[Citation.]” (County of Orange v. Lexington Nat. Ins. Corp. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1488, 1491-1492.) However, the trial court’s legal conclusions are not binding on appeal where the evidence is undisputed and the issue raises a question of law. (People v. American Bankers Ins. Co. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 348, 350; People v. American Bankers Ins. Co. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 561, 564 (American Bankers), superceded on statute on other grounds, as will be explained, post, in County of San Bernardino v. Ranger Ins. Co. (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1148 (County of San Bernardino).) “‘When interpreting a statute our primary task is to determine the Legislature’s intent. [Citation.]
(Italics added.) County of San Bernardino v. Ranger Ins. Company (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1140, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 57 ( Ranger ), held that county counsel, rather than the district attorney, was the proper counsel to represent the county with respect to a surety's appeal from the trial court's denial of a motion to set aside a summary judgment on a forfeiture and exonerate the bond. The non-appearing defendant had been arrested by the surety's agents after notice of bail forfeiture was sent to the parties, after which he had entered a guilty plea and been sentenced.
Two appellate court decisions, this court's 1995 decision in Ranger, and the 1967 superior court appellate department (County of Santa Clara) decision in Hadley, have observed that the district attorney "'is the proper representative of the People to receive notices in [bail] forfeiture proceedings.'" (County of San Bernardino v. Ranger Ins. Co. (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1144-1145 (Ranger); People v. Hadley (1967) 257 Cal.App.2d Supp. 871, 878-879 (Hadley).) As we explain, Ranger and Hadley are based on former versions of the bail forfeiture statutes, and nothing in either decision is contrary to our conclusion in this case that "prosecuting agency," as used in the current bail forfeiture statutes (§ 1305 et seq.), is the agency prosecuting the defendant, which in most cases will be the district attorney.
On October 6, 1998, American filed a new motion to vacate the forfeiture of bail. In this motion, American relied on the amendment to section 980, subdivision (b), arguing that it applied retroactively pursuant to People v. Durbin, supra, 64 Cal.2d 474, and County of San Bernardino v. Ranger Ins. Co. (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1140. County counsel opposed the motion on the ground that the amended version of the statute was not yet effective, without however distinguishing Durbin or the other authorities cited by American.
This rule of construction, which finds expression in our statutes (Code Civ. Proc., § 3), may be rooted in concerns that retroactive application of new criminal laws may be barred by the ex post facto clause, and that retroactive application of new civil laws may offend due process considerations. (See generally Landgraf v. USI Film Products (1994) 511 U.S. 244, 266-267 [ 128 L.Ed.2d 229, 114 S.Ct. 1483]; County of San Bernardino v. Ranger Ins. Co. (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1148-1149 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 57].) However, different considerations are implicated in the limited circumstances in which the Legislature enacts a statute that completely reverses substantive law by effectively permitting previously prohibited conduct.
Although the trial court entered judgment in favor of Corel, "a judgment does not become final so long as the action in which it is entered remains pending [citation] and an action remains pending until final determination on appeal [citation]." ( County of San Bernardino v. Ranger Ins. Co. (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1149 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 57] ( County of San Bernardino).) Therefore we must consider whether the newly amended version of the UCL applies to this case, which was filed prior to Prop. 64's approval by the voters but was still pending at the time Prop. 64 became effective. Courts generally presume that a newly enacted statute does not have retrospective effect unless there has been some clearly expressed contrary intent.
The statutorily enumerated circumstances are where: the accused appears voluntarily or in custody in court after surrender or arrest (§ 1305, subd. (c)(1)); the accused is surrendered by the surety in the county where the case is pending and is released prior to appearance in court (§ 1305, subd. (c)(2)); or the defendant is arrested in the "underlying case" outside the county where the matter is pending and is surrendered to custody by the surety prior to appearance in court (§ 1305, subd. (c)(3)). (§ 1305, subds. (c)(1)-(3); see County of San Bernardino v. Ranger Ins. Co. (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1148.) All of these circumstances set forth in section 1305, subdivision (c) arise when the accused is either in court or has been arrested.
(§ 5953.) Until judgment is entered and the appellate process or other proceedings are completed, the matter is not final, and there is no vested right. ( Graczyk, supra, 184 Cal.App.3d at p. 1006; County of San Bernardino v. Ranger Ins. Co. (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1149 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 57] ["'statutory remedy does not vest until final judgment . . .'"].) Awards are only final when the entire process, including appellate review, is concluded.
" (Italics omitted.) ( County of San Bernardino v. Ranger Ins. Co. (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1149 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 57].) In light of this clear and settled authority, we hold that the statutory repeal rule squarely applies to Proposition 64. Proposition 64 repealed two purely statutory rights: (1) an uninjured person's statutory right to prosecute a UCL claim on behalf of the general public; and (2) a private party's statutory authorization to pursue a representative action.
Unlike a common law right, a "`statutory remedy does not vest until final judgment.'" ( County of San Bernardino v. Ranger Ins. Co. (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1149 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 57]; South Coast Regional Com. v. Gordon (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 612, 619 [148 Cal.Rptr. 775].) (6) "This rule only applies when the right in question is a statutory right and does not apply to an existing right of action which has accrued to a person under the rules of the common law, or by virtue of a statute codifying the common law.