No. 05-04-00675-CR
Opinion Filed March 24, 2005. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.
On Appeal from the 219th District Court Collin County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 219-82420-03. Affirm as Modified.
Before Justices WHITTINGTON, FITZGERALD, and RICHTER.
KERRY P. FITZGERALD, JUSTICE
James Cramer appeals his conviction for failure to register as a sex offender. A jury found appellant guilty, and the trial court found the two punishment-enhancement paragraphs true and sentenced appellant to thirty years' imprisonment. Appellant brings two points of error contending (1) the evidence is factually insufficient to support his conviction; and (2) the judgment failed to credit appellant the time he served in jail before trial. We sustain appellant's second point of error, modify the judgment to credit appellant his time served, and affirm the judgment as modified.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In 1990, appellant was convicted of aggravated sexual assault and sentenced to fifteen years' confinement. Because of this conviction, appellant is subject to the sex offender registration program for life. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 62.01(6)(A), 62.12(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2004-05). Under this program, a sex offender who changes his address must report in person to the local law enforcement authority within seven days of changing his residence and provide proof of his identity and residence. Id. § 62.04(a). On September 8, 2003, appellant was still incarcerated but about to be released. He filled out a form stating he planned to move to a particular address in McKinney. The form set out the registration requirements under the act, and appellant signed the form, which stated he had been notified of his duty to register as a sex offender and that he understood the registration requirements. Appellant was released from the penitentiary on September 8, 2003. Appellant did not register with the law enforcement authority in McKinney. On October 2, 2003, a McKinney police officer went to the address appellant had put on the registration form on September 8, but the house at that address was being renovated and was uninhabited. The officer checked to see that appellant had not registered anywhere else in Texas, and he then prepared the documents to obtain an arrest warrant for failure to comply with the registration requirements. Appellant was apprehended on October 19, 2003 in a traffic stop. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
In his first point of error, appellant contends the evidence is factually insufficient to support the jury's verdict of guilt. In determining the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we view all of the evidence in a neutral light, and we determine whether the evidence of appellant's guilt, taken alone, is too weak to support the finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, or the evidence contrary to the verdict is so strong that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard could not have been met. Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477, 484-85 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004). Appellant asserts the evidence is factually insufficient to show his failure to register was knowing and intentional. In this point of error, appellant cites to evidence from the punishment phase showing appellant's low level of education and his misunderstanding of the registration requirements. None of this evidence was before the jury at the guilt phase of the trial; accordingly, we cannot consider it in determining the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's finding of appellant's guilt. See McCarty v. State, 788 S.W.2d 213, 215 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1990), pet. dism'd per curiam, improvidently granted, 820 S.W.2d 795 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991). Appellant acknowledges in his brief that "[t]he record indicates that he signed the pre-release notification, and was aware that he had some vague duty to register." Appellant argues the evidence is insufficient because no one read the registration requirements to him or explained their meaning to him. Appellant signed the form, which stated, "I have been notified of my duty to register as a sex offender in Texas pursuant to Chapter 62, Code of Criminal Procedure. I understand that: . . . [listing the registration requirements]." The evidence before the jury contained no indication appellant did not understand the registration requirements. After reviewing in a neutral light all the evidence before the jury, we cannot conclude that the evidence of appellant's guilt is so weak, or the contrary evidence so strong, that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard could not have been met. We hold the evidence is factually sufficient to support appellant's conviction. We overrule appellant's first point of error. In his second point of error, appellant contends the trial court erred by not crediting his sentence with the time he served in jail between his arrest and sentencing. This amount of time is required to be included in the judgment. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.01, § 1(18), art. 42.03, § 2(a) (Vernon Supp. 2004-05). The judgment does not reflect the amount of time served to be credited to appellant. The State agrees this omission is error. This Court has authority to modify the judgment to make the record speak the truth when it has the necessary information before it to do so. See Williamson v. State, 990 S.W.2d 404, 408 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1999, no pet.); Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1991, pet. ref'd) (en banc). In this case, the record shows appellant was arrested on October 19, 2003 and was held continuously until his sentencing on April 21, 2004, a total of 186 days. We sustain appellant's second point of error. We modify the judgment to provide appellant has 186 days credited to his sentence. We affirm the judgment as modified.