S.M.'s testimony alone was sufficient to support Dukes's convictions. See United States v. Danzey, 594 F.2d 905, 916 (2d Cir. 1979) (“[T]he testimony of a single, uncorroborated eyewitness is generally sufficient to support a conviction.”) (citations omitted)); see also Cox v. Herbert, 420 F.Supp.2d 144, 162 (W.D.N.Y. 2006) (The victim's “testimony alone would have been sufficient, even without the corroborating witnesses.”). And while Dukes challenges S.M.'s credibility, see Docket Item 3 at 38-39 (arguing on direct appeal that S.M.'s testimony was inconsistent), “[t]he law is well established that questions of witness credibility are jury questions and a federal habeas court may not reassess the jury's finding of credibility, ” Jackson v. Health, 2010 WL 3075557, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2010).

Petitioner's argument that his sentence was "unconstitutionally vindictive" is not cognizable on habeas review, because the sentence fell within the lawful range of state law sentences upon a conviction of murder in the first degree and petitioner has presented no evidence that the sentence amounted to impermissible retaliation against petitioner by the trial court for the exercise of petitioner's rights. See Cox v. Herbert, 420 F. Supp. 2d 144, 158 (W.D.N.Y. 2006) ("A petitioner's challenge to the term of his sentence generally does not present a cognizable constitutional issue if the sentence falls within the applicable statutory range."). It is axiomatic that counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise this meritless claim.