• 5-7 To avoid a motion to dismiss, it must be clear that no set of facts can be proved which would entitle plaintiff to recover. ( Courtney v. Board of Education (1972), 6 Ill. App.3d 424, 425, 286 N.E.2d 25, 26.) Section 2-603(c) of the Civil Practice Law (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2-603(c)) tells us that "pleadings shall be liberally construed with a view to doing substantial justice between the parties."
( Johnson v. Nationwide Business Forms, Inc. (1976), 41 Ill. App.3d 128, 359 N.E.2d 171; Cain.) The motion admits all well-pleaded facts ( Acorn Auto Driving School, Inc. v. Board of Education (1963), 27 Ill.2d 93, 187 N.E.2d 722), and it must clearly appear that there are no facts which would entitle plaintiffs to relief for the dismissal to be warranted. ( Courtney v. Board of Education (1972), 6 Ill. App.3d 424, 286 N.E.2d 25.) On review, the allegations must be interpreted in the light most favorable to plaintiffs in determining whether their complaint has set forth a cause of action on which relief may be granted. J.J. Harrington Co. v. Timmerman (1977), 50 Ill. App.3d 404, 365 N.E.2d 721; Wooded Shores Property Owners Association, Inc. v. Mathews (1976), 37 Ill. App.3d 334, 337, 345 N.E.2d 186, 189. Defendants rely generally on the Board's statutory powers in support of their motion.
Id. Yet another Illinois decision should be noticed in this context. In Courtney v. Bd. of Ed. of the City of Chicago, 6 Ill.App.3d 424, 286 N.E.2d 25 (1972), the appellate court ruled that a complaint challenging the action of the Board of Education in bypassing certain persons holding principal's certificates near the top of the eligibility list in favor of others nearer the bottom stated a valid cause of action. The facts were that certain persons who had held their certificates for a longer time and thus were at the top of the list were bypassed when the Board appointed others who had not held their certificates as long. But this decision does not state that any given person possessing a certificate is entitled to a principalship by virtue of reaching the top of the eligibility list. At most it means that the Board may not consider those lower on the list before considering those higher up. It is a case involving priority of consideration and not entitlement to promotion.
• 1, 2 It is well settled that a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action admits all facts well pleaded and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. A motion to dismiss should not be granted unless it clearly appears that no set of facts could be proved under the pleadings which would entitle a plaintiff to relief. ( Courtney v. Board of Education (1972), 6 Ill. App.3d 424.) Pleadings are to be liberally construed with a view to doing substantial justice between parties, but even a liberal construction will not overcome the requirement that sufficient facts be alleged to state a cause of action. ( Church v. Adler (1953), 350 Ill. App. 471.)
Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law to be determined by the court ( Lenzi v. Morkin (1983), 116 Ill. App.3d 1014, 452 N.E.2d 667); an ambiguous contract is one capable of being understood in more than one sense ( Mid-City Industrial Supply Co. v. Horwitz (1985), 132 Ill. App.3d 476, 476 N.E.2d 1271). If an ambiguity exists, then the interpretation of a document is a question of fact which cannot be resolved by a section 2-615 motion; rather, the question can only be resolved after a trial on the merits. ( UIDC Management, Inc. v. Sears Roebuck Co. (1986), 141 Ill. App.3d 227, 490 N.E.2d 164.) Additionally, a complaint should not be dismissed pursuant to section 2-615, unless it clearly appears that no set of facts could be proved under the pleading which should entitle a plaintiff to relief. Courtney v. Board of Education (1972), 6 Ill. App.3d 424, 286 N.E.2d 25. In the instant matter, defendants, in support of their contention that the settlor intended that they retain the Northwestern stock indefinitely to preserve family control of Northwestern, rely in part on the following trust language:
It is well settled that, in construing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the complaint must be liberally construed, all facts well pleaded are admitted as true, and all reasonable inferences are drawn from them. ( Agee v. First National Bank (1979), 68 Ill. App.3d 794, 796, 386 N.E.2d 899.) A motion to dismiss should not be granted unless it is clearly evident that no set of facts under the pleading could exist which would entitle the plaintiff to relief. ( Courtney v. Board of Education (1972), 6 Ill. App.3d 424, 425, 286 N.E.2d 25.) Given the recognized obligation of the employer to utilize enough employees to insure the safety of the workplace, and the clear allegation that that duty was breached here, the majority's conclusion that the complaint does not state a cause of action is simply incorrect. Because the complaint must be liberally construed, the cause of action alleged against the co-employees was also sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss, given the duty of care owed by one employee to another.
In determining whether a complaint states facts or conclusions, the complaint must be considered as a whole and not in its disconnected parts. ( Courtney v. Board of Education, 6 Ill. App.3d 424, 286 N.E.2d 25.) With these legal principles in mind, a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action unless it clearly appears that no set of facts could be proved under the pleadings which would entitle plaintiffs to relief. ( Courtney v. Board of Education, supra; Callaizakis v. Astor Development Co., 4 Ill. App.3d 163, 280 N.E.2d 512.) Finally, section 42(2) of the Civil Practice Act states that `[n]o pleading is bad in substance which contains such information as reasonably informs the opposite party of the nature of the claim or defense which he is called upon to meet.' (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 110, par. 42(2).)"
(See Rinck v. Palos Hills Consolidated High School District No. 230 (1979), 82 Ill. App.3d 856, 863, 403 N.E.2d 470, 474.) A petition should not be dismissed unless it clearly appears that no set of facts could be proved under the pleadings which would entitle the petitioner to relief. ( Courtney v. Board of Education (1972), 6 Ill. App.3d 424, 425, 286 N.E.2d 25, 26.) Plainly, Kotsiopoulos' allegations, when interpreted in a light most favorable to Kotsiopoulos, show that Kotsiopoulos acted with due diligence and that he has a meritorious defense. • 6, 7 Moreover, the general allegations in the motion to dismiss the petition are not sufficient to support the granting of the motion.
Plaintiff contends that each of the five counts stated a cause of action and was improperly dismissed. We will consider them separately in the light of the applicable law that in determining the propriety of a dismissal of an action, we are to be concerned only with questions of law presented by the pleadings ( Fancil v. Q.S.E. Foods, Inc. (1975), 60 Ill.2d 552, 328 N.E.2d 538); that all facts well pleaded as well as reasonable inferences which can be drawn from those facts should be accepted as true ( Browder v. Hanley Dawson Cadillac Co. (1978), 62 Ill. App.3d 623, 379 N.E.2d 1206); that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action unless it clearly appears that no set of facts could be proved under the pleadings which should entitle plaintiff to relief ( Courtney v. Board of Education (1972), 6 Ill. App.3d 424, 286 N.E.2d 25); and that to withstand a motion to dismiss, the complaint must minimumly allege facts sufficiently setting forth the essential elements of the cause of action ( Woodill v. Parke Davis Co. (1978), 58 Ill. App.3d 349, 374 N.E.2d 683, aff'd (1980), 79 Ill.2d 26, 402 N.E.2d 194). We turn then to the question as to whether a cause of action is stated in count I, which is predicated upon a violation of section 100.2-3 of the Ordinance (Municipal Code of Chicago 1979, ch. 100.2, § 100.2-3), providing that:
• 1 A motion to dismiss admits all facts well pleaded and the reasonable inferences which may be drawn therefrom are taken as true for the purposes of the motion. ( Giers v. Anten (1978), 68 Ill. App.3d 535, 539, 386 N.E.2d 82, 85; Horwath v. Parker (1979), 72 Ill. App.3d 128, 134, 390 N.E.2d 72, 77; Courtney v. Board of Education (1972), 6 Ill. App.3d 424, 425, 286 N.E.2d 25, 26.) The attached exhibits are an integral part of the complaint and must be so considered.