In re Mclain's Estate, 262 N.W. 666, 669-70 (Iowa 1935). However, once actual occupancy ceases, a presumption arises that the homestead is abandoned. Crail v. Jones, 221 N.W. 467, 469 (Iowa 1928). In that instance, the burden shifts to the one claiming the exemption to show a fixed, specific, and abiding intent to return.

Actual occupancy is necessary to continue the homestead right, except that the right will continue during a temporary absence while the owner has a fixed and definite intention of returning. In re McClain's Estate, 220 Iowa 638, 262 N.W. 666, 669-70 (1935); Crail v. Jones, 206 Iowa 761, 221 N.W. 467, 469 (1928); Fardal v. Satre, 200 Iowa 1109, 206 N.W. 22, 24 (1925). Physical removal from a home and the establishment of a new home constitutes a prima facie case of abandonment, and the burden is upon the debtor to show an intention to return.

Monte Vista Bank Trust Co. v. Savage, 75 Colo. 180, 225 P. 219; Jarvais v. Moe, 38 Wis. 440; Pedersen v. Nielsen, 212 Wis. 608, 250 N.W. 400; Shaffer v. Miller, 195 Iowa 891, 192 N.W. 868; Crail v. Jones, 206 Iowa 761, 221 N.W. 467; Harper v. Forbes, 15 Cal. 202; Stotts v. Stotts, 198 Mich. 605, 165 N.W. 761; Kaes v. Gross, 92 Mo 647, 3 S.W. 840; Vittengl v. Vittengl, 156 Iowa 41, 135 N.W. 63; Marshall v. Applegate, 10 Ky Law Rep 811, 10 S.W. 805; Rasmussen v. Rasmussen, 368 Ill. 137, 13 N.E.2d 166; Waples, Homestead and Exemption, 564; 40 CJS 671-672, Homesteads § 196. "The intention which is sufficient to rebut the presumption must be positive and certain, not conditional or indefinite."

"[T]he actual removal from a homestead, with no intention to return to it as a home, is an equivalent to a surrender of all claim of homestead to the premises, and constitutes an abandonment of such right." Crail v. Jones, 221 N.W. 467, 469 (Iowa 1928). The record indicates that Debtors purchased their homestead in November of 1991 and moved in a short time thereafter.

[2] The case at bar was tried to the court, a jury being waived, and under familiar rules the finding of the court in a law case upon disputed questions of fact has the same force and effect as a verdict of a jury. Farmers State Bank v. Fisher, 204 Iowa 1049, 216 N.W. 709; Crail v. Jones, 206 Iowa 761, 221 N.W. 467; In re Wise's Estate, 206 Iowa 939, 221 N.W. 567. We are constrained to hold that the findings of the trial court have sufficient support in the record, and that the court did not err in admitting the will to probate.

The exact contention of appellant, as we understand it, is that as appellees have already acquired and paid for a new homestead, the excess of the amount thus paid loses its exempt character and becomes subject to judicial process. It is in this connection further contended by appellant that the intention of appellees to use the balance in the bank for household and living expenses is clearly shown and that the same, for this reason, may not be claimed as exempt. It has been too often held to require citation of authority that exemption laws are to be liberally construed to effectuate their purpose. It is equally well settled that the debtor has a reasonable time after the sale of his homestead to invest the proceeds in a new homestead. Fardal v. Satre, 200 Iowa 1109; Crail v. Jones, 206 Iowa 761. The intention of appellees to invest the sum garnished in the repair and improvement of the new homestead would seem to be quite clearly established.