Opinion
Case No.: 1:03 CV 82
April 30, 2004
AMENDED ORDER
This Order amends the court's earlier Order of the same date:
Pending before the court is Defendant Sheet Metal Workers International Association, Local Union No. 33 of Northern Ohio's (the "Union" or "Defendant") Motion for Attorneys' Fees (ECF No. 43). For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff is awarded $9,694.75 in attorneys' fees and costs.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On January 13, 2003, Plaintiff Courtad Construction Systems, Inc. ("Courtad") filed this action against the Union pursuant to Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 and the Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10, seeking to vacate an arbitration award entered in favor of the Union. Subsequently, the parties consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction, and this case was transferred to the docket of Magistrate Judge Jack B. Streepy. On February 19, 2004, Magistrate Streepy granted the Union's motion for summary judgment, and awarded the Union attorneys' fees pursuant to Article X, Section 6 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA") (ECF No. 42). The Union submitted its brief in support of attorneys' fees and costs, and Courtad filed its brief in opposition. Upon the retirement of Magistrate Streepy, this case was reassigned to this court for resolution of all outstanding issues.
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS A. Legal Standard
Magistrate Streepy concluded that an award of attorneys' fees was appropriate under the facts and circumstances of this case. Specifically, he concluded:
The CBA at Article X, Section 6 states that following the decision of the [Local Joint Arbitration Board]:
a local party may enforce the award by any means, including proceedings in a court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with applicable state and federal law. If the party seeking to enforce the award prevails in the litigation, such a party shall be entitled to its costs and attorney's fees in addition to such other relief as is directed by the courts.
The CBA at issue is quite specific in mandating attorney's fees. Such fees were awarded in another case based on identical CBA language. See Local Union No. 38 v. Hollywood Heating Cooling, 88 F. Supp.2d 246, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) aff'd, 2001 WL 15612 (2nd Cir. Jan. 5, 2001). Accordingly, attorney's fees shall be ordered.
Op. at 17.
When determining what amount of attorneys' fees and costs a prevailing party is entitled to recover, a trial court's primary concern should be that the fee awarded be reasonable, that is, "one that is adequately compensatory to attract competent counsel yet which avoids producing a windfall for lawyers." Adcock-Ladd v. Secretary of Treasury, 227 F.3d 343, 349 (6th Cir. 2000). As a starting point, the court should determine the fee applicant's "lodestar," which is the number of hours reasonably expended on the case by an attorney, multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. Id. (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)).
The trial judge may then adjust the "lodestar" to reflect relevant considerations peculiar to the subject litigation, taking into consideration factors such as the time and labor required by the case, the novelty and difficulty of the questions presented, the customary fee, the results obtained, and the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys. Id. (citing Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974)). The party seeking an award of fees and costs has the burden of submitting evidence supporting the hours and rates claimed. Id. at 437 ("[T]he fee applicant bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an award and documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates."). Although counsel is not expected to record in great detail how each minute of the day is spent, the general subject matter should be identified. Id. at 437 n. 12. Furthermore, the documentation "must be of sufficient detail and probative value to enable the court to determine with a high degree of certainty that such hours were actually and reasonably expended in the prosecution of the litigation." United Slate, Tile Composition Roofers v. G M Roofing, 732 F.2d 495, 502 n. 2 (6th Cir. 1984).
B. Plaintiff's Attorneys' Fees and Costs
The Union asserts that it is entitled to an award of $12,890.70 in attorneys' fees and costs. The Union supports its request with the affidavit of William Webster ("Webster"), counsel for the Union, and a billing summary for the work performed by its counsel. In Webster's affidavit, he states that his billing rate in this case was $105 per hour; that Joseph Allotta's billing rate was $110 per hour; that Michael Pazzo's rate was $95 per hour; that Ellen Grachik's rate was $90 per hour; that the paralegal's rate was $60 per hour; and that the legal assistant's rate was $25.00 per hour. Webster states that these rates reflect the normal rates that his law firm charged the Union through January 1, 2004, and that after that date each rate increased by $10.
Courtad challenges the Union's requested fees on several grounds. First, Courtad argues that, pursuant to Magistrate Streepy's Order and Art. X, Sec. 6 of the CBA, the Union is only entitled to fees for time and costs expended to enforce the award of the arbitration panel. Specifically, Courtad maintains that fees should only be awarded based on the Union's efforts to enforce the April 18, 2003 Local Joint Arbitration Board's (the "Board") decision, and therefore any time billed prior to April 18 would not qualify under the CBA. Similarly, Courtad argues that no time expended between April 18 and July 18 should qualify for a fee award because it was not until July 18, 2003, that Courtad gave notice of its intent to appeal the Board's April 18 decision by filing its motion to amend the Complaint. The court disagrees.
The Board issued its first decision in favor of the Union on November 14, 2002. Courtad appealed that decision by filing this action on January 13, 2003. In response, the Union took significant steps to enforce the Board's award. The Union sought, and was granted, two extensions of time to file its answer to Courtad's Complaint. On April 2, 2003, the Union filed its Answer and Counterclaim, and on April 3, the parties participated in a case management conference with the court. Despite the fact that the Board voluntarily vacated and reconsidered its first award, the court has no doubt that the time expended by the Union after Courtad filed this action was in an effort to enforce the arbitration award. The Union had no way to predict the outcome of the Board's second decision, and in the meanwhile, was obligated to defend this action and assert counterclaims of its own. Simply put, the court declines to adopt Courtad's narrow reading of the Magistrate Judge's Order.
Likewise, even though Courtad's intentions for appealing the April 18 award remained unknown until July 18, the Union continued to expend efforts to enforce the first award. A review of the Union's billing statement establishes that between April 18 and July 18, counsel for the Union reviewed the arbitrator's decision, made contact with the court regarding various matters, filed a notice of appearance of counsel, and spoke with counsel for Courtad on various occasions. Based on these circumstances, the court finds that the Union's efforts between April 18 and July 18 were directed towards enforcing the Board's award. Thus, the court declines to reduce these fees.
Second, Courtad argues that the Union has excessively billed for the time spent drafting pleadings, discovery requests and dispositive motions. Courtad takes issue with the Union's representation that it spent 16 hours or $1,653.75 drafting its amended counterclaim, arguing that such a pleading should have only required five hours. It also contends that the Union only made one discovery request in the form of seven interrogatories, yet billed 5.5 hours or $500 for this effort. Lastly, with respect to the Union's motion for summary judgment, Courtad maintains that the issues presented in this case were "a common and non-complex area of law," and therefore 37.75 hours or $3,420 for the motion, and 26.75 hours or $3,092.50 for its reply brief, are excessive. In response, the Union argues that this case "involved a myriad of complex issues," forcing the Union to "research and respond to each and every issue raised by [Courtad]." Reply Br. at 3. It contends that extensive thought was put into phrasing the interrogatories, and that various challenges were presented in crafting the motion for summary judgment, including reviewing lengthy transcripts.
The court concludes that the Union's submissions for these items must be reduced. The Union claims that the issues Courtad presented in its Amended Counterclaim were complex and time consuming, but fails to even identify what those complexities were and how they specifically impacted its ability to defend this action. There is simply nothing in the record to suggest that this case differs from a typical arbitration appeal case. With respect to the fees for the Amended Counterclaim, as Courtad notes, the Union's amendment did not require a wholesale revision of the original Counterclaim. Rather, the Union simply added several paragraphs to the existing Counterclaim. As to the dispositive motion, the Union bills nearly as many hours for preparing its reply brief as it did its motion for summary judgment. Consequently, the court concludes that there is some unnecessary redundancy in the request. Thus, the Union's fee statement must be reduced by 15% because the amounts expended for drafting pleadings, discovery requests and dispositive motions were not reasonable. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433.
Courtad's argument that time was inappropriately billed on December 3, January 13 and January 14 is not well-taken. The court has reviewed these items and is satisfied that they consist of time expended in efforts to enforce the Board's award. Therefore, the court declines to strike the $372.50 from the request.
Finally, Courtad argues that the time related to preparing the billing statement should either be excluded altogether, since it was not time spent enforcing the award, or that it should be reduced to 3% of the hours expended on the substance of the case. See Coulter v. State of Tenn., 805 F.2d 146, 151 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that, in the absence of a trial, the trial court "struck the right balance" by limiting the fees related to preparation of a fee statement to approximately 3% of the hours allowed for preparing and litigating the main case).
In this case, the Union's "main case" hours total 131.3 hours. Of those hours, 22.75 were dedicated to preparation of the fee statement, which equates to 17.3% of the "main case" hours. In light of Coulter, awarding the Union 22.75 hours for time related to preparing the fee statement would be unreasonable. Thus, the court will reduce the award to 3% of the main hours, or $480.
Three percent of 131.3 is approximately four hours. Four hours billed at the highest attorney's rate ($120) is $480. Additionally, in light of Coulter's 3% rule, the court declines to award the Union an additional $810 for preparation of its reply brief for attorneys' fees as requested.
Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to $9,694.75 in attorneys' fees and costs.
The Union's original fee request was for $12,884.25. Subtracting the $1,966.25 request for preparation of the fee statement and awarding $480 instead, the Union's base award is $11,398. This award was reduced by 15%, for a fee award of $9,688.30, plus $6.45 in costs, for a grand total of $9,694.75.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion for Attorneys' Fees (ECF No. 43) is granted to the extent of $9,694.75 in attorneys' fees and costs.IT IS SO ORDERED.