Opinion
Civil Action No. 02-2255-CM.
November 23, 2004
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Leon S. Cowan brought suit against defendant Unified School District 501, Shawnee County, Kansas, asserting that defendant discriminated against him on the basis of his race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., the Kansas Act Against Discrimination, ("KAAD"), Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-1001 et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. In its February 19, 2004 Order, this court granted in part and denied in part Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 47), leaving only the issue of whether plaintiff was discriminated against because of his race when he was denied an interview for the boys' basketball head coach position at Topeka West High School ("TWHS"). On April 29, 2004, a jury found for plaintiff (Doc. 68). Pending before the court is Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Judgment to Include Equitable Relief (Doc. 70).
Pursuant to Title VII, plaintiff requests that the court grant him instatement into the next available boys' high school basketball head coaching position and, additionally, front pay for this year and the next five years. Defendant contends that plaintiff is entitled to receive neither instatement nor front pay. If the court grants equitable relief, however, defendant urges that plaintiff not be instated into a position where a current coach will be displaced and not receive more than one year of front pay, less amounts plaintiff earned or could have earned using reasonable efforts.
I. Standard
The district court has broad discretion in granting equitable relief in Title VII cases. See Dilley v. SuperValu, Inc., 296 F.3d 958, 967 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, 624 F.2d 945, 957 (10th Cir. 1980)). The court's discretion, however, "must be guided by the fact that `one of the central purposes of Title VII is `to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination.''" Carter v. Sedgwick County, 36 F.3d 952, 957 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976) (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975))).
Instatement is the preferred equitable relief remedy under Title VII and should be ordered whenever possible. Abuan v. Level 3 Communications, Inc., 353 F.3d 1158, 1176 (10th Cir. 2003). In a situation in which "an appropriate position for the plaintiff is not immediately available without displacing an incumbent employee, courts have ordered reinstatement upon the opening of such a position and have ordered front pay to be paid until reinstatement occurs." Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours Co., 532 U.S. 843, 846 (2001). On the other hand, "in cases in which reinstatement is not viable because of continuing hostility between the plaintiff and the employer or its workers, or because of psychological injuries suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the discrimination, courts have ordered front pay as a substitute for reinstatement." Id.
Front pay is defined as simply the "money awarded for lost compensation during the period between judgment and reinstatement or in lieu of reinstatement." Id. Any front pay awarded by the court, however, "must specify an ending date and must take into account any amount that the plaintiff could earn using reasonable efforts." Carter v. Sedgwick County, 929 F.2d 1501, 1505 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing Edwards v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 892 F.2d 1442, 1449 (9th Cir. 1990)).
When both legal and equitable relief are sought on common factual determinations in the same case, the court is bound by the jury's findings when resolving the equitable issues. Smith v. Diffee Ford-Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 298 F.3d 955, 965 (10th Cir. 2002). In other words, "the subsequent findings by the trial judge in deciding the equitable claims [cannot] conflict with the jury's determinations." Ag Servs. of Am., Inc. v. Nielsen, 231 F.3d 726, 731 (10th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, this court is bound by the jury's finding that plaintiff was discriminated against because of his race when he applied to defendant for the position of TWHS boys' basketball head coach and was denied an interview and the position.
II. Analysis
The court first considers plaintiff's request to be instated into the next available boys' basketball head coach position with defendant. Keeping in mind that instatement is the preferred method of equitable relief, and that neither party has introduced evidence of hostility between plaintiff and defendant in this case, the court believes instatement of some kind is appropriate. Significantly, plaintiff does not request to be instated immediately, but rather requests instatement into the next available position. In addition, because plaintiff was denied an interview and the coaching position at TWHS, as opposed to another high school in defendant's school district, the court believes instatement into the next available position at TWHS is appropriate. Furthermore, the court believes that a time limitation on plaintiff's possible instatement of three years is appropriate. Therefore, the court awards plaintiff instatement into the next available boys' basketball head coach position at TWHS within the next three calendar years if such a position becomes available.
The court next considers plaintiff's request for front pay. Because plaintiff will likely not begin working as TWHS's boys' basketball head coach within the next year, if at all, the court follows Pollard and finds that some amount of front pay is equitable. Plaintiff argues that a front pay award should equal the amount of money plaintiff would have received working as TWHS's boys' basketball head coach, less the amount of money he received working for defendant as a middle school boys' basketball head coach. Defendant argues that if plaintiff receives any front pay, it should be limited to that which he would have received as TWHS's boys' basketball head coach, less the amount he could have received annually while working for defendant as a coach for three different middle school sports.
The court does not believe plaintiff's duty to mitigate his damages requires him to work three coaching positions to compensate for defendant's discrimination regarding one coaching position. Therefore, the court grants front pay in the amount of $3,475.29 annually for three calendar years beginning immediately. This amount was calculated by subtracting the amount plaintiff currently receives for his assignment as boys' basketball head coach at the middle school level for the 2004/2005 school year, or $1,750.71, from the amount plaintiff would have received as a boys' basketball head coach at TWHS for the 2004/2005 school year, or $5,226.00. Furthermore, defendant is ordered to pay plaintiff's front pay in the same cycle as defendant currently disburses plaintiff's wages. In the event plaintiff is instated as TWHS's boys' basketball head coach within the next three years, front pay will cease for the pay period beginning the first pay period plaintiff receives wages as TWHS's boys' basketball head coach position.
Neither party raised the issue of interest in their motions. Therefore, the court has not considered interest in calculating plaintiff's award of front pay.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff's Motion to Amend Judgment to Include Equitable Relief (Doc. 70) is granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant shall instate plaintiff into the next available TWHS boys' basketball head coaching position if such a position becomes available within the next three (3) calendar years.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant shall pay plaintiff front pay in the amount $3,475.29 annually in the manner set forth above for three (3) calendar years, starting immediately and ceasing if plaintiff is instated as TWHS's boys' basketball head coach.