Opinion
C.A. No. 06A-06-002.
Submitted: March 12, 2007.
May 8, 2007.
James D. Griffin, Esquire, Griffin Hackett, P.A. Georgetown, DE.
Judith A. Goldie 200 McKim Street Zelienople, PA.
Mary Page Bailey, Esquire Department of Justice Carvel State Office Building Wilmington, DE.
Dear Counsel and Ms. Goldie:
Pending before the Court is Country Life Homes, Inc.'s (hereinafter "Country Life") appeal of the Division of Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board's (hereinafter "Board") March 28, 2006 decision (hereinafter "Decision") granting Judith A. Goldie (hereinafter "Goldie") unemployment benefits. For the reasons stated herein the Board's Decision is affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellee, Goldie, was employed by Country Life from February 7, 2005 until September 27, 2005. At all times relevant hereto, Goldie worked full-time in accounts payable.
Goldie's employment was terminated, and she filed for unemployment insurance benefits. Benefits were granted by a Claims Deputy. The decision of the Claims Deputy was appealed and subsequently affirmed by an Appeals Referee. An appeal was later taken to the Board, and was again affirmed.
The Board adopted the factual findings made by the Appeals Referee. The Court includes a brief synopsis of those findings as follows. On Monday, September 19, 2005, Goldie had to leave work early due to a medical emergency with her daughter. The following day Goldie informed work that she was still waiting to hear from her doctor.
It is not clear from the Referee `s findings whethe r or not this co ntact was ma de during w orking hou rs. The factual findings do not evidence any verbal exchange in this instance. The Court interprets the findings to mean tha t the Referee fo und it credib le that this informatio n was only co nveyed by w ay of voicem ail.
On Wednesday, September 21, 2005, before the start of her shift, Goldie left a voice message that she was in Pittsburgh and asked the director of human resources to return her phone call. Goldie was in Pittsburgh because it was thought that her mother had suffered a stroke. The director of human resources did not gather the reason for the absence from the message left by Goldie. Nevertheless, the director of human resources did not return Goldie's phone call as requested in the message. Later that same evening, Goldie again left a voice mail message that she was in Pittsburgh and would not be in to work for the rest of the week.
During the afternoon of Friday, September 23, 2005, Goldie called the director of human resources to inform her that she was back in town. The director chastised Goldie despite a reminder that the reason for her absence was her mother's illness. Goldie was told to return to work on the following Tuesday. Goldie did so. Upon arrival Goldie was asked to turn over her keys and was terminated from employment. The Appeals Referee found that Goldie had "received no prior warnings of any kind."
Also included in the evidence presented was the following. On August 16, 2005 Goldie received a written warning for falsification of company time records. On September 9, 2005 an incident occurred where Goldie took what was deemed to be an excessive amount to time to make a business related trip to the bank. Country Life asserts that upon return from that business trip, Goldie appeared to have engaged in some form of substance abuse. That allegation was unsubstantiated.
A written report of the incident was put in Goldie's file, but no copy of that report was given to Goldie.
The Board further added, in its Decision, that "[a]lthough the employer [Country Life] . . . had not to be pleased with this chain of events — although they do not seem to have been within the claimant's [Goldie's] control and, therefore, could not be considered misconduct — the claimant [Goldie] was given no indication that her job was in jeopardy." It was noted that "[w]ithout an unambiguous warning . . . she [Goldie] was denied the opportunity to conform her conduct to her employer's expectation and retain her employment."
Following the Board's March 28, 2006 Decision, Country Life sent a letter to the Board which was treated as a request for a rehearing on the matter. The Board denied the application for reconsideration. Country Life now appeals the matter to this Court.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Supreme Court and this Court repeatedly have emphasized the limited appellate review of the factual findings of an administrative agency. The function of the reviewing Court is to determine whether the Board's conclusions are supported by substantial evidence and are free from legal error. General Motors Corp. v. Fritz, 2004 Del. Super. LEXIS 228 (Del.Super. June 9, 2004). "`Substantial evidence' means `such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Id., quoting, DABCC v. Newsome, 690 A.2d 906, 910 (Del. 1996).
Only where there is no substantial, competent evidence to support the Board's factual findings may a reviewing court overturn the Board's decision. Fritz, 2004 Del. Super. LEXIS 228. "In reviewing a record for substantial evidence, the Court will consider the record in the light most favorable to the party prevailing below, resolving all doubts in its favor." Id., quoting, Weiss v. Del. Dep't of Health Soc. Servs., 2003 Del. Super. LEXIS 266 (Del.Super. July 30, 2003). The Court does not weigh the evidence, determine questions of credibility, or make its own factual findings. Fritz, 2004 Del. Super. LEXIS 228. It merely determines if the evidence adequately supports the agency's factual findings and is legally correct. 19 Del. C. § 3323(a).
DISCUSSION
The Board's review of claims is de novo and it may make its own conclusions based on the material before it. Robbins v. Deatons, 1994 Del. Super. LEXIS 38, at *9 (Del.Super. Feb. 7, 1994). The Board is dually authorized to adopt or affirm the findings of the Appeals Referee. Thomas v. Chrysler Corp., 1995 Del. Super. LEXIS 46, at *6 (Del.Super. Jan. 31, 1995) ("When the Board affirms a referee's decision after taking additional evidence or affirms it without taking such evidence, this Court will rely upon the referee's determination for the findings of fact and conclusions of law."). In the instant case, the Board adopted the findings of the Appeals Referee, and also made additional findings. In this regard, the Court will look to both the findings stated in the Board decision as well as those in the Appeals Referee's decision to determine whether substantial evidence exists.
The Delaware Code provides that an individual discharged from work for just cause is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits. 19 Del. C. § 3315(2). "Just cause" is defined as a "willful or wanton act or pattern of conduct in violation of the employer's interests, the employee's duties, or of the employee's expected standard of conduct." Avon Products, Inc. v. Wilson, 513 A.2d 1315, 1317 (Del. 1986). However, "not every act which violates the employer's interest or the employee's duties or expected standard of beh avior is necess arily a willful or wanton act." Kingswood Cmty. Ctr. v. Chandler, 1999 Del. Super. LEXIS 98, at *6 (Del.Super. Jan. 19, 1999). Inadvertence in isolated instances or good faith errors in judgment do not equate to just cause for termination. Id.
"It is equally true that negligent behavior can rise to the level of misconduct." Glass v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 1994 Del. Super. LEXIS 470, at *6 (Del.Super. Sept. 15, 1994). "An instructive Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court case defines misconduct as inter alia ` . . . negligence in such a degree as to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests, or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer.'" Id. (citation omitted). In Delaware, negligence amounts to just cause if it occurs "despite warnings and is not excusable as an expected result of either the nature of the job or of the ability of the employee." Id. (citation omitted).
Where an individual is discharged due to alleged misconduct, the employer has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that just cause existed before the claimant will be disqualified from unemployment benefits. Short v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 1986 Del. Super. LEXIS 1120, at *2 (Del.Super. Apr. 2, 1986). Thus, the essential issue is whether substantial evidence exists to support the Board's conclusion that Country Life terminated Goldie's employment without any willful or wanton misconduct on her part.
The Board concluded that Goldie's conduct did not rise to the level of willful or wanton conduct that would have justified her termination. In order for a just cause termination to exist in cases where no prior warning is given, an employee's conduct must rise to the level of an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests, or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. The chain-of-events in the present case do not rise to such a level. Circumstances well beyond Goldie's control necessitated a period of absence. The Court limits its conclusion to the facts presented in this case, emphasizing that this is not a case where an employee was unexplainably and unjustifiably absent from work.
The Court takes pause to note that excessive, unexcused absences or tardiness can, in certain instances, constitute just cause for discharge. Sierra v. Reliable Corp., 1997 Del. Super. LEXIS 355, at *3 (Del.Super. July 29, 1997). Such behavior is considered to be "misconduct" as defined above. The instances where such behavior does not constitute misconduct, however, include absences due solely to legitimate illness or other emergency situations. Despite the misunderstanding between the parties involved here, there was sufficient testimony provided to allow the Board to credit Goldie's contention that she informed Country Life of the legitimate reason for her absence. Such determinations of credibility are left for the Board to make and this Court will not disturb them.
Moreover, even assuming that Goldie's conduct was negligent, the Board's Decision is free from legal error. In instances where an employee's conduct amounts only to a good faith error in judgment, an employer must give prior warnings that such conduct will not be acceptable. Failure to do so does not preclude the employer from terminating an at-will employee, but it will open the proverbial door for an award of unemployment benefits. This Court has further held that "a single act of irresponsibility does not rise to the level of willful or wanton conduct." Kingswood Cmty. Ctr., 1999 Del. Super. LEXIS 98, at *9 (citation omitted).
Among the evidence submitted was the warning given to Goldie on August 16, 2005 for falsifying company time records. The reason for that warning and the later absence which caused Goldie's termination are not so similarly situated as to inextricably connect one with the other. The prior warning did not put Goldie on notice that an emergency related absence would lead to termination.
The Board credited Goldie's testimony that on multiple occasions she attempted to contact County Life and inform the appropriate person of her whereabouts. Goldie left voice messages and even requested that her phone call be returned in order to further discuss the matter. Country Life could easily have contacted Goldie, even if for no other reason that to warn Goldie that any further absence would be grounds for termination. However, Country Life chose not to do so. Goldie's failure to speak with someone directly about her absence does not rise above the level of a good faith error in judgment. Even viewed in the most negative light her actions could be justifiably viewed as a single act of irresponsibility. Consequently, the Board correctly applied the law to the facts and found that Country Life had not met its burden of proving that just cause existed for Goldie's termination.
CONCLUSION
Considering the foregoing, substantial evidence exists to support the Referee's decision as affirmed by the Board. Judith A. Goldie was discharged from Country Life Homes, Inc. without just cause. Correct legal principles were applied in reaching the Board's decision. Accordingly, the Board's decision is affirmed, and Judith A. Goldie is, if otherwise qualified, entitled to receive unemployment benefits.
IT IS SO ORDERED