Taken together, the above factors were sufficient to give the officer a particularized and objective basis for suspecting that Taylor and the vehicle's driver were or were about to be engaged in criminal activity. See Rolfe, 278 Ga. App. at 607; Cox v. State, 263 Ga. App. 266, 267 (1) ( 587 SE2d 205) (2003); Evans v. State, 216 Ga. App. 21, 23 (2) ( 453 SE2d 100) (1995); Smith v. State, 182 Ga. App. 58, 58-59 ( 354 SE2d 681) (1987). Compare State v. Winnie, 242 Ga. App. 228, 229-230 ( 529 SE2d 215) (2000) (officer's observation that appellee's vehicle was parked behind a closed business during the early morning hours alone, without any report of criminal activity or other evidence of suspicious activity, was insufficient to justify the investigative stop).

Id. In Cox v. State, 263 Ga. App. 266, 268-9(2)(b) ( 587 S.E.2d 205) (2003), a case similar to the one before us, this court distinguished Evans, holding that, in the presence of a continuing witness objection and the absence of a charge that the police officer fabricated his testimony, the trial court erred in allowing the report to go out with the jury. "Allowing the narrative portion of the police report to go out with the jury violated the continuing witness rule."

On appeal, Liggett argues that the report was not admissible because he never specifically called the officer’s credibility into question and therefore the State had no basis for rehabilitating him through admission of the report; he also asserts that the report should have been redacted. See generally Cox v. State , 263 Ga. App. 266, 268 (2) (b), 587 S.E.2d 205 (2003) (a claim of recent fabrication in the officer’s trial testimony may render a police report admissible). But Liggett did not raise these arguments below and they therefore are waived.

As "[s]elf-induced error cannot be complained of on appeal," this enumeration of error provides no basis for reversal. See Broadnax-Woodland, supra; Cox v. State, 263 Ga. App. 266, 268 (2) (b) ( 587 SE2d 205) (2003). (Citation and punctuation omitted.)

Thus, when the totality of the circumstances known at the time of the second stop is considered, we conclude that Officer Lefreniere was justified in suspecting that Crowley was involved in criminal activity and, therefore, in detaining him for further investigation. See Cox v. State, 263 Ga. App. 266, 267 (1) ( 587 SE2d 205) (2003). And because the evidence at issue was seized following the second stop, we find that the trial court properly denied Crowley's motion to suppress.

op); Howden v. State, 240 Ga. App. 139, 141 ( 522 S.E.2d 279) (1999) (denial of motion to suppress reversed where suspect observed driving away from warehouse located in area known for criminal activity late at night); In the Interest of T.J.B., 237 Ga. App. 824, 825-826 ( 517 S.E.2d 77) (1999) (denial of motion to suppress reversed when evidence showed only that juvenile was deliberating avoiding contact with law enforcement in an area known for drug transactions); Attaway v. State, 236 Ga. App. 307, 309 ( 511 S.E.2d 635) (1999) (stop not justified when suspect observed driving several times around subdivision late at night). And equally instructive are the cases where this Court or our Supreme Court found the stop was justified: Garmon v. State, 271 Ga. 673, 677-678(2) ( 524 S.E.2d 211) (1999) (officers had independent information that suspects observed leaving residence, where officers had reasonable belief illegal activities were occurring, were participating in those activities); Cox v. State, 263 Ga. App. 266 ( 587 S.E.2d 205) (2003) (officers observed defendant at 3:40 a.m. in a no-trespass-posted parking lot in an area plagued by burglaries, and evasive action taken upon approach of police cruiser); Evans v. State, 262 Ga. App. 712 ( 586 S.E.2d 400) (2003) (suspect appeared startled when he saw officer behind him, tried to evade officer, and then returned to his original route when officer no longer behind him). In this case, I believe that although the circumstances may have been such that the officer would have been justified in following Howard in order to closely observe his activities to gain more information that would have either confirmed the officer's suspicions that Howard was the person he was looking for or eliminated him as a suspect, the information known to the officer at the time of the stop did not provide a particularized and objective basis for suspecting Howard of illegal activity such that an investigatory stop was justified.