Cousin v. Cousin

15 Citing cases

  1. Nunez v. Gray

    No. 2210 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Aug. 7, 2017)

    In any event, Mother's argument is unpersuasive, because a trial court is not required "to articulate every fact upon which [it] relies," as long as it sufficiently considers the relevant issues. See, e.g., Cousin v. Cousin, 97 Md. App. 506, 518 (1993); see also Flanagan v. Flanagan, 181 Md. App. 492, 533 (2008) ("[u]nder discretionary review, a trial judge's failure to state each and every consideration or factor does not, without demonstration of some improper consideration, constitute an abuse of discretion, so long as the record supports a reasonable conclusion that appropriate factors were taken into account in the exercise of discretion") (citations and quotation marks omitted); Malin v. Mininberg, 153 Md. App. 358, 429 (2003) ("although consideration of the [statutory] factors [regarding a monetary divorce award] is mandatory, the trial court need not go through a detailed check list of the statutory factors . . . because a judge is presumed to know the law") (citations and quotation marks omitted).

  2. Aytenfsu v. Tefera

    No. 654 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Nov. 29, 2016)

    Evidence of the inability of parents to communicate is, by itself, a sufficient reason to refuse to grant joint legal custody. See Cousin v. Cousin, 97 Md. App. 506, 517 (1993); Hughes v. Hughes, 80 Md. App. 216, 233 (1989). As Mother explains in her brief, the trial court did not base its custody decision solely on Father's unwillingness to communicate with Mother.

  3. Lemley v. Lemley

    102 Md. App. 266 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994)   Cited 56 times
    Holding that an award of temporary or rehabilitative alimony may not be made unless the recipient spouse is not self-supporting and citing Hull v. Hull, 83 Md. App. 218, 220-221, 574 A.2d 20

    This should have been clear from the ruling in Domingues, wherein the Court held that the chancellor must determine "which facts are properly before him [or her]" before exercising independent judgment to determine the proper result. Domingues, 323 Md. at 496, 593 A.2d 1133. Compare Cousin v. Cousin, 97 Md. App. 506, 517, 631 A.2d 119 (1993) (holding that there is no need to address each finding of fact where appellant does not allege specific fact-finding error). Because the chancellor failed to state how he resolved each challenge to the master's findings of fact, we must remand for a more definite statement of his decision.

  4. Blaine v. Blaine

    97 Md. App. 689 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993)   Cited 52 times
    In Blaine, 336 Md. at 58, the Court of Appeals considered Ms. Blaine's motion for an indefinite extension of her alimony pursuant to FL ยง 11-107(a).

    Melrod v. Melrod, 83 Md. App. 180, 195, 574 A.2d 1 (1990). The scenarios that have been examined as to whether alimony may be awarded at the time of divorce teach the following: the award of alimony pendente lite is insufficient, in and of itself, to reserve the issue of indefinite alimony for consideration at the time of divorce or subsequently, Speropulos v. Speropulos, 97 Md. App. 613, 616-18, 631 A.2d 514 (1993); a request by a litigant for "reasonable" alimony preserves the chancellor's ability to award indefinite alimony because the term "alimony" is to be used generically, Cousin v. Cousin, 97 Md. App. 506, 518-20, 631 A.2d 119 (1993); a trial court may, if the predicate facts are present, award both rehabilitative and indefinite alimony, Coviello v. Coviello, 91 Md. App. 638, 605 A.2d 661 (1992); a court may decide to award rehabilitative alimony while exercising the power to reserve as to indefinite alimony, Benkin v. Benkin, 71 Md. App. 191, 524 A.2d 789 (1987); and, rehabilitative alimony may not be awarded as an interim consolation prize to a dependent spouse who, in seeking indefinite alimony, had failed to convince the chancellor that her medical condition at the time prevented her from being employed in the only field of expertise for which she was trained, Thomasian v. Thomasian, 79 Md. App. 188, 192-96, 556 A.2d 675 (1989). In post-divorce modification contexts, however, the reported case law guidance constitutes a smaller universe.

  5. Blaine v. Blaine

    336 Md. 49 (Md. 1994)   Cited 93 times
    Stating that a number of enumerated statutory factors are equitable and reflect "concepts, for the most part [that are] already in existence in Maryland common law. . . ."

    We agree with the intermediate appellate court that indefinite alimony does not constitute a claim separate from rehabilitative alimony; the two terms express concepts of duration. See Blaine, supra, 97 Md. App. at 707-08, 632 A.2d 191; Cousin v. Cousin, 97 Md. App. 506, 518-19, 631 A.2d 119 (1993). Thus, contrary to Dr. Blaine's contention, the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel do not bar consideration of an award of indefinite alimony as long as new circumstances exist that would entitle the recipient to seek an extension of alimony.

  6. Rivera-Ramirez v. Hall

    No. 756-2022 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Feb. 14, 2023)

    Id.; see also Cousin v. Cousin, 97 Md.App. 506, 518 (1993) ("The chancellor is not required to articulate every fact upon which he relies.").

  7. Hull v. Hull

    No. 418-2022 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Jan. 9, 2023)

    Malin, 153 Md.App. at 429 (quotation marks and citation omitted). See also Cousin v. Cousin, 97 Md.App. 506, 518 (1993) (holding that the court "is not required to articulate every fact upon which [it] relies"). Instead, "[t]he application and weighing of the factors is left to the discretion of the trial court."

  8. Kohan v. Kohan

    No. 1582-21 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Sep. 13, 2022)

    The court must determine "which facts are properly before [it]" before exercising independent judgment to determine the proper result. Domingues, 323 Md. at 496; cf. Cousin v. Cousin, 97 Md.App. 506, 517 (1993) (explaining that there is no need to address each finding of fact where the excepting party does not allege specific fact-finding error) (citing Noffsinger v. Noffsinger, 95 Md.App. 265, 274 n.1 (1993))." "

  9. In re Adoption/Guardianship of N.A.

    No. 1845 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Sep. 26, 2017)

    Moreover, it is black-letter law that a trial judge is not required "to articulate every fact upon which [it] relies," as long as it sufficiently considers the relevant issues. See e.g. Cousin v. Cousin, 97 Md. App. 506, 518 (1993); see also Flanagan v. Flanagan, 181 Md. App. 492, 533 (2008)("[u]nder discretionary review, a trial judge's failure to state each and every consideration or factor does not, without demonstration of some improper consideration, constitute an abuse of discretion, so long as the record supports a reasonable conclusion that appropriate factors were taken into account in the exercise of discretion") (citations and quotation marks omitted). When the court analyzed the FL ยง 5-323(d) factors, the court clearly took into account the appropriate factors.

  10. In re J. B.

    No. 0415 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Nov. 30, 2016)

    As a result, they are barred from raising this issue for the first time on appeal. See Md. Rule 8-131(a) (Other than matters of jurisdiction, appellate courts will not ordinarily consider any issue "unless it plainly appears by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court[."]). See also Cousins v. Cousins, 97 Md. App. 506, 518 (1993) ("Appellant cannot complain that the court was missing vital information when he did not bring it to the court's attention earlier."). This leaves us with appellants' second contention, namely, that the juvenile court erred when it concluded that the facts did not support a finding that J.B. was a CINA.