Cox v. Ford Leasing Development Co.

2 Citing cases

  1. PSC Metals, Inc. v. Shelby Land Co.

    Case No. 3:14-cv-02019 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 13, 2017)

    " (citations omitted)); Chassereau v. Stuckey, 342 S.E.2d 623, 624 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986) ("Ordinarily, in the absence of an exclusion of other purposes, a lease for a specific purpose will be regarded as permissive instead of restrictive and does not limit the use of the premises by the lessee to such purposes."); Cox v. Ford Leasing Dev. Co., 316 S.E.2d 182, 183 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984) ("[O]rdinarily, in the absence of an exclusion of other purposes, a lease for a specific purpose is generally regarded as 'permissive' instead of 'restrictive,' and does not limit the use of the premises by the lessee to such purposes. . . .").

  2. Hawaiian Ass'n of Seventh-Day Adventists v. Wong

    130 Hawaii 36 (Haw. 2013)   Cited 72 times
    Holding that the terms of the contract at issue were "reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation, there are genuine issues of material fact regarding the intent of the drafts, and summary judgment is therefore inappropriate"

    See, e.g., Alchemy Commc'ns Corp. v. Preston Dev. Co., 148 N.C.App. 219, 558 S.E.2d 231, 235 (2002) ("A mere statement of the purpose of a lease or words that describe the use of the premises are deemed permissive rather than restrictive"); Bennett v. Waffle House, Inc., 771 So.2d 370, 372 (Miss.2000) (en banc) (lease provision setting forth use of property, "absent a clear and specific indication that the landlord intended to limit the tenant's use of the property, is generally permissive and not restrictive") (quotation marks omitted); Ray–Ron Corp. v. DMY Realty Co., 500 N.E.2d 1163, 1165 (Ind.1986) ("A lease of property which specifies the purpose of the lease but does not prohibit other purposes is deemed permissive only"); Cox v. Ford Leasing Dev. Co., 170 Ga.App. 81, 316 S.E.2d 182, 183 (1984) ("a lease for a specific purpose is generally regarded as permissive instead of restrictive") (quotation marks omitted).See, e.g., Rapids Assocs. v. Shopko Stores, Inc., 96 Wis.2d 516, 292 N.W.2d 668, 670 (Wis.Ct.App.1980) ; Noon v. Mironski, 58 Wash. 453, 108 P. 1069, 1070 (1910) ; Baron Bros., Inc. v. Nat'l Bank of S.D. Sioux Falls, 83 S.D. 93, 155 N.W.2d 300, 303 (1968) ; Hyatt v. Grand Rapids Brewing Co., 168 Mich. 360, 134 N.W. 22, 23 (1912) ; Beck v. Giordano, 144 Colo. 372, 356 P.2d 264, 265 (1960) (per curiam); Silkey v. Malone, 123 Ind.App. 395, 111 N.E.2d 665, 667 (1953) (in banc); Bevy's Dry Cleaners & Shirt Laundry, Inc. v. Streble, 2 Ohio St.2d 250, 208 N.E.2d 528, 531–32 (1965).