Thus, we must determine the duties upon which the employee spends the majority of his or her time (principal duties) and consider the character of those principal duties “against the admittedly amorphous standard of the duties and activities traditionally performed by law enforcement officers.” Coyazo v. State, 1995–NMCA–056, ¶ 13, 120 N.M. 47, 897 P.2d 234; see Weinstein, 1996–NMSC–021, ¶¶ 8, 12, 121 N.M. 646, 916 P.2d 1313. There is no “exhaustive list of activities that fit within the law enforcement mold.”

Thus, we must determine the duties upon which the employee spends the majority of his or her time (principal duties) and consider the character of those principal duties “against the admittedly amorphous standard of the duties and activities traditionally performed by law enforcement officers.” Coyazo v. State, 1995–NMCA–056, ¶ 13, 120 N.M. 47, 897 P.2d 234 ; see Weinstein, 1996–NMSC–021, ¶¶ 8, 12, 121 N.M. 646, 916 P.2d 1313. There is no “exhaustive list of activities that fit within the law enforcement mold.”

This Court has noted that duties traditionally performed by law enforcement officers are "admittedly amorphous." Coyazo v. State, 120 N.M. 47, 50, 897 P.2d 234, 237 (Ct.App. 1995). "Determination in each case is fact specific, but informed by a practical, functional approach as to what law enforcement entails today."

The New Mexico Court of Appeals has held that a district attorney acting in his or her prosecutorial role is not a "law enforcement officer" as defined by Section 41-4-3(D). Coyazo v. New Mexico, 897 P.2d 234, 237 (N.M.App. 1995). However, the Court pointed out that there is no "universal rule of immunity in favor of district attorneys," and that the court must measure the "day-to-day duties, responsibilities, and activities" of the district attorney against the traditional duties and activities of a law enforcement officer.

In Methola v. Eddy County, 95 N.M. 329 (1980), the individual defendants were sheriffs deputies, and not private company corrections officers, and thus were clearly "law enforcement officers" under § 41-4-12. In Coyazo v. State, 120 N.M. 47 (Ct. App. 1995), the court found that the district attorney was not a "law enforcement officer," for purposes of the exception to general sovereign immunity covering state employees under the Tort Claims Act. The difference between what Mr. Beauvais claims these cases stand for (that corrections officers are "law enforcement officers" under § 41-4-12), and what they actually say, makes the Court question whether Mr. Beauvais actually read the cases on which he relies.

The traditional duties of law enforcement officers are "admittedly amorphous," so the inquiry is fact-specific and "informed by a practical, functional approach as to what law enforcement entails today." Coyazo v. State, 897 P.2d 234, 237-39 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995). Traditional law-enforcement duties that directly impact public order include "preserving the public peace, preventing and quelling public disturbances, and enforcing state laws, including but not limited to the power to make arrests for violation of state laws."

The New Mexico appellate court has held, in other circumstances, that non-attorney employees of the DAO were not "law enforcement officers." See Abalos v. Bernalillo County Dist. Att'y's Office, 105 N.M. 554, 734 P.2d 794, 801 (Ct.App. 1987) (holding that employees who processed paperwork to notify detention center of indictment and warrant were not involved in holding accused persons in custody so as to be considered "law enforcement officers"); see also Coyazo v. State, 120 N.M. 47, 897 P.2d 234, 236 (Ct.App. 1995) (holding that "law enforcement officer" does not include "district attorneys in their prosecutorial role" because they do not engage in traditional law enforcement activities). Looking solely at the pleadings, judgment for appellees was warranted, as Abreu's complaint merely states that Armijo is the "chief investigator" for the DAO. ApltApp. at 71. It does not allege that Armijo is a "law enforcement officer" or describe his duties to show that he fits within § 41-4-12's waiver. Cf. Dunn v. McFeeley, 984 P.2d at 767 ("[O]ur appellate courts have repeatedly found that a connection to law enforcement activity, even being a member of the law-enforcement team, is insufficient by itself to make one a law enforcement officer; the person's duties must directly impact public order.").

finition strictly.” Chavez-Rodriguez v. City of Santa Fe, No. CIV 07-633, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47154, at *10 (D.N.M. April 20, 2009)(Browning, J.). See, e.g., Montes v. Gallegos, 812 F.Supp. 1165, 1172 (D.N.M. 1992)(Parker, J.)(holding that the mayor is not a law enforcement officer under the NMTCA, notwithstanding his statutory authority and obligation to exercise law enforcement functions); Anchondo v. Corr. Dep't, 1983-NMSC-051, ¶ 14, 666 P.2d 1255, 1258 (holding that the Secretary of Corrections and the Warden of a state penitentiary are not law enforcement officers under the NMTCA); Dunn v. McFeeley, 1999-NMCA-084, ¶ 25, 984 P.2d 760, 767 (holding that the Office of the Medical Investigator's Medical Investigator and the crime 40 laboratory technician are not law enforcement officers under the NMTCA), cert. denied, No. 25, 764, 981 P.2d 1207 (1999); Coyazo v. State, 1995-NMCA-056 ¶ 20, 897 P.2d 234, 238 (holding that the public defender and his staff are not law enforcement officers under § 41-4-3(D)); Callaway v. N.M. Dep't of Corr., 1994-NMCA-049, ¶¶ 11-12, 875 P.2d at 397 (holding that correctional officers at a penitentiary are not law enforcement officers under the NMTCA, notwithstanding their statutory power to make arrests); Vigil v. Martinez, 1992-NMCA-033, ¶ 20, 832 P.2d 405, 412 41 (holding that probation and parole officers are not law enforcement officers under the NMTCA). See also Johnson v. Holmes, 377 F.Supp.2d 1069, 1083

Chavez-Rodriguez v. City of Santa Fe, No. CIV 07-633, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47154, at *10 (D.N.M. April 20, 2009)(Browning, J.). See, e.g., Montes v. Gallegos, 812 F. Supp. 1165, 1172 (D.N.M. 1992)(Parker, J.)(holding that the mayor is not a law enforcement officer under the NMTCA, notwithstanding his statutory authority and obligation to exercise law enforcement functions); Dunn v. McFeeley, 1999-NMCA-084 ¶ 25, 984 P.2d 760, 767 (holding that the Office of the Medical Investigator's Medical Investigator and the crime laboratory technician are not law enforcement officers under the NMTCA), cert. denied, No. 25,764, 981 P.2d 1207 (1999);Coyazo v. State, 1995-NMCA-056 ¶ 20, 897 P.2d 234, 238 (holding that the public defender and his staff are not law enforcement officers under § 41-4-3(D)); Callaway v. N.M. Dep't of Corr., 1994-NMCA-049 ¶¶ 11-12, 875 P.2d at 397 (holding that correctional officers at a penitentiary are not law enforcement officers under the NMTCA, notwithstanding their statutory power to make arrests);Vigil v. Martinez, 1992-NMCA-033 ¶ 20, 832 P.2d 405, 412 (holding that probation and parole officers are not law enforcement officers under the NMTCA);Anchondo v. Corr. Dep't, 1983-NMSC-051 ¶ 14, 666 P.2d 1255, 1258 (holding that the Secretary of Corrections and the Warden of a state penitentiary are not law enforcement officers under the NMTCA). See also Johnson v. Holmes, 377 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1083 (D.N.M. 2004)(Browning, J.)("Akin to a law enforcement officer is, as a matter of law, insufficient to waive sovereign immunity under § 41-4-12 NMSA 1978."), aff'd, 455 F.3d 1133 (10th Cir. 2006).

Chavez-Rodriguez v. City of Santa Fe, No. CIV 07-633, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47154, at *10 (D.N.M. April 20, 2009)(Browning, J.). See, e.g., Montes v. Gallegos, 812 F. Supp. 1165, 1172 (D.N.M. 1992)(Parker, J.)(holding that the mayor is not a law enforcement officer under the NMTCA, notwithstanding his statutory authority and obligation to exercise law enforcement functions); Anchondo v. Corr. Dep't, 1983-NMSC-051, ¶ 14, 666 P.2d 1255, 1258 (holding that the Secretary of Corrections and the Warden of a state penitentiary are not law enforcement officers under the NMTCA); Dunn v. McFeeley, 1999-NMCA-084, ¶ 25, 984 P.2d 760, 767 (holding that the Office of the Medical Investigator's Medical Investigator and the crime laboratory technician are not law enforcement officers under the NMTCA), cert. denied, No. 25,764, 981 P.2d 1207 (1999); Coyazo v. State, 1995-NMCA-056 ¶ 20, 897 P.2d 234, 238 (holding that the public defender and his staff are not law enforcement officers under § 41-4-3(D)); Callaway v. N.M. Dep't of Corr., 1994-NMCA-049, ¶¶ 11-12, 875 P.2d at 397 (holding that correctional officers at a penitentiary are not law enforcement officers under the NMTCA, notwithstanding their statutory power to make arrests);Vigil v. Martinez, 1992- NMCA-033, ¶ 20, 832 P.2d 405, 412 (holding that probation and parole officers are not law enforcement officers under the NMTCA).See also Johnson v. Holmes, 377 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1083 (D.N.M. 2004)(Browning, J.)("Akin to a law enforcement officer is, as a matter of law, insufficient to waive sovereign immunity under § 41-4-12 NMSA 1978."), aff'd, 455 F.3d 1133 (10th Cir. 2006). The Court predicts that the Supreme Court of New Mexico, if presented with the issue, would agree with the result in Dunn v. McFeeley that the Office of the Medical Investigator's Medical Investigator and the crime laboratory technician in Dunn v. McFeel