Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. SJ0961, Stan Blumenfeld, Judge.
Nunez & Bernstein and E. Alan Nunez for Defendant and Appellant.
Raymond G. Fortner, Jr., County Counsel, and Brian T. Chu, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
ZELON, J.
Appellant Indiana Lumbermens Mutual Insurance Company (“Indiana Lumbermens”), a bail surety, appeals from the trial court’s order denying a Penal Code section 1305.4 motion to extend the 180-day period to vacate a bail bond forfeiture and exonerate the bond. The alleged bail agent of Indiana Lumbermens filed the section 1305.4 motion to extend time on the date on which the 180-day exoneration period expired, but did not file a supporting declaration of good cause until 24 days later. The trial court denied the motion as untimely on the grounds that the bail agent failed to file a declaration of good cause supporting the motion prior to the expiration of the exoneration period. The court thereafter entered summary judgment against Indiana Lumbermens on the forfeited bond. Based on the plain language of the bail forfeiture statute, we conclude that the section 1305.4 motion filed on behalf of Indiana Lumbermens was untimely, and accordingly, affirm.
Unless otherwise stated, all further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Guillermo Bernal (“Bernal”) was charged in Los Angeles County with driving with a suspended license in violation of Vehicle Code section 14601.1, subdivision (a). On December 4, 2006, Indiana Lumbermens posted a surety bond in the amount of $30,000 to secure the release of Bernal from custody. The bail agent identified on the bond was Demetria Barnes Bails Bonds. On February 2, 2007, Bernal failed to appear for arraignment and the trial court declared the bond forfeited. On that same day, the clerk of the court mailed a notice of forfeiture to Indiana Lumbermens and Demetria Barnes Bail Bonds.
By statute, as of February 2, 2007, Indiana Lumbermens had 180 days, plus five days for mailing, to move to vacate the forfeiture and exonerate the bond. (§ 1305, subds. (b), (c).) The 185th day after the mailing of the notice of forfeiture was August 6, 2007. On that date, Harley C. Esparza (“Esparza”), appearing in pro. per. for A Bail Bond Company, filed a section 1305.4 motion to extend the 180-day exoneration period on the bond posted for Bernal. In its motion, A Bail Bond Company identified itself as a real party in interest and represented that it was the bail agent responsible for conducting an investigation into the whereabouts of Bernal. The company also asserted that it had exercised due diligence in its efforts to locate Bernal and requested an additional 180 days to return him to custody.
The moving papers filed by A Bail Bond Company on August 6, 2007, consisted of (1) a notice of motion and motion, (2) a memorandum of points and authorities, (3) a copy of the February 2, 2007 notice of forfeiture, and (4) a proposed order extending the exoneration period for an additional 180 days. Although the notice of motion made reference to a supporting declaration, no such declaration was submitted with the moving papers, and elsewhere in the motion, it was stated that a declaration of Esparza would be filed as a supplement. The notice of motion set forth a hearing date of September 4, 2007. When the motion was filed, however, the clerk of the court changed the hearing date to August 27, 2007.
On August 27, 2007, A Bail Bond Company’s motion to extend the 180-day exoneration period was called for hearing. According to the trial court’s September 5, 2007 Minute Order, Esparza admitted at the hearing that A Bail Bond Company had not submitted a declaration of good cause with its motion because Esparza was awaiting the investigative notes from his agents before filing a supporting declaration. Esparza also represented to the court that he recently had learned that Bernal was now in custody on other charges in San Luis Obispo County, California. At A Bail Bond Company’s request, the court continued the hearing on the section 1305.4 motion to September 4, 2007. The court also directed the parties to address the timeliness of the motion at the continued hearing given the absence of a supporting declaration of good cause.
The record on appeal does not contain a reporter’s transcript of the hearing.
On August 30, 2007, A Bail Bond Company filed a “Notice of Amendment to Motion and Motion to Exonerate Bond” (“Amended Motion”). In its Amended Motion, A Bail Bond Company requested that the court not only extend the exoneration period, but also that it vacate the forfeiture and exonerate the bond on the grounds that Bernal was now in custody. The Amended Motion was accompanied by a declaration of Esparza, the owner of A Bail Bond Company. In his declaration, Esparza detailed A Bail Bond Company’s efforts to locate Bernal prior to the expiration of the exoneration period, and explained that, on August 17, 2007, his investigators learned through an online search that Bernal had been in the custody of the San Luis Obispo Sherriff’s Department since August 12, 2007. Upon receiving this information, Esparza instructed the investigators to return their investigative file to his office so that a declaration of good cause could be drafted and filed with the court.
On September 4, 2007, the trial court held the continued hearing on A Bail Bond Company’s section 1305.4 motion, and after taking the matter under submission, denied the motion as untimely. The court reasoned that the statute specifically mandates that a motion to extend time be filed within the initial 180-day exoneration period and that it be supported by a declaration or affidavit of good cause. The court concluded that A Bail Bond Company’s failure to file any declaration in support of its section 1305.4 motion within the statutory exoneration period rendered the entire motion untimely. Having denied the request for an extension, the court also denied A Bail Bond Company’s motion to vacate the forfeiture and exonerate the bond on the grounds that Bernal was not surrendered to custody until August 12, 2007, six days after the exoneration period expired.
On November 1, 2007, the trial court entered summary judgment against Indiana Lumbermens on the forfeited bond. On December 21, 2007, Indiana Lumbermens filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard Of Review
In its appeal, Indiana Lumbermens asserts that the trial court erred in denying the section 1305.4 motion filed on its behalf by A Bail Bond Company. We ordinarily review the trial court’s ruling on a section 1305.4 motion to extend the statutory exoneration period for an abuse of discretion. (County of Los Angeles v. Fairmont Specialty Group (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1018, 1028; People v. Ranger Ins. Co. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 676, 679-680.) In this case, however, the trial court did not rule on the merits of A Bail Bond Company’s motion, but rather denied the motion as untimely based on its interpretation of section 1305.4’s procedural requirements. The proper interpretation of a statute, and its application to undisputed facts, presents a question of law that is subject to de novo review. (People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 432; California Veterinary Medical Assn. v. City of West Hollywood (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 536, 546.)
Although not raised as an issue before the trial court, the County now argues that A Bail Bond Company lacked standing to bring the section 1305.4 motion because it was not identified as the bail agent on the bond posted by Indiana Lumbermens, and did not sufficiently describe its relationship with Indiana Lumbermens or the listed bail agent in its moving papers. However, in light of our conclusion that the motion brought by A Bail Bond Company was not timely filed, we need not address the separate issue of standing. For purposes of our analysis, we will assume A Bail Bond Company had proper standing to file a section 1305.4 motion on Indiana Lumbermens’ behalf.
The rules governing statutory interpretation are well-settled. We begin with the fundamental principle that “[t]he objective of statutory construction is to determine the intent of the enacting body so that the law may receive the interpretation that best effectuates that intent. [Citation.]” (Fitch v. Select Products Co. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 812, 818.) To ascertain that intent, “we turn first to the words of the statute, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning. [Citations.]” (Nolan v. City of Anaheim (2004) 33 Cal.4th 335, 340.) The statute’s every word and clause should be given effect so that no part or provision is rendered meaningless or inoperative. (Manufacturers Life Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1995) 10 Cal.4th 257, 274; DuBois v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 382, 388].) Moreover, a statute is not to be read in isolation, but construed in context and “‘with reference to the whole system of law of which it is a part so that all may be harmonized and have effect. [Citations.]’” (Landrum v. Superior Court (1981) 30 Cal.3d 1, 14.) “If the statutory language is unambiguous, ‘we presume the Legislature meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the statute governs.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Toney (2004) 32 Cal.4th 228, 232; see also Lennane v. Franchise Tax Bd. (1994) 9 Cal.4th 263, 268 [“‘Where the statute is clear, courts will not “interpret away clear language in favor of an ambiguity that does not exist.” [Citation.]’”].) With these principles in mind, we turn to the language of the bail forfeiture statute.
II. Timeliness Of The Section 1305.4 Motion
When a criminal defendant for whom a bail bond has been posted fails to appear without sufficient excuse, the trial court must declare the bond forfeited. (§ 1305, subd. (a); People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 653, 657.) Within 180 days of the forfeiture of the bond, plus five days for service of the notice of forfeiture by mail, the bail surety may seek to have the forfeiture vacated and the bond exonerated on the grounds that the defendant has voluntarily appeared or is in custody after surrender or arrest. (§ 1305, subds. (b), (c)(1).) If the forfeiture is not set aside by the expiration of the exoneration period, the court must enter summary judgment against the surety. (§ 1306, subd. (a); People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co., supra, at p. 657.)
Section 1305.4 allows the surety or its bail agent to bring a motion, based on good cause, for an order extending the 180-day exoneration period. The statute specifically states as follows: “Notwithstanding Section 1305, the surety insurer, the bail agent, the surety, or the depositor may file a motion, based upon good cause, for an order extending the 180-day period provided in that section. The motion shall include a declaration or affidavit that states the reasons showing good cause to extend that period. The court, upon a hearing and a showing of good cause, may order the period extended to a time not exceeding 180 days from its order. A motion may be filed and calendared as provided in subdivision (i) of Section 1305.”
A motion to extend time under section 1305.4 must be filed before the expiration of the 180-day exoneration period. (§§ 1305, subd. (i), 1305.4; People v. American Surety Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 719, 727-728.) It also must be based on events occurring within that exoneration period. (People v. Ranger Ins. Co. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 638, 649; People v. Seneca Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 75, 82-83.) If timely filed, the motion may be heard by the trial court within 30 days after the exoneration period has expired, and the court may extend the hearing date beyond the 30 day period upon a showing of good cause. (§§ 1305, subd. (i), 1305.4; People v. Ranger Ins. Co. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1234, disapproved on other grounds in People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co., supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 663, fn. 7.)
“‘The object of bail and its forfeiture is to insure the attendance of the accused and his obedience to the orders and judgment of the court.’ [Citations.]” (People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co., supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 657.) “Given the underlying policy of avoiding forfeitures in favor of bringing defendants before the court, a trial court, faced with a section 1305.4 motion for extension, should draw all inferences in favor of the surety.” (People v. Accredited Surety & Casualty Co., Inc. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1349, 1358.) Yet notwithstanding the policy disfavoring forfeitures, the provisions of the bail forfeiture statute must be strictly followed or the court acts without or in excess of its jurisdiction. (People v. Ranger Ins. Co., supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 1234; People v. American Surety Ins. Co., supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at p. 725.) The burden is on the party seeking to set aside a forfeiture or to extend an exoneration period “‘to establish by competent evidence that its case falls within the four corners of these statutory requirements.’ [Citation.]” (People v. American Surety Ins. Co., supra, at p. 725.)
In this case, the undisputed evidence establishes that the bail agent of Indiana Lumbermens filed a section 1305.4 motion within the 180-day exoneration period, but did not file a supporting declaration of good cause until 24 days after the exoneration period expired. We agree with the trial court that the bail agent’s deliberate failure to file any declaration whatsoever within the statutory 180-day period rendered its motion untimely under section 1305.4. The language of section 1305.4 is unambiguous. It explicitly provides that a motion to extend time must be filed before the expiration of the exoneration period. (§§ 1305.4, 1305, subd. (i).) It also specifically mandates that the motion “shall include a declaration or affidavit that states the reasons showing good cause to extend that period.” (§ 1305.4.) Therefore, to be timely under the plain language of the statute, a motion made pursuant to section 1305.4 must be filed within the 180-day exoneration period and must be accompanied by a declaration or affidavit of good cause. The unsupported motion filed on Indiana Lumbermens’ behalf failed to satisfy these statutory requirements.
Indiana Lumbermens contends that section 1305.4 must be construed in favor of the surety and that its bail agent substantially complied with the statute by timely filing a notice of motion before the exoneration period expired. While it is true that the good cause showing under section 1305.4 is a relatively low threshold, a surety seeking to extend the exoneration period still must comply with the specific procedural requirements of the statute, including its limitations period. (See, e.g., People v. American Surety Ins. Co., supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at pp. 727-728 [affirming the denial of a section 1305.4 motion as untimely where the motion was filed after the exoneration period had expired]). As appellate courts construing section 1305.4 repeatedly have recognized, an “extension is not automatic. [The surety] has to earn any additional time by a showing of good cause. That means an explanation of what efforts [it] made to locate [the defendant] during the initial 180 days, and why such efforts were unsuccessful.” (People v. Ranger Ins. Co., supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 681; see also County of Los Angeles v. Fairmont Specialty Group, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 1027; People v. Ranger Ins. Co., supra,150 Cal.App.4th at p. 649; People v. Seneca Ins. Co., supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at pp. 82-83.) “[S]ection 1305.4 does not provide an automatic 30-day ‘breather’ for sureties who are unable to demonstrate good cause for failing to return a defendant to custody within the initial [exoneration] period.” (People v. Seneca Ins. Co., supra, at p. 83.)
Indeed, the procedural history of this case suggests that Indiana Lumbermens’ bail agent was seeking to circumvent the limitations period imposed by section 1305.4 by waiting until the last minute to file a bare-bones motion lacking in any evidentiary support. A Bail Bond Company did not file its motion to extend time until August 6, 2007, the final day of the 180-day exoneration period. Notably, in filing the motion, the owner of A Bail Bond Company intentionally opted not to include a declaration of good cause because he did not yet have the investigative notes necessary to demonstrate due diligence. By his own admission, Esparza did not obtain the investigative file from the agents assigned to locate the defendant until some time after August 17, 2007. Accordingly, although A Bail Bond Company brought a motion to extend time on the grounds that it had exercised due diligence in its search efforts, it did not actually have any evidence of due diligence at the time the motion was filed.
Furthermore, A Bail Bond Company still had not filed a supporting declaration of good cause by August 27, 2007, the date that the section 1305.4 motion initially was called for hearing. Indiana Lumbermens asserts that its bail agent did file a declaration by the date of the continued hearing on September 4, 2007, which was also the date that it originally had noticed for the hearing in its motion. That fact is irrelevant; whether the hearing date was selected by the parties or the court, A Bail Bond Company had notice that its motion was set to be heard on August 27, 2007, yet failed to file a declaration of good cause by that date. Instead, the agent waited until August 30, 2007, 24 days after the motion was filed and three days after the matter was called for hearing, to submit any evidence in support of its extension request. Given this sequence of events, Indiana Lumbermens cannot establish that its bail agent substantially complied with the time limitations of section 1305.4 simply by filing an unsupported notice of motion.
Indiana Lumbermens next argues that there is a distinction between a notice of motion and the motion itself. Specifically, it reasons that section 1305.4 requires that a notice of motion be filed within the 180-day exoneration period, but that the motion itself is not made until the hearing, which can be held up to 30 days later. According to Indiana Lumbermens, the statutory language indicating that “[t]he motion shall include a declaration or affidavit” merely means that a supporting declaration must be filed at or before the hearing when the motion is made. (§ 1305.4.) Indiana Lumbermens’ argument is unavailing. In general, a motion “is deemed to have been made and to be pending before the court for all purposes, upon the due service and filing of the notice of motion...” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1005.5.) Here, A Bail Bond Company’s section 1305.4 motion was deemed made when it filed and served its “Notice of Motion and Motion to Extend Time” on August 6, 2007, the last day of the 180-day exoneration period. The motion was untimely because the moving papers filed on that date failed to include the requisite declaration of good cause.
Even accepting Indiana Lumbermens’ argument, the declaration that its bail agent eventually filed with the court was still untimely because it was not filed by the date that the motion was initially called for hearing on August 27, 2007. The agent did not submit a supporting declaration until three days later.
Indiana Lumbermens notes that the Rules of Court regarding law and motion practice do not require that a motion be supported by a declaration, nor do they permit any paper to be rejected for filing on the grounds that it was not timely submitted. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1112, subd. (b) [“Other papers may be filed in support of a motion, including declarations...”], and rule 3.1300, subd. (d) [“No paper may be rejected for filing on the ground that it was untimely submitted for filing.”].) The Rules of Court, however, must be construed in a manner that is consistent with statutory law. (Hess v. Ford Motor Co. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 516, 532; People v. Hall (1994) 8 Cal.4th 950, 960.) In this case, section 1305.4 sets forth specific procedural requirements for any motions filed under the statute, and its provisions must be strictly followed so that the court does not act without jurisdiction. (People v. American Surety Ins. Co., supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at p. 725.) Moreover, contrary to Indiana Lumbermens’ claim, the Rules of Court do not require a trial court to accept untimely filings, but rather provide that the court may, in its discretion, refuse to consider any late filed paper. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1300, subd. (d).)
Finally, Indiana Lumbermens suggests that the mere filing of its section 1305.4 motion extended the exoneration period “by operation of law at least until the date of hearing, September 4, 2007.” It thus contends that it was entitled to an exoneration of the bond because the defendant was returned to custody on August 12, 2007, three weeks before the hearing date. This argument ignores the requirement that a motion to extend time or to set aside a forfeiture must not only be filed within the initial exoneration period, but also must be based on facts occurring within that period. (People v. Ranger Ins. Co., supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at pp. 649-650; People v. Seneca Ins. Co., supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at pp. 82-83; People v. Granite State Ins. Co. (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 758, 768.) “[T]he time allowed to return the defendant to custody [is] not automatically extended by the mere filing of [a section 1305.4] motion. Indeed, the court lack[s] jurisdiction to grant the motion based on facts occurring after the initial 185-day period [has] expired.” (People v. Seneca Ins. Co., supra, at p. 82; see also People v. Granite State Ins. Co., supra, at p. 768 [“[A] motion to vacate forfeiture must be filed before the end of the exoneration period, and the facts upon which the motion is based must be established before that period expires.”].) Here, the record reflects that the defendant was not arrested until six days after the exoneration period expired. Therefore, the mere fact that the defendant was returned to custody while a section 1305.4 motion was pending was not a sufficient basis for exonerating the bond.
III.Conclusion
The trial court did not err in denying the section 1305.4 motion to extend the exoneration period because the motion was not supported by a timely filed declaration of good cause. The 180-day exoneration period accordingly expired on August 6, 2007. Because the defendant was not returned to custody until after the expiration of the exoneration period, Indiana Lumbermens was not entitled to relief from the order of forfeiture, and summary judgment was properly entered on the forfeited bond.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The County of Los Angeles shall recover its costs on appeal.
We concur: PERLUSS, P. J., JACKSON, J