This brings us to the basis of our decision. It is settled law in the state that if a prisoner is incarcerated by authorities within the State of Georgia, the proper county in which to bring a writ of habeas corpus is the county in which he is detained. Craig v. State, 234 Ga. 398 ( 216 S.E.2d 296) (1975). This pleading was filed in Camden County, the county in which the appellant was tried for the crime for which he is currently incarcerated.
None of the cases cited by the dissent as contrary authority address the issue currently before this Court. In Waye v. State, 239 Ga. 871, 238 S.E.2d 923 (1977), Craig v. State, 234 Ga. 398, 216 S.E.2d 296 (1975), and Neal v. State, 232 Ga. 96, 205 S.E.2d 284 (1974), we held the proper county in which to bring or file a petition for habeas corpus is the county of a petitioner's detention. Similarly, in Nix v. Watts, 284 Ga. 100, 664 S.E.2d 194 (2008), we held the Camden County Superior Court was without jurisdiction to consider a habeas corpus petition that had been improperly filed in that county.
We find that the habeas court did so err and, therefore, we reverse. See generally Craig v. State, 234 Ga. 398 ( 216 SE2d 296) (1975) (petitioner can attack Georgia conviction even though he is restrained by federal authorities in another state). The entry of a guilty plea involves the waiver of three federal constitutional rights: the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront one's accusers, and the trial court has a duty to ensure that the defendant understands the constitutional rights being waived.
Rickett contends that the trial court erred because the Superior Court of Ware County has jurisdiction over the habeas proceeding notwithstanding the fact that he is incarcerated in Florida. Craig v. State, 234 Ga. 398 ( 216 S.E.2d 296) (1975). However, the jurisdiction of the habeas court has never been questioned.
The law is clear that when a petitioner who is restrained by federal authorities in another state seeks to attack a Georgia conviction, the proper forum for filing a habeas corpus petition is the superior court in the county in which the petitioner was sentenced. Craig v. State, 234 Ga. 398 ( 216 S.E.2d 296) (1975). Furthermore, OCGA ยง 9-15-2 does not apply to habeas corpus proceedings.
It was therein held that a habeas corpus petition which alleged that petitioner's conviction was void would not be dismissed as being moot, even though his sentence has been completely served, when the petitioner "is suffering collateral consequences in the nature of a due process violation." Nix v. State, 233 Ga. 73 ( 209 S.E.2d 597) (1974); Craig v. State, 234 Ga. 398 ( 216 S.E.2d 296) (1975); Callahan v. State, 235 Ga. 359 ( 219 S.E.2d 717) (1975). It is clear that nothing in the petition raises the question of the possible invalidity of the 1969 plea of guilty. Appellant states that despite his innocence he pleaded guilty to avoid receiving a longer sentence which he might have received from a jury.
This holding is in harmony with recent decisions of this court which have expanded the reach and application of a writ of habeas corpus. See Craig v. State, 234 Ga. 398 ( 216 S.E.2d 296) (1975); Atkins v. Hopper, 234 Ga. 330 ( 216 S.E.2d 89) (1975); Nix v. State, 233 Ga. 73 ( 209 S.E.2d 597) (1974); Parris v. State, 232 Ga. 687 ( 208 S.E.2d 493) (1974). Under the facts of this case the trial court erred in granting the state's motion to dismiss the appellant's application for a writ of habeas corpus.
See Nix v. State, 233 Ga. 73 ( 209 S.E.2d 597) (1974), in which Code Ann. ยง 50-127 (3) was interpreted to authorize a post-conviction habeas corpus action to be filed, under the circumstances of that case, in the county of the sentencing court despite the petitioner's incarceration elsewhere. See, also, Craig v. State, 234 Ga. 398 ( 216 S.E.2d 296) (1975). Clearly then, jurisdiction and venue of the present action lie in the Superior Court of Floyd County. Appellant's custody had been transferred to the Sheriff of Floyd County by the State Board of Corrections and appellant was actually and physically detained in that county by the sheriff.
P. 333. In Craig v. State, 234 Ga. 398 ( 216 S.E.2d 296) (1975) we held: "If a petitioner desires to attack what he considers a void conviction, and he is restrained by federal authorities in another state, proper jurisdiction to entertain his habeas petition is the one in which he was sentenced." In Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, the United States Supreme Court said: "The overruling of McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131 (1934), made it possible for prisoners in custody under one sentence to attack a sentence which they had not yet begun to serve.
Because the record shows that Anderson was incarcerated in Atlanta, Fulton County, when he moved for an out-of-time appeal, the Superior Court of Whitfield County lacked jurisdiction to entertain his motion. Craig v. State, 234 Ga. 398, 399 ( 216 SE2d 296) (1975). Id.