Crafton v. Harris

3 Citing cases

  1. Govan v. Brown

    228 A.3d 142 (D.C. 2020)   Cited 1 times

    However, a testator's knowledge of the contents of a will, while a predicate for testamentary intent, is not dispositive of the separate issue of testamentary capacity. Therefore, we reject appellee Brown's request that we "take guidance" from Crafton v. Harris , 9 Tenn. App. 561 (Ct. App. 1929), because that case turned on "the determinative question" of "whether the testator understood the legal effect of the provisions of said will," i.e., had the requisite testamentary intent, id. at 562 (and where the court summarily rejected the challenge to testamentary capacity, id. at 563 ). While a testator's knowledge of the contents of a will is "an essential ingredient of intent," Turpin , 19 A.3d at 807 (quoting 1 Bowe & Parker § 5.8), it is ultimately not necessary evidence to prove testamentary capacity.

  2. Murray v. Garrison

    43 Tenn. App. 248 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1956)

    'The fact that a will is executed by a testator by making his mark, is prima facie evidence of his inability to write or to read writing, and in such a case there ought to be evidence by the attesting witnesses in explanation of the manner of signing, or evidence of the knowledge of the contents of the will, to make the formal execution complete, or to entitle the plaintiffs to a verdict, if no counter proof is offered.'          To the same effect see the cases of Crafton v. Harris, 9 Tenn.App. 561; Nobles v. Farmer, 9 Tenn.App. 6; Condry v. Coffey, 12 Tenn.App. 1; Burrow v. Lewis, 24 Tenn.App. 253, 142 S.W.2d 758.         In the trial below, in addition to the testimony of the two subscribing witnesses that the paper writing was read to Mr. Murray, there was other testimony which showed that Mr. Murray understood the contents of this paper writing.

  3. Burrow v. Lewis

    142 S.W.2d 758 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1940)   Cited 12 times

    In the later case of Bartee v. Thompson, 67 Tenn. (8 Baxt.), 508, 512 (the court citing Cox v. Cox, supra), it was held that where the testator is blind or illiterate no presumption obtains that he knows the contents of the will from the mere fact that he executed it. The court said that in such cases there must be other evidence of knowledge of the contents of the will before the proponent is entitled to a verdict establishing it. The point was again considered in Crafton v. Harris, 9 Tenn. App. 561, 564, where it was said that the fact that the testator cannot read is regarded as a circumstance not only sufficient to excite suspicion but to repel the presumption of knowledge of the contents of the will, the court saying that in such cases it must appear to the entire satisfaction of the jury that the testator understood and assented to the provisions of the will. (Italics ours.)