Opinion
5-22-0343
06-30-2023
COUNTRY PREFERRED INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CATHY WESTERHEIDE, Defendant-Appellant.
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Monroe County. No. 18-MR-75 Honorable Dominic L. Kujawa Jr., Judge, presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE BOIE delivered the judgment of the court. Justice McHaney concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
BOIE PRESIDING JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: We affirm the judgment of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff where the defendant failed to make a written demand for arbitration within two years from the date of the accident as required by the underinsured provisions of the defendant's automotive insurance policy.
¶ 2 The plaintiff, Country Preferred Insurance Company, filed a declaratory action in the circuit court of Monroe County, on November 19, 2018. The plaintiff's declaratory action sought a determination of whether the defendant, Cathy Westerheide, was barred from asserting an underinsured motorist claim for failing to make a written demand for arbitration within two years from the date of the accident as required by the defendant's automotive insurance policy, number PA3715854 (policy), issued by the plaintiff.
¶ 3 On February 11, 2020, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to section 2-1005 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1005 (West 2020)). On January 12, 2022, the circuit court entered a written judgment finding that the time to demand arbitration had not been tolled, and that the defendant had failed to make a written demand for arbitration within two years from the date of the accident as required by the policy. Thus, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant filed a motion to reconsider the circuit court's judgment on February 10, 2022, and the circuit court denied the defendant's motion to reconsider on May 5, 2022. Thereafter, the defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
¶ 4 The defendant now appeals the judgment of the circuit court raising the sole issue of whether the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Monroe County.
¶ 5 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 6 On October 6, 2016, the defendant was involved in an automotive accident with another motorist in St. Louis, Missouri. The other motorist was insured by Nationwide Insurance Company, with liability limits of $100,000, and the defendant was insured by the plaintiff. The defendant was a resident of Illinois at the time of the incident and the defendant's policy was issued in Illinois. There is no dispute that the defendant's policy was in effect on the date of the accident, and that the defendant filed a timely claim for medical payments under the policy within two years of the date of the accident. The issue in this appeal, however, pertains to the underinsured provisions of the defendant's policy.
¶ 7 The defendant's policy, regarding underinsured motorist claims, provided as follows:
"SECTION 2
Uninsured-Underinsured Motorist,
Coverage U
* * *
Conditions, Section 2
* * *
3. Arbitration. If we and an insured disagree over whether that insured is legally entitled to recover damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle or underinsured motor vehicle or if agreement cannot be reached on the amount of damages, the insured must make a written demand for arbitration. When this is done, each party will select an arbitrator. The two arbitrators will then select a third. If the arbitrators are not selected within 45 days from insured's written demand, either we or the insured may in writing request arbitration be submitted to the American Arbitration Association.
* * *
7. Legal Action Against Us. No suit, action or arbitration proceedings for recovery of any claim may be brought against us until the insured has
fully complied with all the terms of this policy. Further, any suit, action or arbitration will be barred unless commenced within two years from the date of the accident. Arbitration proceedings will not commence until we receive your written demand for arbitration." (Emphases in original.)
¶ 8 We note that paragraph "3. Arbitration," was revised by an amendatory endorsement of the policy's provisions that deleted the initial paragraph "3. Arbitration" contained in the policy and replaced it with the paragraph quoted above. The initial paragraph "3. Arbitration" stated as follows:
"3. Arbitration. If we and an insured disagree over whether that insured is legally entitled to recover damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle or if agreement cannot be reached on the amount of damages, either party must make a written demand for arbitration. When this is done, each party will select an arbitrator. The two arbitrators will then select a third. If they cannot agree on a third arbitrator within 45 days, either party may request that arbitration be submitted to the American Arbitration Association." (Emphases in original.)
¶ 9 On February 8, 2018, counsel for the defendant sent the plaintiff a letter of representation. The contents of that correspondence, in its entirety, were as follows:
"Dear [claims adjustor]:
Please be advised that our office has been retained by [the defendant] and [her husband] to prosecute a claim on their behalf, as a result of injuries
[the defendant] sustained on October 6, 2016 when [the defendant] was injured in an automobile accident.
At this time our office is requesting that [plaintiff] forward a copy of the medical bills ledger, and copies of all medical bills and all medical records that you have regarding [the defendant's] medical treatment for injuries she sustained resulting from the accident on 10/6/2016.
Thank you for your time and consideration."
¶ 10 The plaintiff's claim activity log demonstrates that an entry was made on February 19, 2018, that stated "Claim Packet" under activity type, and in the comment section "Other - 2/8/18 atty LOR[.] Document Type: Other[.] Description: 2/8/18 atty LOR[.]" The plaintiff's claim activity log also shows that an entry was made on October 19, 2018, that stated in the comment section as follows:
"I called insd atty, ***. I asked if he put us on notice of UIM and requested arb within two years as required by our policy. [H]e said he did not have to as this was MO loss. I explained it is IL policy and per policy, he has to given [sic] us proper notice within two years. He asked that I send it in writing. I sent email to him with policy wording."
¶ 11 The same day, the plaintiff sent the defendant's counsel the following electronic correspondence:
"Good speaking with you today. You had requested that we open an Underinsured Motorist claim for your client, [the defendant]. As we discussed, your firm did not put us on formal notice for demand for UIM
arbitration within two years, as required by our policy. We have copied that portion from our policy for your records[.]
* * *
Feel free to contact us with additional questions or concerns. We are closing our Underinsured Motorist coverage at this time based on notice given after the two-year time period."
The defendant's counsel responded stating that it was "a Missouri accident," and that the defendant did not have confirmation of the other motorist's insurance policy limits at that time.
¶ 12 On November 12, 2018, the defendant's counsel informed the plaintiff that the other motorist's insurer had disclosed and tendered its policy limit of $100,000, for settlement and full release of liability regarding the accident. The defendant's counsel also indicated that the defendant intended to proceed with a claim or lawsuit for underinsured motorist coverage against the plaintiff. Thereafter, on November 19, 2018, the plaintiff filed the declaratory action from which this appeal stems. The entire policy, including the amendatory endorsement, was attached to the plaintiff's declaratory action.
¶ 13 On February 11, 2020, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to section 2-1005 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-1005 (West 2020)). The circuit court conducted a hearing on the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on May 10, 2021, and took the matter under advisement. On January 12, 2022, the circuit court issued a written order finding that the time to demand arbitration had not been tolled, and that the defendant had failed to make a written demand for arbitration within two years from the date of the accident as required by the policy. As such, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
¶ 14 The defendant filed a motion to reconsider the circuit court's judgment on February 10, 2022, and the circuit court denied the defendant's motion to reconsider on May 5, 2022. The defendant then filed a timely notice of appeal of the circuit court's judgment, and this appeal followed.
¶ 15 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 16 On appeal, the defendant raises the sole issue of whether the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The purpose of summary judgment is to determine whether there are any issues of material fact. Winnetka Bank v. Mandas, 202 Ill.App.3d 373, 387 (1990). Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions, and exhibits on file, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, demonstrate there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2020); Rexroad v. City of Springfield, 207 Ill.2d 33, 38-39 (2003). While the party opposing a motion for summary judgment is not required to prove their case, they have a duty to present a factual basis that would arguably entitle them to judgment in their favor. Winnetka Bank, 202 Ill.App.3d at 387-88.
¶ 17 Our standard of review upon a circuit court's grant of summary judgment is de novo. Adams v. Northern Illinois Gas Co., 211 Ill.2d 32, 43 (2004). Under a de novo standard of review, this court does not defer to the lower court's judgment or reasoning, but performs the same analysis that the lower would perform. Arthur v. Catour, 216 Ill.2d 72,78 (2005). Further, the construction of an insurance policy involves a question of law, and our standard of review pertaining to those issues regarding the construction of the policy is also de novo. American States Insurance Co. v. Koloms, 177 Ill.2d 473, 479-80 (1997).
¶ 18 Within the parameters of the above standards, we consider the issue of whether the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant argues that this matter involves an underinsured (UIM) claim, which is distinguishable from an uninsured (UM) claim. According to the defendant's argument, a UIM claim requires that the insured successfully litigate against the other motorist to collect the limits of his/her policy, and then to engage in informal negotiation with the insurer until an impasse is reached before the insured can proceed with a demand for arbitration.
¶ 19 The defendant cites to the first sentence of paragraph 7, section 2, of the policy which states that "No suit, action or arbitration proceedings for recovery of any claim may be brought against us until the insured has fully complied with all the terms of this policy." (Emphases in original.) The defendant argues that to fully comply with all the terms of the policy, she was required to successfully prosecute an action against the other driver, obtain an offer of the policy limits, receive the plaintiff's permission to release the other motorist, and accept the offer before she could take action to recover under her UIM coverage. As such, the defendant argues that the other motorist involved in the October 6, 2016, accident did not disclose his/her policy limits until November 12, 2018, 37 days after the two-year anniversary of the accident, and therefore, the defendant was only able to fully comply with the conditions precedent of the policy and proceed with a UIM claim after November 12, 2018.
¶ 20 In Hannigan v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 264 Ill.App.3d 336 (1994), the court rejected an insured's argument that it was impossible to comply with the policy's limitations provisions when the insured had no knowledge of the other's driver's inadequate coverage until after the limitations period had expired. Id. at 342-43. In addressing an identical uninsured-underinsured provision to the provision at issue in this case, the Hannigan court found that the provision was unambiguous and clear in its requirement that a demand for arbitration must be commenced within two years after the date of the accident. Id. at 343.
¶ 21 We agree with the Hannigan court. The rules for construction of an insurance contract are well established, and if the words used in the policy are unambiguous, the courts afford them their plain, ordinary, and popular meanings. Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Iles, 2013 IL App (5th) 120485, ¶ 20. Although the first sentence of paragraph 7 requires the defendant to fully comply with all the terms of the policy before proceeding with a suit, action, or arbitration, the second sentence of paragraph 7 clearly states that: "Further, any suit, action or arbitration will be barred unless commenced within two years from the date of the accident." As the Hannigan court noted, there is no need to determine when the insured knew or should have known of the existence of the right to bring any suit, action, or arbitration since the provision clearly stated that any claim was required to be made within two years of the accident. Hannigan, 264 Ill.App.3d at 342. As such, the defendant's argument that she could not have made a UIM claim or a demand for arbitration until after the two-year limitation when the other driver disclosed his/her policy limits is without merit.
¶ 22 The defendant also argues that under section 143.1 of the Illinois Insurance Code (215 ILCS 5/143.1 (West 2016)), the time from the accident date until the plaintiff's denial on October 19, 2018, was tolled. Section 143.1 of Illinois Insurance Code states as follows:
"Periods of limitation tolled. Whenever any policy or contract for insurance *** contains a provision limiting the period within which the insured may bring suit, the running of such period is tolled from the date proof of loss is filed, in whatever form is required by the policy, until the date the claim is denied in whole or in part." Id.
The purpose of the above statute providing for tolling of an insurance policy's limitation period once proof of loss has been filed is to prevent insurance companies from sitting on claims, allowing the limitations period to run, and depriving an insured of an opportunity to litigate their claims in court. Burress-Taylor v. American Security Insurance Co., 2012 IL App (1st) 110554, ¶ 18.
¶ 23 The defendant argues that the plaintiff received proof of loss through a recorded statement given by the defendant on the date of the accident. As such, the defendant argues that the policy's limitation period was tolled from October 6, 2016, until October 19, 2018, and that the defendant had two years from October 19, 2018, in which to file her UIM claim and make a written demand for arbitration.
¶ 24 The plaintiff argues that the defendant's reliance on a supposed recorded statement as a "proof of loss" is forfeited because the defendant failed to make the argument in the circuit court. According to the plaintiff, the defendant first mentioned tolling during oral arguments on the motion for summary judgment and then again in her motion to reconsider. The plaintiff argues that neither the defendant's arguments at the hearing nor her arguments within her motion to reconsider were based upon a sworn statement or that such statement would constitute a proof of loss that would invoke the tolling statute. The plaintiff also argues that the defendant fails to cite to any portion of the record on appeal to support her assertion that she gave a recorded statement on the date of the accident, or to support her assertion that the recorded statement constituted the policy's required proof of loss.
¶ 25 The general rule is that an argument presented for the first time on appeal is deemed forfeited. Barnett v. Zion Park District, 171 Ill.2d 378, 389 (1996). Further, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h) states that an appellant's argument "shall contain the contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefor, with citation of the authorities and the pages of the record relied on." Ill. S.Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020).
¶ 26 The defendant's argument states that this matter also implicates tolling considerations and then quotes the tolling statute. The defendant then states that the plaintiff "obtained the recorded statement, which was form of proof of loss required by the policy." The defendant, however, fails to provide any citation to the record on appeal that would indicate that she gave a recorded statement on the date of the accident. The defendant's fact section states that the defendant reported the claim in a timely manner and signed all medical authorizations sent by the plaintiff with citations to the record, but makes no mention of the defendant providing a recorded statement.
¶ 27 The defendant further fails to cite to any portion of the policy, or any precedent, that would support her contention that the recorded statement, if one was given, constituted a proof of loss under the policy. The defendant's entire argument regarding tolling consists of five sentences that are devoid of any citations to the record on appeal or to precedent.
¶ 28 An appellant may not foist onto the reviewing court the burden of researching the record in an effort to support the argument presented. Ramos v. Kewanee Hospital, 2013 IL App (3d) 120001, ¶ 37. Arguments that do not comply with Rule 341(h) do not merit consideration and may be rejected by this court for that reason alone. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Sanders, 2015 IL App (1st) 141272, ¶ 43. Regardless of forfeiture, we find that the defendant's brief on this argument fails to comply with Rule 341(h)(7), and is forfeited.
¶ 29 Next, the defendant argues that the February 8, 2018, correspondence from the defendant's counsel was sufficient to initiate an "action" for "damages" under the UIM policy. The defendant argues that the correspondence specifically stated that the defendant intended to prosecute a claim for damages for bodily injury sustained in the accident. As such, the defendant argues that the February 8, 2018, correspondence triggered a requirement for the plaintiff to participate in an informal pre-arbitration negotiation process and for the plaintiff, as the party declaring the impasse, to make a written demand for arbitration.
¶ 30 The defendant makes this argument without any citation to precedent which would indicate such correspondence has been found to be sufficient to initiate an action for damages under a UIM policy. Further, the defendant's argument that the plaintiff had an obligation to demand arbitration if an agreement was not reached on damages, is based on the deleted portion of the "3. Arbitration" provision that "either party must make a written demand for arbitration." We note that the defendant quotes the amended "3. Arbitration" provision within the fact section of her brief, but she quotes the deleted "3. Arbitration" provision within this argument. The defendant also fails to inform this court of the conflict between the two provisions or to provide any argument on why the deleted provision should be controlling.
¶ 31 Additionally, even if the February 8, 2018, correspondence was held to be sufficient to assert a UIM claim, it would still fail to meet the arbitration requirement since it failed to request arbitration. In Maier v. CC Services, Inc., 2019 IL App (3d) 170640, the court held that when an insured provides notice to the insurer that an underinsured motorist claim is being asserted, such notice of a claim does not satisfy the contractual requirement of a request for arbitration. Id. ¶ 30. The Maier court based its finding on the fact that a notice of claim differs significantly from a written demand for arbitration. Id. ¶ 27. The Maier court found that the correspondence from the insured's counsel failed to mention arbitration in any manner, and as such, did not satisfy the contractual requirement of a request for arbitration. Id. ¶ 30; see also Buchalo v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 83 Ill.App.3d 1040, 1045 (1980) (holding that the insured's correspondence concerning arbitration failed to make a demand for arbitration).
¶ 32 In this matter, the February 8, 2018, correspondence stated that counsel had been retained to "prosecute a claim" and failed to make any mention of arbitration. As such, we find that the defendant's counsel's correspondence of February 8, 2018, did not satisfy the contractual requirement of the policy requiring a written request for arbitration.
¶ 33 Finally, we note that the defendant makes an unsupported argument that the "custom in this region" is that UIM cases are settled in an interim informal process and that the defendant's defense firm "has settled every other UIM case *** with [the plaintiff] at this informal stage." This argument is irrelevant. Our decision is based on the facts of this case as applied to the statutory law and precedent regarding the issue and arguments presented in this case. As such, this argument is without merit.
¶ 34 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 35 Based on the above, we find that the defendant failed to make a written demand for underinsured motorist arbitration within two years from the date of the accident as required by the policy, and therefore, the plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. As such, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Monroe County.
¶ 36 Affirmed.
¶ 37 JUSTICE CATES, specially concurring:
¶ 38 My colleagues affirm the grant of summary judgment based on a similar factual basis in Hannigan v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 264 Ill.App.3d 336 (1994). I agree that the case sub judice is similar to Hannigan as it relates to the language of the insurance policy at issue here. But as distinguished from the present case, the trial court in Hannigan did not consider whether the limitations period for filing the insured's claim was tolled under section 143.1 of the Illinois Insurance Code (Code) (215 ILCS 5/143.1 (West 2016)). After reviewing the record in this case, I find that section 143.1 of the Code is applicable, and that defendant Westerheide provided timely notice of the accident and proof of loss to toll the running of the two-year limitation period for demand arbitration of her claim. Westerheide, however, failed to make a formal request for arbitration within two years after her insurer denied her UIM claim, even though she had ample time to do so. Accordingly, I agree that summary judgment was appropriate under the circumstances of this case, but for different reasons than my colleagues. Therefore, I concur in the result only.
¶ 39 On October 6, 2016, Westerheide was involved in an automobile accident in St. Louis, Missouri. On the date of the accident, Westerheide was insured by the plaintiff, Country Preferred Insurance Company (Country Preferred). Following the accident, Westerheide notified Country Preferred that she had been involved in an accident and that she had been injured. In response to a request to admit, Country Preferred admitted that "the insured reported the accident in a timely manner and timely made a claim for medical payments coverage under the Country policy which claim is required to be made within two years of the date of the accident." In addition, a "Claim Activity Log," produced by Country Preferred, contained entries indicating when Westerheide reported the loss on October 6, 2016, and the time of the loss. Country Preferred has never disputed that Westerheide made a proper claim. That the insured promptly and properly notified Country Preferred of the accident, as required under the subject policy, is undisputed.
¶ 40 On February 8, 2018, Westerheide's counsel sent Country Preferred a letter of representation. The letter did not include a demand for arbitration. On October 19, 2018, just two years after the date of the accident, Rick Green, an agent of Country Preferred, called Westerheide's attorney. According to an entry in the Claim Activity Log, Green asked Westerheide's counsel if he had put Country Preferred "on notice of UIM and requested arb[itration] within two years as required by our policy." Westerheide's counsel responded that "he did not have to as this was a [Missouri] loss." Green explained the policy requirements and that same day sent Westerheide's counsel a copy of that portion of the policy requiring notice and a request for arbitration within two years from the date of the accident. In response, Westerheide's counsel explained that he did not know the limits of the other policy as of that date.
¶ 41 On November 12, 2018, Westerheide's attorney informed Country Preferred that the at-fault driver's insurer had tendered its policy limits in the amount of $100,000 for settlement. Westerheide's counsel then informed Country Preferred that he intended to proceed with a claim for the underinsured motorist coverage for Westerheide. Country Preferred responded by filing a complaint for declaratory judgment, with a copy of Westerheide's insurance policy attached. Country Preferred claimed that Westerheide failed to demand arbitration within two years of the date of her accident, and thus she was time-barred from making a claim for underinsured motorist benefits.
¶ 42 Country Preferred subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that Westerheide had not filed a demand for arbitration within two years from the date of the accident. On January 12, 2022, the circuit court granted summary judgment for Country Preferred, finding that the time for filing the demand for arbitration had not been tolled, and that Westerheide had failed to make a demand for arbitration within two years from the date of the accident. The circuit court did not explain why the tolling provision did not apply.
¶ 43 In my view, the circuit court erred when it found the tolling provision in section 143.1 did not apply to Westerheide's claim. Section 143.1 provides:
"Whenever any policy or contract for insurance, except life, accident and health, fidelity and surety, and ocean marine policies, contains a provision limiting the period within which the insured may bring suit, the running of such period is tolled from the date proof of loss is filed, in whatever form is required by the policy, until the date the claim is denied in whole or in part." 215 ILCS 5/143.1 (West 2016).
Section 143.1 is an important statutory restriction on limitation provisions in insurance contracts. See American Access Casualty Co. v. Tutson, 409 Ill.App.3d 233, 236 (2011). Section 143.1 is designed to protect consumers when an insurance policy contains a time limitation. Tutson, 409 Ill.App.3d at 237. The intent of the provision is to prevent insurance companies from sitting on claims, allowing the limitations periods to run and depriving insureds of the opportunity to litigate their claims. Tutson, 409 Ill.App.3d at 237.
¶ 44 Here, Country Preferred's policy required that arbitration be commenced within two years after the date of the accident. However, under section 143.1 of the Code, the running of the policy's limitations period is tolled from the date a proof of loss is filed until the date the claim is denied. Country Preferred's policy only provides that its insureds submit a "sworn proof of loss" when requested by Country Preferred. In this case, Country Preferred did not make such a request or provide Westerheide with any special "proof of loss" form that it claims was not properly completed by Westerheide. Indeed, it would be disingenuous for Country Preferred to claim that Westerheide did not file an adequate proof of loss. Westerheide promptly and properly advised Country Preferred of the claim on October 6, 2016. She also filled out signed authorizations in order for Country Preferred to obtain her medical records and bills. The record reveals that Country Preferred produced a claim file in discovery consisting of approximately 1200 pages. Some of the documents related specifically to correspondence between Westerheide and Country Preferred regarding the accident. In additional responses to discovery requests, Country Preferred acknowledged that one of its claim representatives, Lea Bombard, was assigned to Westerheide's case and frequently communicated with her. Country Preferred further acknowledged that it was collecting medical records and bills of the insured pursuant to medical authorizations provided by Westerheide and her attorneys. It is clear from the record that Country Preferred was well aware of the accident, the litigation with the other motorist, and Westerheide's medical condition and ongoing need for treatment.
¶ 45 My colleagues focus on a recorded statement referenced by Westerheide's counsel, that is not contained in the record on appeal. A recorded statement is but one mode of providing proof of loss. The provision in an insurance policy requiring proof of loss is intended to give the insurer the opportunity to investigate the claim, with a view towards securing information as to any possible defenses. McDonald v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 251 Ill.App.3d 354, 356 (1993). The policy at issue did not require any specific type of proof of loss. Where, as here, the insured has in good faith furnished proof sufficient to apprise the insurer of the character and extent of the claim and afforded the insurer sufficient notice to investigate any possible defenses, and no particular forms are required by the policy or by statute, the submission of the proof of loss is sufficient to toll the two-year limitation period under section 143.1. McDonald, 251 Ill.App.3d 356-57. Thus, the presence or absence of a recorded statement is not dispositive of the issue. It is clear from the circuit court's order of January 12, 2022, that the issue of tolling was raised by Westerheide. Thus, contrary to the view expressed by my colleagues, the tolling issue was not forfeited.
¶ 46 Having determined that the tolling provision in section 143.1 applied to this claim, the issue is whether Westerheide made a timely demand for arbitration. According to the record, Country Preferred denied the claim on October 19, 2018, when it closed its file and indicated that Westerheide had not complied with the two-year notice provision. The two-year notice provision in the policy began to run on that date. Westerheide's counsel, however, did not make a demand for arbitration within two years of the denial of Westerheide's claim. Throughout all of the proceedings on summary judgment, Westerheide's counsel did not make a demand for arbitration. The two-year limitations period for demanding arbitration expired on October 19, 2020. Because the defendant never made a demand for arbitration, summary judgment for Country Preferred was proper under the circumstances. Accordingly, I concur in the result.