We find persuasive the majority of courts, including the seven federal circuits, that have addressed FIFRA preemption since the United States Supreme Court's explanation of express preemption analysis in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 120 L.Ed.2d 407, 112 S.Ct. 2608 (1992), and that have held inadequate label and failure to warn claims are expressly preempted. See, e.g., Bice v. Leslie's Poolmart, Inc., 39 F.3d 887 (8th Cir. 1994); MacDonald v. Monsanto Co., 27 F.3d 1021 (5th Cir. 1994); King v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours Co., 996 F.2d 1346 (1st Cir.), cert. dismissed, 114 S.Ct. 490 (1993); Worm v. American Cyanamid Co., 5 F.3d 744 (4th Cir. 1993) ( Worm II); Shaw v. Dow Brands, Inc., 994 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1993); Arkansas-Platte Gulf Partnership v. Van Waters Rogers, Inc., 981 F.2d 1177 (10th Cir.) ( Arkansas-Platte II), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 60 (1993); Papas v. Upjohn Co., 985 F.2d 516 (11th Cir.) ( Papas II), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 300 (1993); but see Couture v. Dow Chem. U.S.A., 804 F. Supp. 1298 (D. Mont. 1992) (holding FIFRA preempts no common-law claims); Burke v. Dow Chem. Co., 797 F. Supp. 1128 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding FIFRA preempts inadequate label claims but not claims for failure to warn through other channels). Upon engaging in our own analysis of the statutory language, we concur with this overwhelming authority and hold Plaintiff's claims for inadequate labeling and failure to warn are preempted.
See also Yowell v. Chevron Chemical Co., 836 S.W.2d 62 (Mo.App. 1992); and Davidson v. Velsicol Chemical, 108 Nev. 591, 834 P.2d 931 (1992), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 1944, 123 L.Ed.2d 650 (1993).See MacDonald v. Monsanto Co., 813 F. Supp. 1258 (E.D.Tex. 1993); Couture v. Dow Chemical U.S.A., 804 F. Supp. 1298 (D.Mont. 1992); Burke v. Dow Chemical Co., 797 F. Supp. 1128 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); Thornton v. Fondren Green Apartments, 788 F. Supp. 928 (S.D.Tex. 1992); Montana Pole Treating Plant v. I.F. Laucks Co., 775 F. Supp. 1339 (D.Mont. 1991), aff'd, 993 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1993); and Riden v. I.C.I. Americas, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 1500 (W.D.Mo. 1991). a. D.C. Circuit
MacDonald, 27 F.3d at 1025. Other post- Cipollone decisions addressing preemption include Kolich v. Sysco Corp., 825 F. Supp. 959 (D. Kan. 1993) (failure to warn claims preempted); Couture v. Dow Chemical U.S.A., 804 F. Supp. 1298 (D. Mont. 1992) (only positive enactments concerning labeling preempted; failure to warn claim is not a labeling requirement and is not preempted); Burke v. Dow Chemical Co., 797 F. Supp. 1128 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (express preemption to some extent, but no implied preemption; court seems to indicate that strict liability claim based on risk-utility test would not be preempted); Yowell v. Chevron Chemical Co., 836 S.W.2d 62 (Mo.App. 1992) (plaintiffs' claims challenged the adequacy of pesticide labels; court held that FIFRA preempted all of plaintiffs' claims, including strict liability claim, because Congress intended to occupy the field of pesticide labeling; court rejected the Ferebee "choice of reaction" analysis); Davidson v. Velsicol Chemical, 108 Nev. 591, 834 P.2d 931 (1992), cert. denied 123 L.Ed.2d 650 (1993) (FIFRA impliedly preempts state tort law actions; court found Cipollone not instructive). The thorough discussion of the preemption analysis set forth in Papas II, Arkansas-Platte II, and
Only two post -Cipollone district court decisions have held that FIFRA does not preempt state common law claims for relief based on inadequate warning or labeling. See MacDonald v. Monsanto Co., 813 F. Supp. 1258 (E.D.Tex. 1993), rev'd, 27 F.3d at 1025; Couture v. Dow Chem. U.S.A., 804 F. Supp. 1298 (D.Mont. 1992). Thus, in light of the conclusions reached by the Eighth Circuit in its recent decision in Welchert, and the six other United States Courts of Appeals to examine the issue of FIFRA's preemptive effect since the Cipollone decision, the court concludes that FIFRA preempts state common law claims based on inadequate labeling.
1987) (express); Papas v. Upjohn Co., 926 F.2d 1019 (11th Cir. 1991) (implied); Fisher v. Chevron Chem. Co., 716 F. Supp. 1283 (W.D.Mo. 1989) (implied).See MacDonald v. Monsanto Co., 813 F. Supp. 1258 (E.D.Tex. 1993); Couture v. Dow Chemical U.S.A., 804 F. Supp. 1298 (D.Mont. 1992).See Worm v. American Cyanamid Co., 5 F.3d 744 (4th Cir. 1993) (FIFRA dictates preemption of any state common law cause of action resting on alleged failure to warn or communicate information about product through labeling); King v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours Co., 996 F.2d 1346 (1st Cir. 1993) (in light of Cipollone, FIFRA preempts state law tort claims based on defendants' alleged failure to warn about health hazards of herbicides they manufactured and sold); Shaw v. Dow Brands, 994 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1993) (common law actions for labeling and packaging deficiencies cannot survive under FIFRA); Arkansas-Platte Gulf v. Van Waters Rogers, 981 F.2d 1177 (10th Cir. 1993) (to extent that state tort claims require showing that defendants' labeling and packaging should have included additional, different, or alternatively stated warnings from those required under FIFRA, they would be expressly preempted); Papas v. Upjohn Co., 985 F.2d 516 (11th Cir. 1993) (claims requiring showing that label
., Arkansas-Platte Gulf Partnership v. Dow Chemical, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 314, 121 L.Ed.2d 235 (1992), on remand, 981 F.2d 1177 (10th Cir. 1993), [hereinafter Arkansas-Platte II], petition for cert. filed, (May 10, 1993); Arkansas-Platte II supra; Papas v. Upjohn Co., 926 F.2d 1019, 1023 (11th Cir. 1991) [hereinafter, Papas I], cert. granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded sub. nom., Papas v. Zoecon Corp., 985 F.2d 516 (11th Cir. 1993) [hereinafter, Papas II], petition for cert. filed, (June 7, 1993); Papas II supra; Gibson v. Dow Chemical Co., 1992 WL 404681 (E.D.Ky.); King v. E.I. DuPont Nemours Co., 806 F. Supp. 1030 (D.Me. 1992); Kennan v. Dow Chemical Co., 717 F. Supp. 799 (M.D.Fla. 1989); Fitzgerald v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 681 F. Supp. 404 (E.D.Mich. 1987). Cases holding that FIFRA does not preempt state tort law suits based on labeling include Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Company, 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984); MacDonald v. Monsanto, 813 F. Supp. 1258 (E.D.Tex. 1993); Couture v. Dow Chemical U.S.A., 804 F. Supp. 1298 (D.Mon. 1992); Burke v. Dow, 797 F. Supp. 1128 (E.D.N.Y. 1992). The case at bar is analogous to Cipollone.
We decline to follow the single post- Cipollone case of which we are aware that supports the plaintiffs' position. See Couture v. Dow Chem. U.S.A., 804 F. Supp. 1298 (D. Mont. 1992). Instead, we join every Federal and State appellate court that has addressed this issue, including the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which has within its jurisdiction the court that decided Couture, supra, in concluding that FIFRA's § 136v(b) preempts all State action pertaining to labeling requirements.
(See Stamps v. Collagen Corp.,supra, 984 F.2d at pp. 1424-1425 [holding Ferebee did not survive Cipollone]; King v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co., supra, 996 F.2d at p. 1351.) While at least one post- Cipollone opinion holds FIFRA does not preempt failure-to-warn claims ( Couture v. Dow Chemical U.S.A. (D.Mont. 1992) 804 F. Supp. 1298), we agree with the majority of courts that have found the preemption clause construed in Cipollone indistinguishable from 7 United States Code section 136v(b). As previously noted, MacDonald v. Monsanto Co., supra, 813 F. Supp. 1258, finding FIFRA did not preempt state law tort claims, was reversed after briefing was completed in this case.
The court thus concluded that even if the EPA refused to permit Chevron to alter its label, the State of Maryland could decide that "as between a manufacturer and an injured party, the manufacturer ought to bear the cost of compensating for those injuries that could have been prevented with a more detailed label than that approved by the EPA" (Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., supra, at 1541). Although a number of Federal District Courts initially accepted Ferebee's "choice of reaction" analysis, and concluded that FIFRA neither expressly nor impliedly preempts State tort claims based upon failure to warn (see, e.g., Couture v. Dow Chem. U.S.A., 804 F. Supp. 1298 [D Mont]; Riden v. ICI Ams., 763 F. Supp. 1500 [WD Mo]; Roberts v. Dow Chem. Co., 702 F. Supp. 195 [ND Ill]; Cox v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 704 F. Supp. 85 [ED Pa]), the next two Federal appellate courts to consider the issue rejected the Ferebee approach, and held that FIFRA impliedly preempts State damages actions which challenge the adequacy of EPA-approved pesticide labels. In Papas v. UpJohn Co. ( 926 F.2d 1019, 1025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit concluded that FIFRA preempted State common-law actions based on labeling claims, since a jury's determination that a pesticide's labeling is inadequate "results in a direct conflict with the EPA's determination that the labeling is adequate to protect against health risks".
A majority of published federal district court decisions issued after Cipollone have also found preemption of common-law actions for failure to warn. See King v E I Du Pont de Nemours Co, 806 F. Supp. 1030 (D Me, 1992); Casper v E I Du Pont de Nemours Co, 806 F. Supp. 903 (ED Wash, 1992); Jordan v Southern Wood Piedmont Co, 805 F. Supp. 1575 (SD Ga, 1992); Burke v Dow Chemical Co, 797 F. Supp. 1128 (ED NY, 1992); but see MacDonald v Monsanto Co, 813 F. Supp. 1258 (ED Tex, 1993); Couture v Dow Chemical USA, 804 F. Supp. 1298 (D Mo, 1992). In Cipollone, the Supreme Court found that a provision stating that "[n]o statement relating to smoking and health . . . shall be required on any cigarette package," other than those mandated by the act, "merely prohibited state and federal rule-making bodies from mandating particular cautionary statements" and did not preempt common-law actions for damages.