Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County Ct. No. 06CF2875, Dan McNerney, Judge.
Nunez & Bernstein and E. Alan Nunez for Defendant and Appellant.
Nicholas S. Chrisos, County Counsel, and Nicole M. Walsh, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
RYLAARSDAM, ACTING P. J.
Continental Heritage Insurance Company appeals from an order refusing to discharge an order of forfeiture and to exonerate bail and from the summary judgment based on the forfeiture. Its argument is predicated on alleged lack of notice of the forfeiture proceedings. This lack of notice resulted from appellant having moved its offices without advising the court. The clerk of the court properly provided notice as required by Penal Code section 1305, subdivision (b) (section 1305) and we therefore affirm the judgment.
Section 1305, subdivision (b) provides that, “[i]f the amount of the bond... exceeds four hundred dollars..., the clerk of the court shall, within 30 days of the forfeiture, mail notice of the forfeiture to the surety.... [¶] If the surety is an authorized corporate surety, and if the bond plainly displays the mailing address of the corporate surety..., then notice of the forfeiture shall be mailed to the surety at that address....” Here the bond, issued in December, 2006, displayed appellant’s address as 2800 Corporate Exchange Drive, Suite 130, Columbus, Oh [sic]43231. In June 2007, appellant moved to 6140 Parkland Boulevard, Suite 321, Cleveland, Ohio 44124. There is no contention that it gave the court notice of this change of address.
In January, 2008, defendant in the underlying criminal case failed to appear, and the court declared bail forfeited. The next day, the clerk mailed the appropriate notice of forfeiture to appellant at the address shown on the bond. The envelope containing the note was returned to the court by the postal service, marked with appellant’s new address. The envelope was stamped “RECEIVED” and presumably placed in the court file. In August the court entered summary judgment on the forfeiture and in October respondent served “notice of entry of summary judgment upon forfeiture of bail bond...” (bold and capitalization omitted) to appellant at its address of record.
This time appellant must have received the notice because in January 2009, it filed a motion to vacate the forfeiture and set aside the summary judgment. The trial court denied the motion.
As appellant notes, citing several cases, including People v. Ranger Ins. Co. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1302, 1305, “[t]he forfeiture and exoneration of bail are entirely a statutory procedure, governed by the special statutes applicable thereto.” The provisions of section 1305 are jurisdictional. (People v. United Bonding Ins. Co. (1971) 5 Cal.3d 898, 907; People v. National Auto. & Cas. Co. (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 150, 153.) And, again quoting from appellant’s opening brief, “[i]t has long been recognized that the course pointed out by a jurisdictional statute must be precisely followed, or the court loses jurisdiction.” (Citing People v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co. (1963) 216 Cal.App.2d 380, 381-382.) Here the clerk precisely followed the statutory procedure. Blame for appellant’s lack of notice can only be placed on its failure to properly amend the bond to state its new address.
Appellant’s reliance on County of Los Angeles v. Resolute Ins. Co. (1972) 22 Cal.App.3d 961 is misplaced. We disagree with appellant’s statement that the case is “precisely the same situation as the present case.” To the contrary, in Resolute Ins. Co., the clerk failed to send the notice of forfeiture to the bonding company at the address shown on the bond, the very opposite of what happened here.
In light of our disposition, we need not consider the other issues raised by respondent.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover its costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR: ARONSON, J., FYBEL, J.