Opinion
Civil Action No. 1:02-CV-0147-BI.
September 30, 2004
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment filed January 20, 2004 (Doc. 58). Defendants filed a Memorandum in Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment on January 20, 2004 (Doc. 58), and Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition on January 28, 2004 (Doc. 60). The Court, having considered the Motion, the Response, the Memorandum, and the applicable law, finds that Defendants' Motion is well-taken in part and that summary judgment should be granted in favor of Defendants on the claims brought against them in their official capacity and on the due process claim. The Court further finds that Defendants' Motion is not well-taken in part, that genuine issues of material fact exist, and that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied as to Plaintiff's failure to protect claim.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed a civil rights Complaint Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on July 8, 2002, alleging that Defendants subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment by failing to protect him from an assault by another inmate and that Defendants further violated his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment by denying him an adequate disciplinary hearing. On December 20, 2002, the Court issued an Order dismissing several Defendants and requiring Defendants Mitchell and Owens to Answer.
The parties agree to the following undisputed facts. On January 12, 2002, at about 2:00 p.m., Plaintiff got into a fight with another inmate, Inmate Crutcher, at the Dick Ware Unit. Officer Mitchell came into the room where the fight occurred, separated Plaintiff and the other inmate, and then started to leave the room. Plaintiff asked to speak with Officer Mitchell outside of the dorm room area, told her that there would be a problem if he returned to the dorm room, and asked not to be sent back into the dorm room. Plaintiff was ordered by Mitchell to return. After his return to the dorm room, Plaintiff and Inmate Crutcher fought again, Plaintiff fell down, and his lip was cut when punched by Inmate Crutcher.
Officer Mitchell filed an incident report about the altercation, and Plaintiff was subsequently subjected to disciplinary restrictions, including placement in solitary confinement without a hearing, and a major disciplinary case.
Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Owens, the disciplinary captain, failed to competently adjudicate the disciplinary hearing.
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. PROC. 56©). See Williams v. Kaufman County, 352 F.3d 994, 1001 (5th Cir. 2003). The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). To determine whether there are any material factual issues, the Court considers applicable substantive law to define which issues are material and then considers the evidence relevant to those issues in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Williams, 352 F. 3d at 1001. If the moving party meets the initial burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to produce evidence or designate specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial. FED. R. CIV. PROC. 56(e); Priester v. Lowndes County, 354 F.3d 414, 419 (5th Cir. 2004). The nonmovant cannot satisfy this burden with conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, or only a scintilla of evidence. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) ( en banc).
Summary judgment is only appropriate when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, there is no genuine issue of material fact precluding judgment as a matter of law for the movant. Mace v. City of Palestine, 333 F.3d 621, 623 (5th Cir. 2003). For summary judgments, all inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. Austin v. Johnson, 328 F.3d 204, 207-208 (5th Cir. 2003).
Qualified immunity protects public officers from suit if their conduct does not violate any "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Linbrugger v. Abercia, 363 F.3d 537, 540 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). A two-step analysis governs whether public officials are entitled to qualified immunity. First, the Court must determine whether the facts, either as the plaintiff alleges or as proved without dispute, establish that the officer violated a clearly established constitutional right. Linbrugger, 363 F.3d at 540 (citing Price v. Roark, 256 F.3d 364, 369 (5th Cir. 2001)). If no constitutional right has been violated, the inquiry ends and the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. Id. If the plaintiff has alleged a constitutional violation, the Court must next determine whether the official's conduct was objectively unreasonable under established law. Linbrugger, 363 F.3d at 540 (citing Bazan v. Hidalgo County, 246 F.3d 481, 490 (5th Cir. 2001)). The first question is governed by the current understanding of constitutional rights, and the second by what was reasonably understood at the time of the challenged act. Roe v. Tex. Dep't of Protective Regulatory Servs., 299 F.3d 395, 401 (5th Cir. 2002).
III. ANALYSIS
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must (1) allege a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Moore v. Willis Indep. Sch. Dist., 233 F.3d 871, 874 (5th Cir. 2000).
A. Whether the claims against Defendants in their official capacities is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Defendants allege that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the claims against them in their official capacities. The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff is an inmate confined in the custody of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Institutional Division (TDCJ-ID), Defendants Mitchell and Owens were officials of TDCJ at the Dick Ware Unit, TDCJ is a governmental entity, and Plaintiff is seeking an award of money damages. Answer at ¶¶ 2-4; Compl. ¶ V-VI.
"The Eleventh Amendment bars an individual from suing a state in federal court unless the state consents to suit or Congress has clearly and validly abrogated the state's sovereign immunity." Perez v. Region 20 Educ. Service Center, 307 F.3d 318, 326 (5th Cir. 2002). State officials are immune under the Eleventh Amendment when they are sued in their official capacities. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663, 39 L.Ed.2d 662, 94 S.Ct. 1347 (1974). Section 1983 does not include a waiver of the states' sovereign immunity. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 338-39, 59 L. Ed. 2d 358, 99 S.Ct. 1139 (1979).
Texas has not waived its Eleventh-Amendment immunity. Sherwinski v. Peterson, 98 F.3d 849, 851-52 (5th Cir. 1996). In order to prevail in an official-capacity action, a plaintiff generally must establish that a policy or custom of the governmental entity played a part in the violation of federal law. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). The Fifth Circuit has held that, as an instrumentality of the state, the TDCJ-ID and TDCJ officials in their official capacity are immune from a suit for money damages under the Eleventh Amendment. Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 742 (5th Cir. 2002); Talib v. Gilley, 138 F.3d 211, 213 (5th Cir. 1998).
Defendants have met their initial burden of showing there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the official capacity claims are barred by their Eleventh Amendment immunity. The burden, therefore, shifts to the Plaintiff to produce evidence or designate specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial. FED. R. CIV. PROC. 56(e). This burden may not be satisfied with conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, or only a scintilla of evidence. Little, 37 F.3d at 1075.
Plaintiff argues that the Defendants, while acting in their official capacities, violated clearly established TDCJ policy and procedure. Plaintiff's conclusory allegations, however, fail to demonstrate that Texas has waived its Eleventh-Amendment immunity in this matter, and they fail to establish that a policy or custom of the governmental entity played a part in the violation of federal law. Kentucky, 473 U.S. at 166. Such conclusory allegations are insufficient to meet Plaintiff's summary judgment burden. FED. R. CIV. PROC. 56(e). Plaintiff has failed to produce evidence or designate specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Id.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant and drawing all inferences in favor of the non-moving party, it is nevertheless apparent that there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding Defendants' Eleventh Amendment claim of immunity from Plaintiff's claims against Defendants in their official capacity. Mace, 333 F.3d at 623. The Court finds that the facts support judgment as a matter of law in favor of Defendants' claim of immunity from Plaintiff's claims against Defendants in their official capacity. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, therefore, should be GRANTED, and summary judgment should be entered, in favor of the Defendants on the claims against them in their official capacity.
B. Whether Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
The Court must first consider whether Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Saucie v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001). As a threshold matter, the Court must consider whether the facts alleged, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, show that the officers' conduct violated a constitutional right. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 736 (2002); Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201; Price, 256 F.3d at 369. Qualified immunity operates "to ensure that before they are subjected to suit, officers are on notice their conduct is unlawful." Hope, 536 U.S. at 739 (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 206). This privilege is "an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability." Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200.
For a constitutional right to be clearly established, its contours must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. Id. If the allegations do not establish the violation of a constitutional right, the officer is entitled to qualified immunity. Id. If the allegations could make out a constitutional violation, the Court must ask whether the right was clearly established — that is, whether "it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted." Id. Where an officer makes a reasonable mistake as to what the law requires, that officer is entitled to immunity. Id. at 205.
1. Whether Defendant Mitchell is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's failure to protect claim.
The Eighth Amendment requires that prison officials protect prisoners from violence at the hands of their fellow prisoners. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). Prison officials are not, however, liable for all inmate-on-inmate violence. Id. at 834. A prison official is liable only if he is deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm. Id. at 837. A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he knows of an "excessive risk to inmate health or safety" and disregards that risk. Id. To be deliberately indifferent, the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. Adames v. Perez, 331 F.3d 508, 512 (5th Cir. 2003). In other words, the prison official must be subjectively aware of a substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839-40. The plaintiff, however, may rely on circumstantial evidence indicating that because the risk was obvious, the official must have known of the risk to the inmate. See Hope, 536 U.S. at 738.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his clearly established right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by failing to protect him from another inmate. Plaintiff claims that Defendant Mitchell entered a room while Plaintiff was engaged in a fight with Inmate Crutcher, separated the two inmates, and left after instructing Plaintiff to remain in the dorm area. Compl. ¶ V. Plaintiff alleges that he requested that Mitchell not put him back in the dorm area "for fear of further assault." Id. Plaintiff alleges that after he returned to the dorm area, Inmate Crutcher assaulted him.
Plaintiff's allegations, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, may be sufficient to show that the Officer Mitchell's conduct violated a constitutional right. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201; Price, 256 F.3d at 369. Plaintiff's allegations taken as true could demonstrate that Mitchell was aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm existed. Plaintiff's allegations may not demonstrate that Mitchell drew the inference that there was a substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff, but the allegations are sufficient to demonstrate that because the risk was obvious, Officer Mitchell must have known of the risk to the inmate. See Hope, 536 U.S. at 738. Having found that Plaintiff's allegations, taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, show that Mitchell's conduct violated a constitutional right, the Court turns to the question of whether the constitutional right claimed was clearly established. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200-201.
A constitutional right is clearly established if "it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted." Id. Where an officer makes a reasonable mistake as to what the law requires, that officer is entitled to immunity. Id. at 205. The United States Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit have both recognized that "the Eighth Amendment imposes on prison officials a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other inmates," and that prison officials can be held liable for their failure to protect an inmate when they are deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Adames, 331 F.3d at 512. It would thus be clear to a reasonable officer that failing to protect an inmate from violence at the hands of another inmate, after being alerted of the likelihood of such violence, would be unlawful. Defendant Mitchell is thus not entitled to qualified immunity on the failure to protect claim.
Defendant asserts that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to Plaintiff's failure to protect claim, arguing that "Cox has not and cannot show that Defendant Mitchell had knowledge of any previous fight with another inmate." Def. Mot. at 5. The parties dispute whether Mitchell had knowledge of the first altercation between Plaintiff and Inmate Crutcher. Defendant bears the burden of showing that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. Considering the evidence relevant to the issue of whether Mitchell was aware of the first fight between Cox and Crutcher, an issue material to a determination of whether Mitchell was "aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exist[ed]", and viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, it is apparent that a disputed issue of material fact exists. Williams, 352 F.3d at 1001; Adames, 331 F.3d at 512. Defendant Mitchell has failed to meet her burden to show that no genuine issue of material fact exists, and is not entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's failure to protect claim. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment should be DENIED as to the failure to protect claim.
2. Whether Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's due process claim.
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the government from depriving an inmate of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. See U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV; Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974). The analysis of procedural due process questions involves a two-part inquiry: (1) whether the state has interfered with an inmate's protected liberty or property interest, and (2) whether procedural safeguards are constitutionally sufficient to protect against unjustified deprivations. See Kentucky Dept. of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989).
In this case, Plaintiff claims that the false disciplinary charge filed by defendant Mitchell and the adverse determination and punishment in the proceedings by Defendant Owens resulted in Plaintiff's loss of recreation, commissary, and property privileges for 45 days; 15 days of solitary confinement; a loss of accrued good time credits and a reduction in Plaintiff's line classification. Defendants argue that Plaintiff received the procedural protections required of due process in a prison disciplinary hearing and that his disciplinary claims do not rise to constitutional muster.
The Court must first determine whether the facts, either as the Plaintiff alleges or as proved without dispute, establish that the officer violated a clearly established constitutional right. Linbrugger, 363 F.3d at 540 (citing Price, 256 F.3d at 369).
Protected liberty interests can be created (1) by the Due Process Clause of its own force or (2) by states through statutes or regulations. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995). The Fifth Circuit has held that the Due Process Clause does not, of its own force, create a protected liberty interest in a prisoner's line classification or his accrued good time credits. Harper v. Showers, 174 F.3d 716, 719 (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (no liberty interest in custodial classification); Malchi v. Thaler, 211 F.3d 953, 959 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557) (Constitution does not guarantee good time credit). Plaintiff has not shown any state statute or regulation that causes Plaintiff's line classification to be a protected state-created liberty interest. See Wilson v. Budney, 976 F.2d 957, 958 (5th Cir. 1992). The classification of prisoners is a matter within the discretion of prison officials and, therefore, is not a protected liberty interest. McCord v. Maggio, 910 F.2d 1248, 1250 (5th Cir. 1990).
Courts have also held or suggested that constitutionally protected liberty interests may be derived from state court judgments or treaties, neither of which is involved in this case. See Walters v. Grossheim, 990 F.2d 381, 384 (8th Cir. 1993) (state court judgment); Bagguley v. Bush, 953 F.2d 660, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (treaty).
Accrued good time credits, on the other hand, have been held by the Fifth Circuit to be protected liberty interests in Texas as to sentences imposed by Texas courts before September 1, 1996. Malchi, 211 F.3d at 957-58. Malchi held "that the loss of good time credits under a state statute that bestowed mandatory sentence reductions for good behavior must be accompanied by certain procedural safeguards in order to satisfy due process." Malchi, 211 F.3d at 957 (quoting Madison v. Parker, 104 F.3d 765, 769 (5th Cir. 1997)). Plaintiff's allegations and the indisputed facts do not demonstrate that Plaintiff has a protected liberty interest in the good time credits lost as a result of the disciplinary sanctions imposed upon him.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Mitchell filed a disciplinary case against Plaintiff for fighting with Inmate Crutcher and gave confused and conflicting testimony at the disciplinary hearing and that Defendant Owens reached an incorrect result in presiding over the disciplinary hearing. Plaintiff's allegations, however, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, fail to show that the officers' conduct violated a constitutional right. Price, 256 F.3d at 369. Prisoners are generally entitled (1) advance notice of the claimed violation; (2) a written statement of the fact finder as to the evidence relied upon and a reason for disciplinary action taken; and (3) a limited opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence. Banuelos v. McFarland, 41 F.3d 232, 234 (5th Cir. 1995). Plaintiff's allegations fail to establish a violation of these due process entitlements. Moreover, the restrictions imposed on Plaintiff were not atypical and significant in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life and did not implicate any recognized and protected liberty interest. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483. Because Plaintiff's allegations and the undisputed facts fail to establish that Defendants Mitchell and Owens violated a clearly established constitutional right related to the disciplinary proceedings, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff's due process claim. Linbrugger, 363 F.3d at 540 (citing Price, 256 F.3d at 369). Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on this claim should be GRANTED, and summary judgment should be entered in their favor on the due process claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
Having considered the motions, the memorandum, the responses, the applicable law, and the interests of justice, the Court finds that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted in part and denied in part as set forth herein.IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment filed January 20, 2004 (Doc. 58), is GRANTED as to Plaintiff's official capacity claims and Plaintiff's due process claim.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment filed January 20, 2004 (Doc. 58), is DENIED as to Plaintiff's failure to protect claim.
Summary Judgment shall be entered in favor of Defendants Owens and Mitchell on the official capacity and due process claims.
SO ORDERED.