Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-5525-12T2
08-12-2014
JOHN COX, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. VINCENZINA COX, Defendant-Respondent. JOHN R. COX and PATRICIA M. COX, Appellants.
Michael A. Luciano argued the cause for appellants (Glazer & Luciano, P.C., attorneys; Mr. Luciano, of counsel and on the briefs). John F. DeBartolo argued the cause for respondent Vincenzina Cox (Atkinson & DeBartolo, attorneys; Mr. DeBartolo, of counsel and on the brief; Amanda J. Muhaw, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Sapp-Peterson and Lihotz. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Ocean County, Docket No. FM-15-1702-07. Michael A. Luciano argued the cause for appellants (Glazer & Luciano, P.C., attorneys; Mr. Luciano, of counsel and on the briefs). John F. DeBartolo argued the cause for respondent Vincenzina Cox (Atkinson & DeBartolo, attorneys; Mr. DeBartolo, of counsel and on the brief; Amanda J. Muhaw, on the brief). PER CURIAM
John R. Cox and Patricia M. Cox are the parents of plaintiff John Cox. They appeal from the trial court order denying their motion to intervene in post-judgment proceedings between their son, John Cox, and former daughter-in-law, defendant Vincenzina Cox, in connection with, among other issues, their daughter-in-law's continued occupancy of the former marital home, which they own. We affirm.
Because the parties share the same last name, for ease of reference, we refer to them by their first names. Additionally, as to father and son, we refer to them as John R. and John, respectively. We intend no disrespect in doing so.
At the time of the divorce, John R. and Patricia entered into an agreement with John and Vincenzina, in which they expressed their desire to "provide a home for their grandchildren until the happening of any condition" set forth in "paragraph two (2) of this agreement." Pursuant to paragraph two, the occurrence of any one of the following events would terminate the agreement:
a) The remarriage of Vincenzina Cox.
b) Regular residence of Vincenzina Cox with any person other than the minor grandchildren.
c) The death of Vincenzina Cox.
d) A change in custody of more than two of the grandchildren.
e) The emancipation of all of the four minor grandchildren.
f) The death of both joint owners of the property.
John filed a motion seeking to declare his youngest daughter, who was twenty years old at the time, emancipated. In the certification he submitted in support of the motion, he stated Vincenzina refused to provide him with proof that their youngest daughter was a full-time sophomore at Brookdale Community College. He also claimed his twenty-eight-year-old son was also living in the home. He accused Vincenzina of "wrongfully extending the time for which [he was to] provide 'child support'" for their daughter and "also compelling [him] to support [Vincenzina] by providing the Freehold home to her under circumstances where that obligation should finally end."
He additionally contended Vincenzina had repeatedly violated the agreement by: (1) permitting their twenty-eight-year-old son to "reside in . . . the former marital residence while he runs his own computer software business out of the home" and (2) allowing their son-in-law to live in the former marital home from 2009 through 2011 and collecting rent from him which Vincenzina never shared with him or his father. The court denied John's motion, and John has not appealed that decision.
Meanwhile, as parties to the agreement permitting Vincenzina to remain in their property until the occurrence of any one of the triggering events, John R. and Patricia filed a motion to intervene. They asserted the agreement terminated when Vincenzina permitted the fiancé of one of her daughters to reside in the home for a short period of time, triggering that part of the agreement prohibiting Vincenzina's "regular residence . . . with any person other than the minor grandchildren." The court permitted John R. and Patricia to participate in oral argument, but ultimately denied their application. The court, citing White v. White, 313 N.J. Super. 637 (Ch. Div. 1998), concluded "the issues as to the satisfaction of the conditions of the Agreement are adequately advanced and represented by [John]."
John R. and Patricia sought reconsideration, which the court denied. In its written statement of reasons incorporated in the order, the court first corrected the last sentence in Paragraph 6 of its earlier order to read: "The [c]ourt does not find that the presence of Timothy, the fiancé of a 'grandchild' . . . three years ago, is sufficient for this [c]ourt to find termination is triggered."
Addressing the portion of the agreement at issue, Vincenzina's "regular residence" with someone other than the minor grandchildren, the court stated:
The [c]ourt finds that Paragraph 2b was logically intended to apply to a situation in which [d]efendant was regularly residing with a person by which she had a relationship, be it a paramour or friend, who was a contemporary of [d]efendant. The provision does not state "regular residence" in the home. It does not state "regular residence" of anyone. The [a]greement states "regular residence of Vincenzina Cox with any person other than the minor grandchildren." The [c]ourt finds that the residence of Timothy for one year, three years ago, at the property, as a fiancé of a grandchild, was not the type of "residence" which triggered termination under Paragraph 2b. Under Newark Publishers' Ass'n. [v. Newark Typographical Union, 22 N.J. 419, 426 (1956)], the [c]ourt should not put a disproportionate emphasis upon a word or clause or a single provision. To adopt the interpretation of the Senior Coxes is to take the provision out of the context of the entire [a]greement, and reform the contract to express something that is not indicated by the review of the entire [a]greement. While the [c]ourt could find that the Senior Coxes' interpretation is a possible interpretation, thus making the provision ambiguous, the [c]ourt does not find that a genuine issue of fact remains, warranting a plenary hearing.
Finally, the court found their contention that "[John] is not in a position to assert [their] rights . . . sufficiently" was without merit. The present appeal followed.
On appeal, John R. and Patricia contend the trial court erred when it denied their application to intervene on the sole issue of enforcement of an agreement to which they are parties and also erred when it denied their application to declare the agreement terminated as a result of Vincenzina permitting her daughter's then fiancé to reside in the home for approximately one year prior to their marriage.
Rule 4:33-1 provides:
Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action if the applicant claims an interest relating to the property . . . which is the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
"'As the rule is not discretionary, a court must approve an application for intervention as of right if the four criteria are satisfied.'" Builders League of S. Jersey, Inc. v. Gloucester Cnty. Util. Auth., 386 N.J. Super. 462, 469 (App. Div. 2006)(quoting Meehan v. K.D. Partners, L.P., 317 N.J. Super. 563, 568 (App. Div. 1998). Moreover, the rule is liberally construed. Ibid. (citing Am. Civil Liberties Union of N.J., Inc., v. County of Hudson, 352 N.J. Super. 44, 67 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 174 N.J. 162 (2002)).
Here, John R. and Patricia failed to satisfy the requirement that their interests were not being adequately represented by John. John expressed in his certification in support of his motion to declare their youngest child emancipated that
[Vincenzina] is currently using our twenty-year-old daughter in an improper effort to continue my obligation and my parent's obligation to provide housing and support to [Vincenzina].John additionally certified:
. . . .
My parents have paid the taxes, sewer, water, upkeep, and homeowner's insurance for [Vincenzina] and the children. I have paid rent to my parents for [Vincenzina] and the children, all utility bills, and renter's insurance.
While the language of our Judgment of Divorce was intended by both my parents and me to be a "shield" to protect my ex-wife and four then young children from the otherwise rigorous post-divorce financial ruin that they would have otherwise experienced, [Vincenzina] has used that language as a "sword" in her battle to remain indefinitely in my parent's rental home at no cost whatsoever to [Vincenzina].John R. and Patricia's position mirrors that of John, namely, that Patricia has breached that portion of the agreement prohibiting regular residence in the former marital home with someone other than the minor children. John "was in as good a position" as John R. and Patricia to advance the motion.
[Vincenzina] continues to reside in the former marital residence with two of our children, 28-year-old John and 20-year-old Cassandra, with John emancipated for five years and running a small business from our home and Cassandra not really being a "fulltime student[,]" while all roof expenses of
the former marital residence continue to be paid by my parents and me.
We next address whether the court erred in construing the agreement as "logically intend[ing] to apply to a situation in which [Vincenzina] was regularly residing with a person by which she had a relationship, be it a paramour or friend[.]" We are mindful that the scope of our review of a trial court's factfinding function is limited, meaning, we are generally bound by the trial court's factual findings when "supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998). Moreover, "[b]ecause of the family courts' special jurisdiction and expertise in family matters, appellate courts should accord deference to family court factfinding." Id. at 413. However, "[a] trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference." Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995). It is against these standards that we review the trial court's determination.
The agreement between John R. and Patricia, and John and Vincenzina was incorporated into John and Vincenzina's Final Judgment of Divorce. Although the agreement is a contract subject to application of contractual principles in its interpretation,
[d]ivorce agreements are necessarily infused with equitable considerations and are construed in light of salient legal and policy concerns. The interpretation, application, and enforceability of divorce agreements are not governed solely by contract law. [C]ontract principles have little place in the law of domestic relations. Thus, settlement agreements, if found to be fair and just, are specifically enforceable in equity.Here, the motion judge properly concluded that the "regular residence" language was logically linked to cohabitation in the former marital residence by an individual with whom Vincenzina was having a relationship. Had the intention of the parties been otherwise, there would be no necessity to specifically state "regular residence of Vincenzina" and "with any person other than the minor children." The intent of the parties would have been satisfied with language which simply precluded anyone other than Vincenzina and the minor children from residing in the home. The specificity of this provision supports the trial court's interpretation that it was directed to Vincenzina cohabitating in the former marital home with someone with whom she was maintaining a relationship.
[Konzelman v. Konzelman, 158 N.J. 185, 194 (1999)(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).]
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELATE DIVISIONn