Coutrier v. Motorcar Corp.

22 Citing cases

  1. McKay v. Ciani

    288 A.D.2d 587 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001)   Cited 15 times

    He asserts that the evidence presented failed to support a finding that there was a therapeutic relationship between him, as the EAP coordinator, and plaintiff, as an employee-nurse who contacted him in connection with his role as the EAP coordinator. Our review of the verdict is limited to determining whether "'the evidence so preponderate[d] in favor of the [defendant] that [the verdict] could not have been reached on any fair interpretation of the evidence'" (Lolik v. Big V Supermarkets, 86 N.Y.2d 744, 746, quoting Moffatt v. Moffatt, 86 A.D.2d 864, affd 62 N.Y.2d 875; see also, Puznowski v. Spirax Sarco, 275 A.D.2d 506, 508; Coutrier v. Haraden Motorcar Corp., 237 A.D.2d 774, 775-776). We are also constrained by the recognition that "'when factual and credibility issues are in * * * dispute * * * prudent deference [must be given] to the traditional, trusted jury process, so long as the required rationality minimum of evidence is adduced'" (Stram v. Farrell, 223 A.D.2d 260, 264, quoting Campbell v. City of Elmira, 84 N.Y.2d 505, 513).

  2. Eisenberg v. The Mansion a Lawrence

    20-CV-02488 (PMH) (PED) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2023)

    The court then correctly considered awards in similar cases with standalone knee injuries stemming from patellar fractures as guideposts to determine the range of an appropriate award, and properly recommended a total compensatory award of $35,000. (Id. at 13-14); see also, e.g. Coutrier v. Haradan Motorcar Corp., 655 N.Y.S.2d 660 (3d Dep't 1997) (awarding $35,000 in compensatory damages for a patellar contusion limiting plaintiff's daily activities and causing significant pain). The Magistrate Judge also correctly noted that “in cases involving the application of federal common law, most courts in the Second Circuit have held that a defendant in default may not invoke the benefits of the set-off rule.”

  3. Eisenberg v. Gold Flowers Design, Inc.

    20 Civ. 2488 (PMH) (PED) (S.D.N.Y. May. 9, 2022)   Cited 1 times

    knee and could not walk as much as he had in the past; following a bench trial, the court awarded plaintiff $27,500 for pain and suffering); Sandy v. NYC Transit Authority, 747 N.Y.S.2d 110 (2d Dep't 2002) (plaintiff was involved in a car accident and sustained multiple rib fractures and crepitation of the knee; she was hospitalized for five days, during which she experienced severe chest pain; jury awarded her $200,000 for past pain and suffering and $150,000 for future pain and suffering; remitted for a new trial on damages unless plaintiff stipulated to $75,000 for past pain and suffering and $50,000 for future pain and suffering); Lolik v. Big V Supermarkets, Inc., 698 N.Y.S.2d 762 (3d Dep't 1999) (Plaintiffs fall caused her preexisting, asymptomatic arthritis in her knees to become symptomatic; jury awarded $10,000 for past pain and suffering and $10,000 for future pain and suffering); Coutrier v. Haradan Motorcar Corp., 655 N.Y.S.2d 660 (3d Dep't 1997) (plaintiff injured her right knee in a car accident; initial diagnosis was a patellar contusion which was treated with physical therapy; arthroscopic surgery was performed nine months later due to persistent pain, swelling, fluid and limited range of motion in the knee; lingering symptoms included pain in the retro patellar area and numbness in her leg; jury awarded $5,000 for past pain and suffering and $30,000 for future pain and suffering); Hulsen v. Morrison, 614 N.Y.S.2d 561 (2d Dep't 1994) (plaintiff sustained permanent injuries in a car accident, including radioculopathy and arthritic changes in his neck, a herniated disk in his lower back and a grade-three chondromalacia in his right knee; jury awarded, inter alia, $175,000 for past and future pain and suffering; remitted for new trial on damages unless plaintiff stipulated to a $75,000 award for past/future pain and suffering).

  4. Luizzi v. Pro Transport Inc.

    02 CV 5388 (CLP) (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2009)   Cited 14 times
    Explaining that all drivers are under a duty " to maintain a reasonably safe rate of speed, to have their automobiles under reasonable control, to keep a proper lookout, under the circumstances then existing, to see and be aware of what was in their view, and to use reasonable care to avoid an accident."

    Goldstein v. United States, 9 F. Supp. 2d 175, 186 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (citing Bradt v. Lancaster, 249 A.D.2d 663, 663-64, 671 N.Y.S.2d 199, 200 (3d Dep't 1998); Terrell v. Kissel, 116 A.D.2d 637, 638-39, 497 N.Y.S.2d 716, 718 (2d Dep't 1986)); see also Guzzardi v. Grotas, 98 A.D.2d 761, 469 N.Y.S.2d 475, 476 (2d Dep't 1983). All drivers are under a duty: (1) to maintain a reasonably safe rate of speed, (2) to have their automobiles under reasonable control, (3) to keep a proper lookout, under the circumstances then existing, to see and be aware of what was in their view, and (4) to use reasonable care to avoid an accident. See Filippazzo v. Santiago, 277 A.D.2d 419, 419-20, 716 N.Y.S.2d 710 (2d Dep't 2000); Coutrier v. Haraden Motorcar Corp., 237 A.D.2d 774, 776, 655 N.Y.S.2d 660, 663 (3d Dep't 1997); Sarosy v. Scheina, 225 A.D.2d 493, 494, 639 N.Y.S.2d 817 (1st Dep't 1996); see also Barile v. Lazzarini, 222 A.D.2d 635, 637, 635 N.Y.S.2d 694, 696 (2d Dep't 1995); Abramowicz v. Roberto, 220 A.D.2d 374, 375, 631 N.Y.S.2d 442, 443 (2d Dep't 1995); Guzzardi v. Grotas, 98 A.D.2d at 761, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 475. If the jury credits Mr. Sanchez's testimony as to how the accident occurred, a reasonable jury could conclude that plaintiff was negligent and acting in violation of the VTL for failing to, at the very least, use reasonable care to avoid the accident.

  5. Saint v. U.S.

    483 F. Supp. 2d 267 (E.D.N.Y. 2007)   Cited 8 times

    With respect to plaintiff's culpability, we similarly view the record as supporting the jury's allocation of 70% of fault to plaintiff. Although plaintiff claims that he had the right of way (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1141), he clearly had a duty to exercise reasonable care in changing lanes and entering the intersection (cf., Patti v. Fenimore, supra, at 871, 581 N.Y.S.2d 432; Walker v. Dartmouth Plan Leasing Corp., 180 A.D.2d 952, 580 N.Y.S.2d 535; Rice v. Massalone, supra, at 863, 554 N.Y.S.2d 294, Ward v. Watson, supra, at 915-916, 536 N.Y.S.2d 899), including the requirement of reducing his speed to an appropriate rate (see, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180[e]). . . . Upon the proof presented at trial, we conclude that plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the apportionment of fault, which was within the province of the jury, could not have been reached by any fair interpretation of the evidence, even though the record may also support a different version (see, Coutrier v. Haraden Motorcar Corp., 237 A.D.2d 774, 775, 655 N.Y.S.2d 660; Krueger v. Wilde, 204 A.D.2d 988, 989, 614 N.Y.S.2d 88; Esner v. Janisziewski, 180 A.D.2d 991, 993, 580 N.Y.S.2d 551; Vail v. Keeler, 166, A.D.2d 817, 819, 562 N.Y.S.2d 818). In Lang v. Bouju, 245 A.D.2d 1000, 667 N.Y.S.2d 440 (3d Dep't 1997), the defendant was making a left turn into a parking lot and drove across a double yellow line into the lane of oncoming traffic, where the plaintiff's decedent, driving a motorcycle, approached in the oncoming lane.

  6. Covey v. Simonton

    481 F. Supp. 2d 224 (E.D.N.Y. 2007)   Cited 305 times
    Holding that "the reasonableness of [defendant's] action in response to the emergency presented by the mattress in the road is an issue that cannot be decided on summary judgment"

    All drivers are under a duty: (1) to maintain a reasonably safe rate of speed, (2) to have their automobiles under reasonable control, (3) to keep a proper lookout, under the circumstances then existing, to see and be aware of what was in their view, and (4) to use reasonable care to avoid an accident. See Filippazzo v. Santiago, 277 A.D.2d 419, 419-20, 716 N.Y.S.2d 710 (2d Dep't 2000); Coutrier v. Haraden Motorcar Corp., 237 A.D.2d 774, 776, 655 N.Y.S.2d 660, 663 (3d Dep't 1997); Sarosy v. Scheina, 225 A.D.2d 493, 494, 639 N.Y.S.2d 817 (1st Dep't 1996); see also Barile v. Lazzarini, 222 A.D.2d 635, 637, 635 N.Y.S.2d 694, 696 (2d Dep't 1995); Abramowicz v. Roberto, 220 A.D.2d 374, 375, 631 N.Y.S.2d 442, 443 (2d Dep't 1995); Guzzardi v. Grotas, 98 A.D.2d at 761, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 475.

  7. Caruso v. U.S.

    No. 01-CV-1207 (DRH) (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2002)   Cited 2 times

    Awards for past pain and suffering for an injury of this nature have ranged from $5,000 to over $200,000. See, e.g., Madsen v. Merola, 288 A.D.2d 520, 521 (3d Dep't 2001) (upholding award of $75,000 for past pain and suffering to plaintiff whose knee and groin were injured in a motorcycle accident where plaintiff had undergone reconstructive surgery on the same knee months earlier); Pfeifer v. Musiker Student Tours, Inc., 280 A.D.2d 266 (1st Dep't 2001) (upholding award of $200,000 to fifteen year old plaintiff for scars to chin, hip, elbow and knee sustained in fall from bicycle); Cotto v. Coyle, 258 A.D.2d 554 (2d Dep't 1999) (affirming award of $30,000 for past pain and suffering and $210,000 for future pain and suffering for injury to knee in sidewalk slip-and-fall); Coutrier v. Haraden Motorcar Crop., 237 A.D.2d 774, 775 (3d Dep't 1997) (affirming award of $5,000 for past pain and suffering and $30,000 for future pain and suffering after 50% reduction for comparative negligence for injury to knee in automobile accident which required arthroscopic surgery); Cochetti v. Gralow, 192 A.D.2d 974 (3d Dep't 1993) (reversing on other grounds a jury award of, inter alia, $10,000 after a 40% reduction for comparative negligence for a knee injury suffered in a slip-and-fall on ice resulting in surgery). Each case is necessarily dependent on its particular facts.

  8. Greblewski v. Strong Health MCO, LLC

    161 A.D.3d 1336 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018)   Cited 15 times

    Furthermore, plaintiff testified that prior to her fall, she was walking straight, did not have a cell phone in her hand and was not distracted by anything. Given that whether a plaintiff is comparatively negligent presents a jury question (seeMannello v. Town of Ulster, Post 1748, Am. Legion, 272 A.D.2d 804, 804–805, 707 N.Y.S.2d 725 [2000] ; Coutrier v. Haraden Motorcar Corp., 237 A.D.2d 774, 775, 655 N.Y.S.2d 660 [1997] ), we discern no basis on this record to disturb the jury's determination ascribing 100% of the fault to defendants (seePaternoster v. Drehmer, 260 A.D.2d 867, 869–870, 688 N.Y.S.2d 778 [1999] ; O'Neill v. Mildac Props., 162 A.D.2d 441, 443, 556 N.Y.S.2d 387 [1990] ). Finally, regarding the amount of damages awarded by the jury, "a court may set aside a jury award of damages when that award ‘deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation’ " ( Albanese v. Przybylowicz, 116 A.D.3d 1216, 1217, 985 N.Y.S.2d 163 [2014], quoting CPLR 5501[c] ; seeKahl v. MHZ Operating Corp., 270 A.D.2d 623, 624, 703 N.Y.S.2d 842 [2000] ).

  9. Jones v. State

    62 A.D.3d 1078 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009)   Cited 2 times

    Defendant bore the burden of proving that claimant acted negligently by playing basketball in view of the hazardous condition on the court ( see CPLR 1412; Zhenfan Zhang v Yellow Tr. Corp., 5 AD3d 337, 338). While a determination of comparative negligence is ordinarily for the trier of fact and will not be disturbed so long as it is supported by the record evidence ( see Paternoster v Drehmer, 260 AD2d 867, 869; Coutrier v Haraden Motorcar Corp., 237 AD2d 774, 776; Lolik v Big V Supermarkets, 210 AD2d 703, 704, revd on other grounds 86 NY2d 744), in reviewing a decision following a nonjury trial, we are empowered to "independently review the evidence and grant judgment as warranted by the record, giving due deference to the Court of Claims' credibility determinations" ( Jackson v State of New York, 51 AD3d 1251, 1252; see Seaman v State of New York, 45 AD3d 1126, 1126-1127).

  10. Nolan v. Union College Trust of Schnectady

    51 A.D.3d 1253 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008)   Cited 59 times

    Defendant further asserts that a new trial should be ordered on the issue of damages because the jury's award, even as reduced by Supreme Court, was excessive. In reviewing awards for excessiveness, the pertinent inquiry is whether "the award deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation" ( Coutrier v Haraden Motorcar Corp., 237 AD2d 774, 777; see CPLR 5501 [c]). We turn first to the $3.36 million awarded to plaintiff for future medical expenses.