Opinion
No. 189, 2000.
October 2, 2000.
Appeal from Superior Court, Sussex County.
AFFIRMED.
Unpublished Opinion is below.
EDWARD H. COVERDALE, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE OF DELAWARE, Plaintiff Below, Appellee. No. 189, 2000. Supreme Court of the State of Delaware. Submitted: July 7, 2000. Decided: October 2, 2000.
Court Below — Superior Court of the State of Delaware, in and for Sussex County in unnumbered Habitual Offender Petition.
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH and HOLLAND, Justices.
ORDER
This 2nd day of October 2000, upon consideration of the appellant's opening brief and the State of Delaware's motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that:
(1) More than 13 years ago, the State of Delaware petitioned the Superior Court, pursuant to 21 Del. C. § 2804, to determine whether Edward H. Coverdale was a motor vehicle habitual offender, as defined in 21 Del. C. § 2802. The Superior Court determined that Coverdale had been separately convicted during a five-year period of at least three serious motor vehicle driving offenses. Accordingly, by order dated October 16, 1987, the Superior Court declared Coverdale to be a habitual motor vehicle offender and revoked Coverdale's driving privileges for five years, as required by 21 Del. C. § 2809.
Effective January 15, 1995, the Court of Common Pleas now considers petitions to determine whether a person is a motor vehicle habitual offender. 69 Del. Laws 333 (1994).
(2) By letter dated March 11, 2000, Coverdale requested that the Superior Court issue a "habitual offender release form." The Superior Court treated Coverdale's request as a petition for reinstatement of his driving privileges pursuant to 21 Del. C. § 2809(3). The State opposed reinstatement because Coverdale had "conviction data on file since being declared a motor vehicle habitual offender in October 1987." The State argued that, as a result of the post-revocation driving convictions, Coverdale had not successfully completed his five-year suspension. The Superior Court agreed and, by letter dated March 31, 2000, denied Coverdale's reinstatement petition on the basis that Coverdale had not "completed a period of sixty months without driving." This appeal followed.
This was the second time Coverdale had requested that his license be reinstated. Coverdale first petitioned the Superior Court in 1997 for reinstatement of his driver's license. By letter dated August 25, 1997, the Superior Court denied Coverdale's petition on the basis that he had not completed a five-year suspension period without convictions.
(3) On appeal, Coverdale argues that the Superior Court abused its discretion and committed legal error when the court interpreted 21 Del. C. § 2809 to require that Coverdale remain violation-free for five years to qualify for restoration of his driving privileges. It is manifest on the face of Coverdale's opening brief that the appeal is without merit.
(4) The record in this case clearly reflects that Coverdale continued to drive, and accumulated numerous driving convictions, in spite of the fact that he was declared a habitual offender and had his driving privileges revoked in 1987. Indeed, at the time Coverdale filed his petition for reinstatement in March 2000, he was serving a prison sentence for a Driving Under the Influence conviction.
See Coverdale v. State, Del. Supr., No. 297, 1999, Holland, J., 2000 WL 990951 (June 23, 2000) (ORDER) (affirming State v. Coverdale, Super. Ct., Cr.A. Nos. 98-11-0329, 0331, 0332 0333).
(5) "[T]he primary purpose of the habitual motor vehicle offender statute is to foster public safety by denying driving privileges to those whose repeated conduct evidences indifference to the safety of others." Under 21 Del. C. § 2809(3), a driver's license shall not issue to a habitual offender until the offender has shown "good cause" for restoration of the privileges, and the Superior Court, "at its discretion, restores to such person the privilege to operate a motor vehicle."
Valerius v. State, Del. Supr., 574 A.2d 855, 857 (1990); 21 Del. C. § 2801.
(6) In this case, Coverdale has not established good cause why his driver's license should be restored. To the contrary, Coverdale's driving record amply demonstrates his "indifference to the safety and welfare of others" and his "disrespect for the laws of this State." As a matter of law and public policy, the Superior Court was well within its discretion when it denied Coverdale's petition for reinstatement.
21 Del.C.. § 2801.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State's motion to affirm is GRANTED. The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT: s/ Joseph T. Walsh Justice