(See United States v. Illinois Surety Co. (7th Cir. 1915), 226 F. 653, aff'd sub nom. Illinois Surety Co. v. John Davis Co. (1917), 244 U.S. 376, 61 L.Ed. 1206, 37 S.Ct. 614; National Surety Co. v. McCormick (7th Cir. 1920), 268 F. 185; County of Will v. Woodhill Enterprises, Inc. (1971), 4 Ill. App.3d 68, 274 N.E.2d 476.) In light of the need for the continuance of construction upon the principal's default, the surety could be deemed to have given its bond with the knowledge that its liability would accrue upon the date of the principal's default.
We perceive no reason why a surety, compensated for the obligation it assumes to a municipality, should be exonerated in circumstances where its liability to the municipality on the bond is clear, simply because the bargained-for improvements were completed by an assignee of the claim by agreement with the municipality. The purpose of the bond, to provide the means by which a municipality may insure completion of a bargained for performance, will be fulfilled by this holding."); see also, Transdulles Ctr. Ltd. P'ship v. USX Corp., 761 F. Supp. 430, 436 (E.D. VA. 1991); Bd. of Sup'rs of Fairfax Cnty. v. Ecology One, Inc., 245 S.E. 2d 425 (VA. 1978); Will Cnty. v. Woodhill Enterprises, Inc., 4 Ill. App. 3d 68, 75 (1971). So long as there is a public purpose for the assignment, the assignment will be upheld.
The purpose of the bond, to provide the means by which a municipality may insure completion of a bargained for performance, will be fulfilled" by allowing assignment. For example, in Transdulles Ctr. Ltd. P'ship v. USX Corp., the Court held that a private assignee of a performance bond could enforce the bond because there was evidence the assignee had completed some of the off-site improvements in question.Clearwater Associates, Inc. v. F. H. Bridge & Son, Contractors, 144 N.J. Super. 223, 228-29 (App. Div. 1976); see also Transdulles Ctr. Ltd. P'ship v. USX Corp., 761 F. Supp. 430, 436 (E.D. Va. 1991) (holding that Morro has been "repeatedly" narrowed to situations where an assignment is made for the sole benefit of a private party and there is no evidence the improvements have been made); Bd. of Sup'rs of Fairfax Cnty. v. Ecology One, Inc., 219 Va. 29, 33 (1978); Clearwater Associates, Inc. v. F. H. Bridge & Son, Contractors, 144 N.J. Super. 223, 229 (App. Div. 1976); Will Cnty. v. Woodhill Enterprises, Inc., 4 Ill. App. 3d 68, 75 (1971). Transdulles, 761 F. Supp. at 436.
Although we have not ruled on the precise issue presented, we think the rule adopted in several other jurisdictions that a County or "municipality may assign its rights under a bond where the assignment is for the purpose of obtaining a performance guaranteed by the bond and upon showing that the improvements have been made" is a sound rule. Clearwater Associates v. F. H. Bridge Son, Contractors, 144 N.J. Super. 223, 229, 365 A.2d 200, 204 (1976); County of Will v. Woodhill Enterprises, Inc., 4 Ill. App.3d 68, 74, 75, 274 N.E.2d 476, 481-82 (1971). The only case cited and relied upon by Ecology and Republic in support of their positions that the assignment was invalid is Morro Palisades Co. v. Hartford Acc. Indem. Co., 52 Cal.2d 397, 340 P.2d 628 (1959).
Illinois courts have stated that, although the powers of an official whose office is created by statute are limited to those powers conferred by statute, a legislative grant of authority carries with it, by implication, the powers necessary to exercise those powers expressly stated. County of Will v. Woodhill Enterprises, Inc., 4 Ill. App. 3d 68, 74, 274 N.E.2d 476 (1971); Citizens Federation of St. Clair County, Inc. v. Brown, 134 Ill. App. 3d 1054, 1057-58, 481 N.E.2d 879 (1985). Although the office of Illinois Attorney General is created by our constitution, rather than by statute, we hold that this rule applies with equal force as to the powers granted to that official by our legislature.
Here the amount due, $51,678.24, was never in dispute except for the above affirmative defense and counterclaim. It is sufficient that this is a suit on a bond and that the money is due. ( County of Will v. Woodhill Enterprises, Inc. (1971), 4 Ill. App.3d 68, 274 N.E.2d 476; Capital Development Board ex rel. P.J. Gallas Electrical Contractors, Inc. v. G.A. Rafel Co. (1986), 143 Ill. App.3d 553, 493 N.E.2d 348.) In Griffin Wellpoint Corp. v. Engelhardt, Inc. (1980), 92 Ill. App.3d 252, 414 N.E.2d 941, the court required that prejudgment interest accrue only from the date the action was commenced.
Defendant argues that prejudgment interest was improper because the amount of damages was not liquidated. • 9, 10 Contrary to defendant's position, however, where an action is on a bond, it does not have to appear that the amount due is liquidated. It is sufficient that the action is based upon a bond and that the money was due. ( Fisher v. Fidelity Deposit Co. (1984), 125 Ill. App.3d 632; County of Will v. Woodhill Enterprises, Inc. (1971), 4 Ill. App.3d 68.) Defendant's reliance on Reserve Insurance Co. v. General Insurance Co. of America (1979), 77 Ill. App.3d 272, is misplaced. In Reserve, the court denied prejudgment interest on a fidelity bond because of the absence of a specified due date for payment on the bond.
• 9 It was not error to award prejudgment interest to Fisher. Where there is suit upon a bond it is sufficient to show that it was a bond sued upon and that the money was due. Interest is properly allowed from the date of suit. ( Griffin Wellpoint Corp. v. Engelhardt, Inc. (1980), 92 Ill. App.3d 252, 414 N.E.2d 941; County of Will v. Woodhill Enterprises, Inc. (1971), 4 Ill. App.3d 68, 274 N.E.2d 476.) In this case, Fisher's suit as obligee on the bond against Fidelity was filed on February 1, 1976.
However, the Weiner court also noted that in the absence of a specific due date in the instrument itself, interest may nevertheless be allowed in cases in which the subject matter of the underlying obligation carried with it an inherent due date. For example, interest has been allowed from the date of the commencement of the suits on judgments obtained for the breach of construction performance bonds which were conditioned upon prompt payment of amounts due persons supplying labor and materials to the defaulting principals. (See United States v. Illinois Surety Co. (7th Cir. 1915), 226 F. 653, aff'd sub nom. Illinois Surety Co. v. John Davis Co. (1917), 244 U.S. 376, 61 L.Ed. 1206, 37 S.Ct. 614; National Surety Co. v. McCormick (7th Cir. 1920), 268 F. 185; County of Will v. Woodhill Enterprises, Inc. (1971), 4 Ill. App.3d 68, 274 N.E.2d 476.) In light of the need for the continuance of construction upon the principal's default, the surety could be deemed to have given its bond with the knowledge that its liability would accrue upon the date of the principal's default.
Reviewing courts have repeatedly stated that the trial court's findings on questions of fact when sitting without a jury will not be disturbed on appeal unless manifestly against the weight of the evidence. County of Will v. Woodhill Enterprises, Inc. (1971), 4 Ill. App.3d 68, 274 N.E.2d 476; Seaboard Surety Co. v. Glenayre Estates, Inc. (1969), 114 Ill. App.2d 341, 252 N.E.2d 712; In re Gleeson's Will (1954), 1 Ill. App.2d 409, 117 N.E.2d 792. No useful purpose would be served in entering into a detailed and exhaustive examination of the evidence adduced in this case before the trial court.