Opinion
24A-CR-810
08-29-2024
John Craig, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT R. Patrick Magrath Alcorn Sage Schwartz & Magrath, LLP Madison, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General J.T. Whitehead Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Decatur Superior Court The Honorable Matthew D. Bailey, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 16D01-1808-F3-1142
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT R. Patrick Magrath Alcorn Sage Schwartz & Magrath, LLP Madison, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General J.T. Whitehead Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Crone, Judge.
Case Summary
[¶1] John Craig appeals a 720-day aggregate sentence imposed by the trial court following his guilty plea to level 6 felony domestic battery and level 6 felony methamphetamine possession. Finding that Craig has not met his burden to establish that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offense and his character, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] For the two years leading up to the fall of 2018, Craig was involved in an on-again-off-again relationship with R.H. Tr. Vol. 2 at 24. R.H. and T.S. were friends. Id. at 20. In August 2018, Craig was living in T.S.'s home. On August 24, 2018, Craig had an altercation with T.S. at her home in the presence of R.H. According to the report of the officer who eventually responded to the incident, T.S. advised that the altercation started when "[s]he confronted [Craig] about the Rent and Car Payments for this month." Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 22. Initially, the altercation involved screaming but escalated to Craig punching a hole in a wall. Tr. Vol. 2 at 20, 23. R.H. feared for T.S. and attempted to intervene. Id. at 23. Craig then approached R.H. from behind, "grabbed" her, strangled her, and lifted her off the ground. Id. at 20. R.H. struggled to breathe and get free. Id. at 20. She did not think that she "was going to get through it." Id. at 21. Her "face was tingling and numb[,]" and she saw "black flecks." Id. R.H.'s legs stopped moving, and T.S. "stepp[ed] in" and tried "to get [Craig] to stop." Id. He released R.H. During the incident, R.H.'s children were playing in the backyard. Id. at 23. Police were called, and Craig was locked out of the home. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 22. R.H. and T.S. gave statements to police.
[¶3] The State charged Craig with level 3 felony aggravated battery, level 6 felony strangulation, level 6 felony domestic battery, and level 6 felony methamphetamine possession. Id. at 30-31. A no-contact order was issued prohibiting Craig from contact with R.H. or T.S. Pursuant to a December 2021 plea agreement, the State agreed to drop the aggravated battery count and the strangulation count. Id. at 119-22. In addition, the State agreed to a maximum sentence of 720 days and to drop a separate case. Craig agreed to plead guilty to two level 6 felonies: domestic battery and methamphetamine possession. The trial court held a guilty plea hearing in October 2023.
T.S. later requested and was granted dismissal of the no-contact order as to herself. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 53-54.
The cause number for the separate case was 16D01-1812-CM-1551.
[¶4] In March 2024, the trial court held a sentencing hearing during which it heard testimony from R.H., T.S., and Craig. More than five years after the incident, R.H. described the incident as "very vivid still." Tr. Vol. 2 at 21. She explained that she doesn't "look over [her] shoulder as often as [she] did" but still fears that Craig would follow her or "try to cause problems[.]" Id. at 21, 22. R.H. expressed hope that Craig would receive a maximum sentence. Id. at 22. Although a presentence investigation report was not completed for reasons unknown, the trial court learned about Craig's prior criminal history in three different states. In Montana, following an altercation with his then-girlfriend, Craig was charged with aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, robbery, injury to a family member, and criminal endangerment. Id. at 46. Ultimately, he was convicted of criminal endangerment and received six years of probation. Id. at 46, 48. Craig's Montana probation transferred to Indiana, and he was on felony probation during August 2018. Id. at 47. Craig also was charged previously in Kentucky with a marijuana offense and a false or fictitious identification offense. Id. at 43, 36. In addition, Craig was convicted of possession of paraphernalia in 2004 in Dearborn County. Id. at 45.
[¶5] The trial court sentenced Craig to 720 days on each of the two counts to be served concurrently in the Decatur County Jail. Appealed Order at 1, 2. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court explained its reasoning as follows:
Mr. Craig's criminal history is an aggravating circumstance. He was on probation for a felony offense in Montana at the time of the offense. That is an aggravating circumstance and the impact on the victim, I find that to be an aggravating circumstance and I specifically find the victim in this case, [R.H.] to be credible.
As far as mitigating circumstance, always begin with the plea of guilty. Consider is it a demonstrating acceptance responsibility or is it a pragmatic decision. It was not done early in the case and the benefit that he received from the State was the dismissal of a Level 3 felony to plea to a Level 6. So going from 3 to 16 years potential penalty on the 3 to the F6, that is a substantial benefit to
Mr. Craig. So I consider that to be a pragmatic decision and not a significant mitigating circumstance.
I also heard what I consider to be an argument for hardship on family, paying child support. Saying it's withheld from his wages, and he has parenting time. He's not a custodial parent. There is some hardship. I'm not going to consider it significant, but it is a mitigating circumstance.
I heard about counseling and AA. Says he tries to get to AA once a week and did go through some counseling, presumably for methamphetamine. I'd say a mitigating circumstance. Not a significant one.
I also heard Mr. Craig express remorse. I was going to give him some credit for that, but then he went on in the same breath to blame the victim. So I don't find him to be remorseful.Tr. Vol. 2 at 52-53. Craig appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[¶6] Craig asks us to revise his sentence pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), which states, "The Court may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender." We apply a "holistic approach" to our 7(B) review. Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 127 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Connor v. State, 58 N.E.3d 215, 219 (Ind.Ct.App. 2016)). In determining whether a sentence is inappropriate, we "'must consider' both factors, but the defendant need not 'necessarily prove' that the sentence is inappropriate on both counts." Id. at 126 (quoting Connor, 58 N.E.3d at 219). When reviewing a sentence, our principal role is to leaven the outliers rather than necessarily achieve what is perceived as the correct result in each case. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008). Craig bears the burden to show that his sentence is inappropriate. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218.
[¶7] "[S]entencing is principally a discretionary function in which the trial court's judgment should receive considerable deference." Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1222. "Such deference should prevail unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character)." Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015). As we assess the nature of the offense and character of the offender, "we may look to any factors appearing in the record." Boling v. State, 982 N.E.2d 1055, 1060 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013). Ultimately, whether a sentence should be deemed inappropriate "turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case." Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224. Additionally, when conducting an appropriateness review, the appellate court may consider all penal consequences of the sentence imposed including the manner in which the sentence is ordered served. Davidson v. State, 926 N.E.2d 1023, 1025 (Ind. 2010).
[¶8] The two prongs of 7(B) review are "separate inquiries to ultimately be balanced in determining whether a sentence is inappropriate." Lane, 232 N.E.3d at 126 (quoting Connor, 58 N.E.3d at 218). "[T]o the extent the evidence on one prong militates against relief, a claim based on the other prong must be all the stronger to justify relief." Id. at 127.
[¶9] Turning first to the nature of the offense, we observe that "the advisory sentence is the starting point the Legislature selected as appropriate for the crime committed." Fuller v. State, 9 N.E.3d 653, 657 (Ind. 2014). The sentencing range for a level 6 felony is between six months and two and one-half years, with the advisory sentence being one year. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7(b). Craig was sentenced to 720 days on each count, to be served concurrently in the Decatur County Jail. Accordingly, Craig received a sentence in keeping with his plea agreement and below the maximum allowable executed sentence of two and one-half years for each of his crimes. It is well established that "[a] defendant's conscious choice to enter a plea agreement that limits the trial court's discretion to a sentence less than the statutory maximum should usually be understood as strong and persuasive evidence of sentence reasonableness and appropriateness." Merriweather v. State, 151 N.E.3d 1281, 1286 n.2 (Ind.Ct.App. 2020) (quoting Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1081 (Dickson, J., concurring)). Craig urges us to reduce his sentence, asserting that he only grabbed and held R.H. "for a short period of time and then released her." Appellant's Br. at 10. He contends that there was no evidence of serious or ongoing injury. He makes no argument regarding the methamphetamine possession count.
[¶10] Our legislature states that a person who knowingly or intentionally "touches a family or household member in a rude, insolent, or angry manner" commits domestic battery, a class A misdemeanor. Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(a)(1). The charging information and guilty plea listed Indiana Code Section 35-42-2-1.3(b)(2), which provides that domestic battery may be a level 6 felony if the person who commits it is at least eighteen years of age and commits it against a household member in the physical presence of a child less than sixteen years old, knowing that the child was present and might be able to see or hear the offense.
[¶11] Here, as R.H.'s children were playing in the backyard on a summer day, Craig screamed at T.S., punched a hole in a wall, grabbed R.H. from behind, strangled her, and lifted her off the ground. She struggled to breathe and thought she would not make it through the incident. Her face became tingly, and she saw black flecks as her legs stopped moving. Craig's actions do not demonstrate restraint, regard, or lack of brutality. Indeed, over five years after the incident, R.H. still felt victimized. Craig does not present us with compelling evidence portraying his offense in a positive light. Nothing about the nature of his offense convinces us that his sentence merits a reduction.
[¶12] We reach a similar conclusion regarding Craig's character. We assess a defendant's character by engaging in a broad consideration of his qualities. Madden v. State, 162 N.E.3d 549, 564 (Ind.Ct.App. 2021). An offender's character is shown by his "life and conduct." Adams v. State, 120 N.E.3d 1058, 1065 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019). A typical factor we consider when examining a defendant's character is criminal history, with its significance varying based on the gravity, nature, and number of prior offenses. See McFarland v. State, 153 N.E.3d 369, 374 (Ind.Ct.App. 2020), trans. denied (2021). Craig acknowledges his prior criminal history, destructive behavior, poor relationship choices, and drug involvement but focuses upon his employment and rehabilitative efforts. He highlights his compliance with a Department of Child Services case, negative drug screens, inpatient mental health treatment, counseling, and substance abuse groups. He asserts that his personal improvements make an aggravated sentence inappropriate.
[¶13] Craig's prior criminal history includes offenses in three separate states. Tellingly, his Montana case involved a similar violent situation with a domestic partner that led to arrest for aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, robbery, injury to a family member, and criminal endangerment. Tr. Vol. 2 at 48. Further, Craig was still on probation for that criminal endangerment when he committed the present domestic battery and methamphetamine possession.
[¶14] As for Craig's rehabilitative efforts, while they are commendable, they do not necessarily "support an argument that his sentence is too harsh, and therefore, inappropriate." See Zavala v. State, 138 N.E.3d 291, 302-03 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019), trans. denied (2020). Similarly, many people are gainfully employed, but employment does not preclude punishment for a crime. Here, Craig's job does not shield him from punishment for either the serious crime he committed against R.H. or his drug possession conviction. See id. (citing Newsome v. State, 797 N.E.2d 293, 301 (Ind.Ct.App. 2003)). In any event, Craig's positive strides were undercut by the fact that even at his sentencing hearing he was still blaming R.H. Specifically, Craig stated that during the 2018 altercation, R.H. "was sitting there yelling at me, throwing her hands in my face." Tr. Vol. 2 at 44. He maintained that R.H. was "actually agitating more" even though she "knew" his background. Id. This blaming of his victim more than five years after the offenses reflects poorly on his character.
[¶15] When he pled guilty to two level 6 felonies, Craig agreed to a potential aggregate sentence of up to 720 days to be served in the Decatur County Jail. His plea saved him from potential consecutive sentences of two and one-half year sentences and possible placement at the Department of Correction. In addition, he received the benefit of the dismissal of various charges. In particular, Craig no longer faced a level 3 felony charge with a maximum sentence of sixteen years. Although Craig's job and rehabilitative efforts are admirable, he has not met his burden to establish that his 720-day aggregate sentence for domestic battery and methamphetamine possession is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offenses and his character. Therefore, we affirm.
[¶16] Affirmed.
Bradford, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.