Opinion
A154035
05-29-2018
COURTNEY K. AND ROBERT V., Petitioners, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CONTRA COSTA COUNTY, Respondent; CONTRA COSTA COUNTY CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES BUREAU, Real Party in Interest.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. J1701040)
The juvenile court bypassed reunification services for Courtney K. (mother) and presumed father Robert V. (father, collectively parents) pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5 and set a permanency planning hearing (.26 hearing). Parents petition for writ relief. They contend the court erred by denying reunification services. We deny the petitions.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. We resolve this case by a memorandum opinion pursuant to California Standards of Judicial Administration, section 8.1. (See People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 850.)
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
E.V. is one of mother's five children. E.V. has three siblings, J.K., Z.K. and K.K., and a half sibling, A.K. In 2011, mother's parental rights as to all children but E.V. were terminated; father's parental rights as to J.K., Z.K., and K.K. were terminated.
Current Dependency
E.V. was born in 2013. In October 2017, mother was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol with E.V. in the car. There were open bottles of alcohol in the car, and mother's "blood alcohol content was determined to be twice the legal limit." Father—who was "passed out in the front seat of the vehicle"—was also arrested. The Contra Costa County Children and Family Services Bureau's (Bureau) operative section 300 petition alleged parents had a "chronic and longstanding substance abuse issue"; that parents were "taken into custody" for the offense; and that parents had failed to reunify with E.V.'s siblings and half sibling. The court removed E.V. from parental care, detained her, and determined she came within section 300, subdivisions (b), (g), and (j).
The disposition report urged the court to bypass reunification services (§ 361.5) and to set a .26 hearing. The report described the circumstances leading to the termination of parental rights as to E.V.'s siblings and half sibling. According to the Bureau, parents: (1) "have failed or refused to comply with a program of drug and alcohol treatment . . . on at least two prior occasions, even though the programs identified were available and accessible"; and (2) "have also failed to reunify with their other children . . . despite receiving three years of services to address their substance abuse issues." The Bureau opined parents "have a serious and chronic substances abuse problem that although they can rectify temporarily; they always find a way to relapse and continue depending on alcohol."
At the dispositional hearing, the court took judicial notice of documents from parents' prior dependency cases. The social worker testified mother had a lengthy history of substance abuse and neglecting the children and that her parental rights as to all children but E.V. had been terminated. Father's parental rights as to two children had been terminated. In one prior dependency, father's reunification services were terminated due to unaddressed "mental health issues." In prior dependencies, parents had completed inpatient substance abuse treatment and attained sobriety, but they relapsed, leading to the termination of their parental rights. Mother had completed eight treatment programs and had received 42 months of reunification services from the Bureau. When they were arrested in October 2017, parents were living at a homeless shelter. Mother did not take advantage of the shelter's Narcotics Anonymous (NA) and Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) programs. Parents were complying with their case plans, but the social worker believed an inpatient program would be "more helpful" for parents, based on their history of substance abuse.
Parents testified at the dispositional hearing. Mother admitted her parental rights as to all children but E.V. had been terminated, and that the first dependency case began because she drove while intoxicated with one of her children in the car. Mother eventually stopped drinking for a period of time, but she did not attend NA or AA meetings. Father acknowledged a prior dependency where he and mother lost custody of J.Z. and Z.K., where the Bureau was concerned he suffered from a mental illness. In the dependency involving K.K., father received a psychological assessment. Father denied being diagnosed with schizophrenia or schizo-affective disorder but acknowledged being prescribed medication (which he did not take).
Parents objected to the Bureau's recommendation to bypass services. Mother's counsel acknowledged mother's "chronic" alcohol abuse problem, but argued she "made subsequent reasonable efforts to treat her alcoholism." Father's counsel stated: "I don't believe . . . there have been previous terminations of parental rights" based on father's "substance abuse." The court bypassed reunification services pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10), (11), and (13), making its findings by clear and convincing evidence. The court did not believe "mother will be able to maintain . . . sobriety." Regarding father, the court noted it had "tried very hard" to understand his testimony and stated: "he has either got a very serious mental issue or he's on some sort of drugs because I would not trust [father] to have the care of a young child for five minutes. And I don't doubt for a second that the mother would place this child alone with [father] when she's doing whatever she's doing." In addition, the court determined father had not addressed "his issues," and had not taken "care of his problems." Finally, the court opined reunification services would not be in E.V.'s best interest. The court set a .26 hearing.
DISCUSSION
Parents argue the court erred by bypassing reunification services under section 361.5, an exception to the general rule that when a child is removed from parental custody, the juvenile court must order reunification services. Under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(11), the juvenile court need not provide reunification services where there is clear and convincing evidence (1) parental rights of a sibling or half sibling have been terminated; and (2) the parent has not subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to the removal of the sibling or half sibling. (K.C. v. Superior Court (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1388, 1393 (K.C.).) We review the denial of reunification services pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b) for substantial evidence. (Jennifer S. v. Superior Court (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1113, 1121-1124 (Jennifer S.).) Where a bypass provision applies, a court may not order reunification services unless the parent establishes by clear and convincing evidence services would be in the minor's best interests. (§ 361.5, subd. (c).) We review the court's section 361.5, subdivision (c) determination for abuse of discretion. (In re Lana S. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 94, 109 (Lana S.).)
We have no difficulty concluding substantial evidence supports the denial of reunification services for mother pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(11). Mother concedes her "parental rights were terminated as to the other children." Her claim that she made "substantial efforts to treat the problems" that led to the removal of the children has no merit. (See K.C., supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1393-1394.) In 2003, mother was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol with A.K. in the car; mother's parental rights as to A.K. and three other children were later terminated. By all accounts, mother is an alcoholic and yet she failed to take advantage of services to maintain that sobriety. In 2017, mother was arrested—again—for driving under the influence of alcohol with a child in her car. The court's decision to bypass reunification services for mother pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(11) was sufficiently supported by the evidence. (See Jennifer S., supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1121-1124; K.C., supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 1394.) We reject mother's claim that providing reunification services was in E.V.'s best interest. (Jennifer S., at p. 1125.)
We reach the same conclusions regarding father, who concedes his parental rights "as to his older children" were terminated. We reject father's contention that there is insufficient evidence the problems that led to the removal of his other children "had any connection to the concerns alleged in the petition in this case." The phrase " 'problems that led to removal' " can include a chronic problem that, while not alleged in the prior petition, was a substantial component of the earlier service plan. (Lana S., supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 108.) A.K., Z.K. and J.K. were removed from parents' care "due to substance abuse related issues of general neglect." As the Bureau explained: "mother was deep into her alcohol addiction, often leaving the children under the supervision of [father] who is not an appropriate caretaker for the children due to his own cognitive delays and mental health issues." In that dependency, father was ordered to address mental health and substance abuse issues. Father participated in substance abuse treatment programs, but relapsed. In this proceeding, the court found as a jurisdictional fact that parents had a "serious and chronic substance abuse problem" and the Bureau's disposition report states parents had received "services to address their substance abuse issues."
Reviewing the record in the light most favorable to the juvenile court's findings, we conclude substantial evidence establishes father's alcohol abuse was a problem that led to the removal of E.V.'s siblings and half sibling in prior dependency proceedings, and that father's alcohol abuse was also factor in the current proceeding. (Jennifer S., supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1123-1124.) This is not a situation like the one in In re D.H. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 807, 815-817, where there was no evidence the parent's alcohol abuse or domestic violence led to the removal of the half siblings. We also conclude substantial evidence supports the court's conclusion that father did not make reasonable efforts to treat his problems. (Jennifer S., at p. 1124 ["juvenile court could reasonably infer a continuing problem"].) Father has not demonstrated the court's section 361.5, subdivision (c) conclusion was an abuse of discretion. (Jennifer S., at pp. 1125-1126.)
At the dispositional hearing, father acknowledged the Bureau's concern, in a previous dependency, that he suffered from a mental illness. He also conceded he had been prescribed medication for a mental illness. Father, however, denied suffering from a mental illness and declined to take prescribed medication. The court opined father "has either got a very serious mental issue or he's on some sort of drugs" based on his testimony at the dispositional hearing. --------
We conclude the court properly denied reunification services pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(11). As a result, we need not determine whether bypass of services was also appropriate pursuant to other exceptions set forth in section 361.5, subdivision (b).
DISPOSITION
Mother and father's respective petitions for extraordinary writ are denied on the merits. This decision is final immediately. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.452, 8.490.)
/s/_________
Jones, P. J. We concur: /s/_________
Needham, J. /s/_________
Bruiniers, J.