Cram v. Town of Geneva

5 Citing cases

  1. Tomasino v. Inc. (In re Suffolk Reg'l Off-Track Betting Corp.)

    Case No. 12-43503-CEC (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2018)

    However, the existence of an agreement by the landowner to provide certain benefits or to satisfy conditions upon a zoning determination does not automatically result in illegal contract zoning. See Id. ("[I]t is not unlawful for a municipality to require that an applicant donate land or property rights or record a restrictive covenant—even if the applicant's obligation to do so is conditioned upon its receipt of necessary approvals—so long as the municipality had not committed itself to a specific course of action with respect to the zoning amendment as consideration therefor."); see also Cram v. Town of Geneva, 190 A.D.2d 1028, 1028-29 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993). As explained by the New York Court of Appeals:

  2. Town of Verona v. Demario Enterprises

    231 A.D.2d 866 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996)

    The zoning issues raised by petitioner "fall outside [DEC's] area of responsibility" ( Matter of Hingston v New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 202 AD2d 877, 878-879, lv denied 84 NY2d 809; see, Matter of Valley Realty Dev. Co. v Jorling, 217 AD2d 349, 355). The record further establishes that DEC "identified the relevant areas of concern, took a hard look at those concerns and gave a reasoned elaboration of the basis of its determination" ( Cram v Town of Geneva, 190 AD2d 1028, 1029). The court erred, however, in staying further proceedings on the second cause of action pending a final determination in a related proceeding commenced in Supreme Court, Albany County. "[A] stay pending determination of another [proceeding] should not be granted unless the other [proceeding] presents complete identity of parties, causes of action and relief sought" ( Matter of Donner, 161 AD2d 405, 406; see, Hope's Windows v Albro Metal Prods. Corp., 93 AD2d 711, 712; Pierre Assocs. v Citizens Cas. Co., 32 AD2d 495, 497). That identity is lacking in the two proceedings.

  3. Matter of Lane — Pondview v. Planning Board

    216 A.D.2d 389 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995)   Cited 1 times

    Accordingly, there was no requirement that a variance be obtained from the Zoning Board of Appeals and the Planning Board did not exceed its authority in granting subdivision approval (see, Matter of Marx v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 185 A.D.2d 348; Marx v Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 137 A.D.2d 333, 339; cf., Thurman v Holahan, 123 A.D.2d 687). Additionally, since there is currently no development plan for the Planning Board to consider with respect to the 20.766-acre second lot, it was not arbitrary or capricious for the Planning Board to issue a negative declaration under SEQRA (see, Matter of Programming Sys. v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 61 N.Y.2d 738, 739; Matter of Long Is. Pine Barrens Socy. v. Planning Bd., 204 A.D.2d 548, 551; Cram v. Town of Geneva, 190 A.D.2d 1028; Cross Westchester Dev. Corp. v. Town Bd., 141 A.D.2d 796, 797; see also, SEQRA Handbook, New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, at 22). Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court properly dismissed the proceeding.

  4. Wilson v. Town of Tuxedo, the Town Bd. of the Town of Tuxedo, the Planning Bd. of the Town of Tuxedo, David Maikisch Inspector of the Town of Tuxedo, & Tuxedo Reserve Owner, LLC (In re Application of Tuxedo Land Trust, Inc.)

    950 N.Y.S.2d 611 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012)

    Levine v. Town of Oyster Bay, 26 A.D.2d at 583 (citing Church v. Town of Islip, supra ); see also Cram v. Town of Geneva, 190 A.D.2d 1028 (4th Dep't 1993). And it is not unlawful for a municipality to require that an applicant donate land or property rights or record a restrictive covenant—even if the applicant's obligation to do so is conditioned upon its receipt of necessary approvals—so long as the municipality had not committed itself to a specific course of action with respect to the zoning amendment as consideration therefor.

  5. Wilson v. Town of Tuxedo (In re Tuxedo Land Trust, Inc.)

    2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 50377 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012)   Cited 1 times

    However, "conditions per se do not void zoning amendments." Levine v Town of Oyster Bay, 26 AD2d at 583 (citing Church v Town of Islip, supra); see also Cram v Town of Geneva,190 AD2d 1028 (4th Dep't 1993). And it is not unlawful for a municipality to require that an applicant donate land or property rights or record a restrictive covenant — even if the applicant's obligation to do so is conditioned upon its receipt of necessary approvals — so long as the municipality had not committed itself to a specific course of action with respect to the zoning amendment as consideration therefor.