County of Ventura v. Channel Islands State Bank

6 Citing cases

  1. City and County of San Francisco v. Farrell

    32 Cal.3d 47 (Cal. 1982)   Cited 127 times
    In City and County of San Francisco v. Farrell (1982) 32 Cal.3d 47, 184 Cal.Rptr. 713, 648 P.2d 935, "we construe[d] the term ‘special taxes’... to mean taxes which are levied for a specific purpose...."

    Other meanings attributed to these words are clearly inappropriate in the context of section 4. (E.g., a tax imposed on a particular class of taxpayers [ Scol Corp. v. City of LosAngeles (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 805, 808 ( 91 Cal.Rptr. 67); Cityof Oceanside v. Pacific Tel. Tel. Co. (1955) 134 Cal.App.2d 361, 362 ( 285 P.2d 704)]; a tax levied in lieu of another tax [ First American Title Ins. Trust Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd. (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 343, 346 (193 Cal.Rptr. 177); County ofVentura v. Channel Islands State Bank (1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 240, 246 ( 59 Cal.Rptr. 404)].) Sometimes the term has been used to mean "special assessment" ( Fischer v. County of Shasta (1956) 46 Cal.2d 771, 774; Los Angeles County Flood ControlDist. v. Hamilton (1917) 177 Cal. 119, 130) which, properly speaking, is a charge earmarked to benefit the particular property upon which the assessment is made ( Cedars of LebanonHosp. v. County of L.A. (1950) 35 Cal.2d 729, 748; County ofSan Bernardino v. Flournoy (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 48, 51).

  2. Los Angeles County Transporation Com. v. Richmond

    31 Cal.3d 197 (Cal. 1982)   Cited 51 times
    In Los Angeles County Transportation Commission v. Richmond (1982) 31 Cal.3d 197, 182 Cal.Rptr. 324, 643 P.2d 941, we held that the requirement that "special districts" obtain two-thirds voter approval for special taxes applied only to those special districts empowered to levy property taxes.

    g that section 4's two-thirds voter approval requirement for "special taxes" was meant to be limited to: (1) "real property taxes," most, if not all, of which would appear to be barred expressly by section 4 (but see Trent Meredith, Inc.,supra, 114 Cal.App.3d at pp. 325, 328); (2) "special assessments" or regulatory fees, which are exacted in reasonable proportion to the cost of a specific governmental service benefiting the payor, and are not taxes at all (see Gov. Code, § 50076; Solvang Mun. Improvement Dist. v. Board of Supervisors,supra, 112 Cal.App.3d at pp. 552-553; Mills, supra, 108 Cal.App. 3d at pp. 659, 663; Malmstrom, supra, 94 Cal.App.3d at p. 984; City of Saratoga v. Huff (1972) 24 Cal.App.3d 978, 986-987 [ 101 Cal.Rptr. 32, 102 Cal.Rptr. 376]); (3) taxes imposed on specific entities or activities (see City ofOceanside v. Pacific Tel. Tel. Co. (1955) 134 Cal.App.2d 361, 370 [ 285 P.2d 704]); or (4) taxes imposed upon taxpayers which are exempt from "ordinary" taxes (see County of Ventura v. Channel Islands State Bank (1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 240, 246 [ 59 Cal.Rptr. 404]). There is no suggestion in the language or history of article XIII A that adoption of any of these specific and limited meanings of the term "special taxes" was contemplated by the framers of the provision or the voters who adopted it.

  3. United States Borax Chemical Corp. v. Mitchell

    27 Cal.3d 84 (Cal. 1980)   Cited 14 times

    This sum must be paid out of county resources. In order to reach their result, the majority apply an unreasonably narrow interpretation of Revenue and Taxation Code section 4831, subdivision (a); in doing so they overlook both the long accepted presumption that an assessment is valid ( Western Union Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles (1911) 160 Cal. 124, 127 [ 116 P. 564]; County of Ventura v. Channel Islands State Bank (1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 240, 245 [ 59 Cal.Rptr. 404]), and the universal rule that deviations are to be viewed "with a hostile eye." ( Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. U.S. (1943) 319 U.S. 598, 612 [87 L.Ed. 1612, 1621, 63 S.Ct. 1284], Murphy, J., dis.) With constant repetition the majority maintain that there was no "clerical error," within the meaning of Revenue and Taxation Code section 4831, and it is apparent from their opinion that they equate a clerical error with inexact mathematical computation.

  4. T.M. Cobb Co. v. County of Los Angeles

    16 Cal.3d 606 (Cal. 1976)   Cited 16 times
    In Cobb, the plaintiff (Cobb) purchased personal property and fixtures (the property) at a private sale in the City of South El Monte (the city) conducted by National Acceptance Company of California (National), the holder of a security interest in the property.

    It in no manner prohibits the assessor in the exercise of his discretion from assessing . . . the leasehold improvements to their owner . . . simply because neither [the owner of the improvements] nor the owner of the land elected to avail themselves of their right to file a written statement attesting to separate ownership under section 2188.2." ( County of Ventura v. Channel Islands State Bank (1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 240, 246 [ 59 Cal.Rptr. 404].) The assessor has merely acted in accordance with the authorization in section 405 to "assess . . . the taxable property in his county . . . to the persons owning, claiming, possessing, or controlling it on the lien date."

  5. AUERBACH v. ASS'T APPEALS BD. NO. 1

    129 Cal.App.4th 240 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005)   Cited 1 times

    (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 248.) (See County of Ventura v. Channel Islands State Bank (1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 240, 247-250 [ 59 Cal.Rptr. 404] [section 1013 does not apply to the determination of ownership for property tax purposes].) Civil Code section 1013, which was enacted in 1872, provides: "When a person affixes his property to the land of another, without an agreement permitting him to remove it, the thing affixed, except as otherwise provided in this chapter, belongs to the owner of the land, unless he chooses to require the former to remove it or the former elects to exercise the right of removal provided for in Section 1013.5. . . ."

  6. Collins Electrical Co. v. County of Shasta

    24 Cal.App.3d 864 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972)   Cited 5 times
    In Collins Electrical Co. v. County of Shasta (1972) 24 Cal.App.3d 864, 101 Cal.Rptr. 285, the Court of Appeal reversed a judgment in favor of Collins Electrical Co., which sought recovery of taxes paid under protest.

    It is sufficient if the article shall appear to be intended to remain where fastened until worn out, unless the purpose to which the realty is devoted has been accomplished or until the article is superseded by another article more suitable for the purpose.'" ( County of Ventura v. Channel Islands State Bank (1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 240, 248 [ 59 Cal.Rptr. 404].) (1c) This court had occasion recently to note that, effective in 1965, the Legislature adopted a provision declaring that telephone and electrical transmission lines, poles and towers are not tangible personal property for sales tax purposes (Rev.