Coyne v. Bersani

40 Citing cases

  1. De Peralta v. Presbyterian Hospital

    121 A.D.2d 346 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986)   Cited 15 times

    (McDermott v. Torre, 56 N.Y.2d 399, 405.) The underlying rationale is the existence of a "`continuing trust and confidence'" which warrants tolling the limitations period (Richardson v Orentreich, 64 N.Y.2d 896, 898; Coyne v. Bersani, 61 N.Y.2d 939, affg 94 A.D.2d 961). In Richardson v. Orentreich (supra, at p 898), the Court of Appeals recognized that, in terms of the accrual of a cause of action for medical malpractice, treatment would not necessarily terminate on the patient's last visit with the physician (see also, McDermott v. Torre, supra, at p 406).

  2. Braten v. Kaplan

    No. 17-1145 (2d Cir. May. 9, 2018)   Cited 1 times

    Accordingly, a client's trust and confidence in his attorney is a predicate for the continuous representation doctrine. See Coyne v. Bersani, 61 N.Y.2d 939, 940 (1984); Farage v. Ehrenberg, 124 A.D.3d 159, 167 (2d Dep't 2014); Aaron v. Roemer, Wallens & Mineaux, L.L.P., 272 A.D.2d 752, 755 (3d Dep't 2000). In order to invoke the doctrine, a plaintiff must provide "clear indicia of 'an ongoing, continuous, developing, and dependent relationship between the client and the attorney.'"

  3. Clifford v. Kates

    58 N.Y.S.3d 873 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2017)

    A patient is not entitled to the benefit of the toll in the absence of continuing efforts by a doctor to treat a particular condition because the policy reasons underlying the continuous treatment doctrine do not justify the patient's delay in bringing suit in such circumstances ( Nykorchuck v. Henriques, 78 N.Y.2d 255, 259 [1991] ). The hallmark of the continuing treatment doctrine lies in a patient's "continuing trust and confidence" in the physician ( Coyne v. Bersani, 61 N.Y.2d 939, 939 [1984] ). Should the record demonstrate that a plaintiff lost faith in the physician, the continuing treatment toll will not apply because it cannot be said that plaintiff continued "to have had the continuing trust and confidence in her health care providers that underlies the continuous treatment doctrine" ( Conway v. Nassau Med. Ctr., 298 A.D.2d 423, 424, 748 N.Y.S.2d 390 [2d Dept 2002] ).

  4. De Carlo v. Ratner

    204 F. Supp. 2d 630 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)   Cited 18 times
    Finding plaintiff's legal malpractice claim time barred because the continuing representation doctrine was inapplicable and where "there [was] a breakdown" in the attorney-client relationship

    We find plaintiff's reliance on the continuous representation doctrine unavailing based on the facts alleged in his Amended Complaint. For the continuous representation doctrine to apply, a predicate of continuing trust and confidence must exist. Coyne v. Bersani, 61 N.Y.2d 939 (1984);Pittelli v. Schulman, 128 A.D.2d 600 (1987). However, if there is a breakdown in that relationship, the doctrine is not applicable. For example, in Aaron v. Roemer, Wallens Mineaux, L.L.P., 272 A.D.2d 752, 707 N.Y.S.2d 711 (3d Dept 2000), the Appellate Division considered an attorney malpractice case in which it was clear from correspondence written by the plaintiff that he perceived that his relationship with his attorneys had been "irretrievably broken" prior to the formal termination of this relationship by counsel's withdrawal.

  5. Allende v. N.Y. City Health Hosp. Corp.

    90 N.Y.2d 333 (N.Y. 1997)   Cited 102 times
    Finding that “that both plaintiff and the doctors ... expected that she would return for further treatment”

    Nor does plaintiff's situation comport with the policies behind the continuous treatment doctrine. As plaintiff herself no longer had any faith in Lincoln she cannot be said to have had the "`continuing trust and confidence'" in her health care providers that underlies the continuous treatment doctrine ( Richardson v Orentreich, supra, at 898, citing Coyne v Bersani, 61 N.Y.2d 939, 940). Moreover, because there is no evidence that plaintiff herself contemplated any continuity of relationship, declining to apply the continuous treatment doctrine would not "require a wronged patient to interrupt corrective efforts by serving a summons on the [negligent treatment provider]" ( Borgia v City of New York, 12 N.Y.2d 151, 156, supra).

  6. Rizk v. Cohen

    73 N.Y.2d 98 (N.Y. 1989)   Cited 179 times
    Holding that plaintiff's claim for fraudulent concealment failed where plaintiff "relie[d] on the same act which forms the basis of his negligence claim — Dr. Cohen's alleged improper advice to plaintiff that there was nothing wrong" and, as such, "plaintiff's allegations do not establish that Dr. Cohen, acting with knowledge of prior malpractice, made subsequent misrepresentations in an attempt to conceal his earlier negligence"

    Citing our decision in Richardson v Orentreich ( 64 N.Y.2d 896), plaintiff argues there was a continuing relationship of trust and confidence between plaintiff and Dr. Cohen which began with plaintiff's reliance upon the initial diagnosis, and continued through Dr. Cohen's contacting the plaintiff in October 1983 (see, Coyne v Bersani, 61 N.Y.2d 939, 940; Greene v Greene, 56 N.Y.2d 86, 94). Plaintiff's reliance on Richardson is misplaced.

  7. Richardson v. Orentreich

    64 N.Y.2d 896 (N.Y. 1985)   Cited 170 times
    Applying continuing treatment doctrine to medical malpractice

    ( Borgia v City of New York, 12 N.Y.2d 151, 155.) The "continuing trust and confidence" which underlies the "continuous treatment doctrine" ( Coyne v Bersani, 61 N.Y.2d 939, 940) does not necessarily come to an end upon a patient's last personal visit with his or her physician ( see, McDermott v Torre, 56 N.Y.2d 399, 406), when further treatment is explicitly anticipated by both physician and patient as manifested in the form of a regularly scheduled appointment for the near future, agreed upon during that last visit, in conformance with the periodic appointments which characterized the treatment in the immediate past. ( Compare, Davis v City of New York, 38 N.Y.2d 257.)

  8. Beroza v. Sallah Law Firm, P.C.

    126 A.D.3d 742 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015)   Cited 19 times

    “ ‘One of the predicates for the application of the doctrine is continuing trust and confidence in the relationship between the parties' ” (Aseel v. Jonathan E. Kroll & Assoc., PLLC, 106 A.D.3d at 1038, 966 N.Y.S.2d 202, quoting Luk Lamellen U. Kupplungbau GmbH v. Lerner, 166 A.D.2d 505, 507, 560 N.Y.S.2d 787 ; see Coyne v. Bersani, 61 N.Y.2d 939, 474 N.Y.S.2d 970, 463 N.E.2d 371 ; Piliero v. Adler & Stavros, 282 A.D.2d at 512, 723 N.Y.S.2d 91 ).

  9. Aseel v. Kroll

    106 A.D.3d 1037 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013)   Cited 24 times   1 Legal Analyses

    “For the doctrine to apply, there must be ‘clear indicia of an ongoing, continuous, developing, and dependent relationship between the client and the attorney’ ” ( Piliero v. Adler & Stavros, 282 A.D.2d 511, 512, 723 N.Y.S.2d 91, quoting Luk Lamellen U. Kupplungbau GmbH v. Lerner, 166 A.D.2d 505, 506, 560 N.Y.S.2d 787). “One of the predicates for the application of the doctrine is continuing trust and confidence in the relationship between the parties” ( Luk Lamellen U. Kupplungbau GmbH v. Lerner, 166 A.D.2d at 507, 560 N.Y.S.2d 787;see Coyne v. Bersani, 61 N.Y.2d 939, 474 N.Y.S.2d 970, 463 N.E.2d 371;Piliero v. Adler & Stavros, 282 A.D.2d at 512, 723 N.Y.S.2d 91).

  10. Gomez v. Katz

    61 A.D.3d 108 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009)   Cited 99 times
    In Gomez v. Katz, the Second Department explained that the continuous treatment doctrine contains three principal elements, the first being that the plaintiff continued to seek, and in fact obtained, an actual course of treatment from the defendant physician during the relevant period.

    Under the continuous treatment doctrine, the 2½ year period does not begin to run until the end of the course of treatment, "when the course of treatment which includes the wrongful acts or omissions has run continuously and is related to the same original condition or complaint" ( Nykorchuck v Henriques, 78 NY2d 255, 258; see also Young v New York City Health Hosps. Corp., 91 NY2d 291, 295; Allende v New York City Health Hosps. Corp., 90 NY2d 333, 337; McDermott v Torre, 56 NY2d 399, 405). The underlying premise of the continuous treatment doctrine is that the doctor-patient relationship is marked by continuing trust and confidence and that the patient should not be put to the disadvantage of questioning the doctor's skill in the midst of treatment, since the commencement of litigation during ongoing treatment necessarily interrupts the course of treatment itself ( see Massie v Crawford, 78 NY2d 516, 519; see also Coyne v Bersani, 61 NY2d 939, 940; Siegel v Kranis, 29 AD2d 477, 480). Implicitly, the doctrine also recognizes that treating physicians are in the best position to identify their own malpractice and to rectify their negligent acts or omissions ( see Allende v New York City Health Hosps. Corp., 90 NY2d at 338; Ganess v City of New York, 85 NY2d 733, 735; Cooper v Kaplan, 78 NY2d 1103, 1104; McDermott v Torre, 56 NY2d at 408). The continuous treatment doctrine contains three principal elements.