It heretofore has been determined that the foregoing provisions apply to a cause of action for an injury which was suffered prior to the effective date of Muskopf and which was reduced to suit prior to the enactment of the moratorium legislation. ( County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (1965) 62 Cal.2d 839, 844 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 796, 402 P.2d 868].) Furthermore, the provisions of these same sections have been held applicable to a cause of action arising after the moratorium legislation and prior to the enactment of the 1963 legislation.

Section 854.8 "provides immunity for diagnosing, treating, confining, and releasing the mentally ill, but makes clear that public entitles and employees are liable for injuries caused by negligent or wrongful acts or omissions in administering or failing to administer prescribed treatment or confinement." Los Angeles County v. Superior Ct. of L.A. Cnty., 62 Cal. 2d 839, 843-44, 44 Cal.Rptr. 796, 402 P.2d 868 (1965) (cleaned up). "[E]mployees can . . . be held liable," in which case "the public entity shall pay any judgment against them."

(Stats. 1963, ch. 1681, § 45, subd. (a); Heieck Moran v. City of Modesto (1966) 64 Cal.2d 229, 231-232 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 377, 411 P.2d 105]; County of LosAngeles v. Superior Court (1965) 62 Cal.2d 839, 844-846 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 796 402 P.2d 868]; see also Teall v. City ofCudahy (1963) 60 Cal.2d 431 [ 34 Cal.Rptr. 869, 386 P.2d 493]; Flournoy v. State of California (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 520 531-537 [ 41 Cal.Rptr. 190]; Hayes v. State of California (1964) 231 Cal.App.2d 48 [ 41 Cal.Rptr. 502]; City of Burbank v. Superior Court (1965) 231 Cal.App.2d 675 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 23]; Loop v. State of California (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 591 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 909]; Dahlquist v. State of California (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 208, 210 [ 52 Cal.Rptr. 324].) No sound basis exists for differentiating in this respect, with attendant inequality, between causes arising out of so-called "proprietary" as distinguished from "governmental" activities, or between those based on statute and those grounded on rules established by judicial decisions.

However, while under sections 856, 855.8 and 815.2 public entities are vicariously liable for such wrongs, section 854.8 mandates that public entities must pay judgments for or indemnify only those public employees who are licensed by the state in one of the healing arts and who suffer a judgment of malpractice against them for acts or omissions within the scope of their employment. ( County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 62 Cal.2d 839, 844 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 796, 402 P.2d 868].) Thus section 854.8 shields public entities from all direct and vicarious liability for injury proximately caused by a patient of a mental institution, except for specific "malpractice" situations.

Brown demonstrates not all legislative classifications are rationally related to legitimate government purposes, but does not allow the court to substitute its judgment for that of the Legislature when a rational relationship can be shown. Brown v. Merlo, supra, 8 Cal.3d 855 is not as directly analogous to this case as is the case of County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 62 Cal.2d 839 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 796, 402 P.2d 868]. At issue in that case was the constitutionality of Government Code section 854.8, which prevented patients in mental wards from recovering for their injuries directly from public entities.

First, while Callet did distinguish between statutory and common law causes of action, the California Supreme Court has since rejected this proposition, concluding that there is "no constitutional basis for distinguishing statutory from common-law rights merely because of their origin." SeeL.A. Cty. v. Superior Court , 62 Cal.2d 839, 844, 44 Cal.Rptr. 796, 402 P.2d 868 (1965). Further, Plaintiffs are simply wrong about Ileto , as it upheld a law "intended to preempt common-law claims, such as general tort theories of liability."

It merely demonstrates the comprehensive nature of the Tort Claims Act. (See County of LosAngeles v. Superior Court (1965) 62 Cal.2d 839, 844-845 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 796, 402 P.2d 868].) IV.

( Green v. Superior Court, supra, 10 Cal.3d at pp. 629-631.) This court has consistently held that a statute should not be given retroactive effect so as to deprive an individual of a pre-existing right unless the Legislature has clearly expressed its intention to accomplish that end. (See, e.g., Balen v. Peralta Junior College Dist. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 821, 828-829 [ 114 Cal.Rptr. 589, 532 P.2d 629]; County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (1965) 62 Cal.2d 839, 844-845 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 796, 402 P.2d 868]; Douglas Aircraft Co. v. Cranston (1962) 58 Cal.2d 462, 465 [ 24 Cal.Rptr. 851, 374 P.2d 819, 98 A.L.R.2d 298].) Although section 1953 invalidates exculpatory clauses in leases executed after January 1, 1976, there is no indication that the Legislature intended to alter or modify the common law principles the courts applied on a case-by-case basis to leases executed before that date.

Rather, the rational relationship test is applied in determining equal protection challenges to prisoner classification for purposes of governmental liability for injury. ( Id.; cf. County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (1965) 62 Cal.2d 839, 846 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 796, 402 P.2d 868]; Corning Hospital Dist. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 488, 496 [ 20 Cal.Rptr. 621, 370 P.2d 325].) The same test has been applied in determining equal protection challenges to benefit classifications under the Workers' Compensation Act.

6) to deal comprehensively with the problem of governmental immunity. ( County of Los Angeles v. SuperiorCourt (1965) 62 Cal.2d 839, 843 [4] [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 796, 402 P.2d 868].) This legislation reinstated the rule of Muskopf to some extent, but restricted governmental liability in certain instances and limited the remedies in others.