" when original complaint alleged vicarious liability against the defendant based on the agent, servant or employee's negligent operation of the vehicle). Accordingly, the defendant Transportation General's objection to the plaintiffs' request to amend is sustained.
Having also reviewed the plaintiffs' request to submit nonstandard discovery, the defendant's objection to that request, and the plaintiffs reply, and in light of this court's ruling sustaining the defendant's objection to plaintiffs' request to amend, the court denies the plaintiffs' request to submit nonstandard discovery.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the defendants' objection to the plaintiffs request to amend is sustained. Plaintiffs' request to submit nonstandard discovery is denied.