And while R&L suggests that the Court should disregard McHugh's "general scheme" rule because neither the Sixth Circuit nor this Court has applied it since, (Doc. 172, #11788), many other district courts in our circuit have. See, e.g., Hochstein v. Microsoft Corp., No. 4-cv-73071, 2006 WL 8066573, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 13, 2006); SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 250 F. Supp. 3d 244, 261 (W.D. Ky. 2017); Counts v. Gen. Motors LLC, No. 16-cv-12541, 2020 WL 6937937, at *9 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 25, 2020); Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Abernathy Motorcycle Sales, Inc., No. 118-cv-1077, 2022 WL 567052, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. Feb. 24, 2022). That's persuasive.
Nor does Smithers' declaration present any actual or apparent prejudice to Defendants. See Moore, Owen, Thomas & Co. v. Coffey, 992 F.2d 1439, 1446 (6th Cir. 1993) (concluding that although an expert affidavit was filed 34 days late, the court could still consider it in ruling on the merits); cf. Estes, 59 Fed.Appx. at 752 (striking late expert affidavit because no disclosure was made by the deadline, and the affidavit provided nine months late would cause prejudice); Counts v. Gen. Motors LLC, No. 16-CV-12541, 2020 WL 6937937, at *13 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 25, 2020) (striking an expert's supplemental disclosures made after submission of expert reports, including the purchase and testing of two new vehicles, because “doubling the amount of data and tripling the number of diesel testing vehicles” was not merely “supplementary”)