Opinion
C.A. No. 98A-04-013-JOH.
Submitted: November 23, 1999.
Decided. December 2, 1999.
Appellees' Motion for Reargument — DENIED .
Leo John Ramunno, Esq., Wilmington, DE.
Deborah I. Gottschalk, Esq. Community Legal Aid Society, Inc., Wilmington, DE.
Appellees Stephen and Denise Nero have moved to reargue this Court's decision reversing a decision in their favor of the Court of Common Pleas. They had sued appellant Courts of Llangollen over a security deposit. Stephen Nero had paid the deposit and was the sole tenant. It is unclear what Denise Nero's role is in this litigation.
The Landlord-Tenant Code makes a landlord liable for double the security deposit if it fails to follow certain provisions regulating the handling of such deposits. Stephen Nero claimed Llangollen had failed to follow those provisions by not giving him the statutorily-required notice of its intended use of the deposit. The Code, however, also imposes notice requirements on tenants. A tenant is obligated to provide a landlord notice of his or her new address at or before the lease's termination. This Court held that Stephen Nero failed to provide such notice thereby relieving Llangollen of any liability arising out of the security deposit.
Courts of Llangollen, Inc. v. Nero, Del.Super., C.A. No. 98A-04-013, Herlihy, J. (October 26, 1999).
The Neros contend this Court erred in two ways in reaching that conclusion. One way concerns this Court's comment that it was "obvious" on April 17, 1996 that Stephen Nero was no longer staying in the rental unit. This observation, they say, is an impermissible finding of fact, in short, something an appellate court should not do. April 17, 1996 was the date of a trial in the Justice of the Peace Court initiated by Llangollen' s action for possession and back rent to which Stephen Nero had counterclaimed for rent abatement and possession. The Neros made part of the appeal in this Court an April 29, 1996 decision of the magistrate who presided over the April 17th trial. That decision is detailed and thorough and without question shows the depth of the dispute between these parties.
The magistrate's opinion states that Stephen Nero had not paid rent for four or five months prior to the trial. While back rent was awarded, it was abated by forty-five percent due to, apparently, very bad living conditions in Stephen Nero's apartment. These facts and other matters recited in the magistrate's opinion about the evidence he heard on April 17th made it clear there was no future in the Nero-Llangollen relationship. In short, this Court was merely commenting on the obvious. There was no finding of fact.
The Neros seem to argue this Court held that the lease was terminated on April 17th. This is meritless. This Court made its observation in the context of reciting Stephen Nero's duty to give Llangollen his new address at or before the lease's termination. The lease, by its own provisions, terminated May 1, 1996. In issuing his award of back rent and abating it by forty-five percent, the magistrate calculated Stephen Nero's rent obligation up to May 1st. That was the date by which he was statutorily obligated to notify Llangollen of his new address. The record, without any dispute, shows he did not do that.
Ironically, the Neros' second claim of error involves a letter Stephen Nero sent the magistrate on April 25, 1996. This letter is referred to in the magistrate's April 29, 1996 opinion. It said that Stephen Nero was withdrawing his claim for possession. Assuming the unlikely, that Stephen Nero was somehow able to stay after April 30, 1996, his April 25th letter is his unequivocal statement and acknowledgment of the May 1st lease termination date. The irony is that neither in that letter nor in any subsequent correspondence on or before May 1st did Stephen Nero fulfill his duty to inform Llangollen of his new address. It is a mystery why he did that in this letter. An additional irony in citing in his reargument to this letter is that it confirms this Court's comment that on April 17th there was not going to be a landlord-tenant relationship after May 1st
The Neros' bases for reargument only confirm this Court's prior ruling. That ruling, as noted then, involved the law on security deposits as it existed in April 1996. Further, this case had unique facts. Whether those unique facts would lead to the same result under the law regulating security deposits as amended after April 1996 is a decision which must await another day.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the motion for reargument of plaintiff Stephen and Denise Nero is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.