See Browning v. Plumlee, 316 Ill.App.3d 738, 249 Ill.Dec. 930, 737 N.E.2d 320 (2000); John Deere Insurance Company v. Allstate Insurance Company, 298 Ill.App.3d 371, 232 Ill.Dec. 544, 698 N.E.2d 635 (1998).         However, Universal claims that this result conflicts with our previous decision in Country Mutual Insurance Company v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Company, 316 Ill.App.3d 161, 249 Ill.Dec. 207, 735 N.E.2d 1032 (2000). The company asserts that we faced this same issue in that case, but declined to hold that the injured party was entitled to coverage limits greater than the minimum required by law.

When the statutory language is clear, the “plain and ordinary meaning must be given effect without resorting to other aids of construction.” Bailey v. Illinois Liquor Control Comm'n, 405 Ill.App.3d 550, 345 Ill.Dec. 190, 938 N.E.2d 629, 634 (2010) (quoting In reMarriage of Beyer, 316 Ill.App.3d 161, 249 Ill.Dec. 207, 735 N.E.2d 1032, 1032 (2001)). Statutes should, whenever possible, not be read so as to make a word, clause, or sentence “superfluous.”

Defendant also cites a Third District case with basically the same scenario. Again, a court referred to the test-driver as a customer when the word "customer" was not at issue. Country Mutual Insurance Co. v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Co., 316 Ill. App. 3d 161, 163 (2000). Defendant argues that the term "customer," as used in an automobile dealership's insurance policy, includes a person who is considering the purchase of an auto by conducting a test-drive of a vehicle and that it is the plain, ordinary, commonsense meaning of the term "customer" to include such a person.

Farmers cites to several Illinois cases to support its contention that primary coverage is generally placed on the insurer of the vehicle rather than the insurer of the driver, regardless of whether the permissive user is insured under a separate personal liability policy. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Smith, 197 Ill. 2d 369, 375-76, 757 N.E.2d 881 (2001); Country Mutual Insurance Co. v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Co., 316 Ill. App. 3d 161, 735 N.E.2d 1032 (2000); Pekin Insurance Co. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 305 Ill. App. 3d 417, 711 N.E.2d 1227 (1999); State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Universal Underwriters Group, 182 Ill. 2d 240, 695 N.E.2d 848 (1998). Farmers fails to recognize a crucial element of the statute, however, as the mandatory insurance statute only requires liability insurance, not primary insurance, as noted by this court in Pierson.

Pierson contends that Illinois public policy overrides the explicit language of the insurance contract and requires that she be protected for the loss to the Benoy vehicle. In support of this contention, she cites Illinois' mandatory insurance law ( 625 ILCS 5/7-601 (West 1998)) and various precedents interpreting and defining the extent to which that statute imposes coverage responsibility on the insurer of an auto dealer: Browning v. Plumlee, 316 Ill. App.3d 738 (2000); Country Mutual Insurance Co. v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Co., 316 Ill. App.3d 161 (2000); State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Universal Underwriters Group, 182 Ill.2d 240 (1998); Universal Underwriters Insurance Group v. Griffin, 287 Ill. App.3d 61 (1997); Madison Mutual Insurance Co. v. Universal Underwriters Group, 251 Ill. App.3d 13 (1993); and Pekin Insurance Co. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 305 Ill. App.3d 417 (1999). Pierson argues that the statute and cases stand for the proposition that Illinois public policy "in favor of permissive drivers" requires that she receive coverage under Benoy's insurance policy.

The primary goal of statutory construction is to ascertain the legislature's intent. Country Mutual Insurance Co. v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Co., 316 Ill. App. 3d 161, 164 (2000). The plain language of the statute is generally the most reliable indicator of that intent.

Finally, we note that the phrase in Universal's policy, "minimum limits provision law," may refer to sections 5-101(b)(6) and 5-102(b)(4) as well as section 7-601. Sections 5-101(b)(6) and 5-102(b)(4) should control the issue of minimum policy limits because those sections are more specifically applicable to car dealerships than section 7-601. See Country Mutual Insurance Co. v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Co., 316 Ill. App.3d 161, 164, 735 N.E.2d 1032, 1035 (2000). We conclude that the legislature intended to require permissive users such as Snyder to be covered under a licensed car dealer's insurance policy with minimum limits of at least $100,000/$300,000.

In this case, whether a violation of the statute occurred depends on the construction placed on the statute. Statutory construction also raises a question of law. Country Mutual Insurance Co. v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Co., 316 Ill. App.3d 161, 164, 735 N.E.2d 1032, 1035 (2000). While deference is generally accorded the construction placed on a statute by an agency given the authority to administer that statute, the courts are not bound by an agency's erroneous construction of the statute.

In construing a statute, the primary goal is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. Country Mutual Insurance Co. v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Co., 316 Ill. App.3d 161, 164 (2000). The plain language of the statute is the best indication of the legislature's intent.