Summary
holding that "there was no factual basis to enter or extend the injunction" for 90 days where "there had been no violence between the parties"
Summary of this case from Frost v. WilsonOpinion
No. 1D17-4049
12-18-2018
Calvin Elvin COUNSIL, Appellant, v. Zeida ANDERSON, Appellee.
Robert Calvin Rivers, Law Offices of Robert Calvin Rivers, Jacksonville, for Appellant. Anadelle Marie Martinez-Mullen, Quigley House, Jacksonville, for Appellee.
Robert Calvin Rivers, Law Offices of Robert Calvin Rivers, Jacksonville, for Appellant.
Anadelle Marie Martinez-Mullen, Quigley House, Jacksonville, for Appellee.
Per Curiam.Appellant seeks review of the order extending a temporary injunction for protection against domestic violence for 90 days. We reverse because there was no factual basis to enter or extend the injunction because, as the trial court orally found, there had been no violence between the parties. Accordingly, even though the injunction has now expired, we remand for entry of an order vacating the injunction. See Pryor v. Pryor , 141 So.3d 1279, 1280 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (explaining that domestic violence injunctions are an exception to the usual rules of mootness because of the collateral consequences that flow from such injunctions) (quoting Rodman v. Rodman , 48 So.3d 1022 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) ).
Appellant did not challenge the legal basis for extending the temporary injunction, so we need not decide that issue. However, for the trial court’s benefit in subsequent cases, we note that "[s]ection 741.30 ‘does not provide for the issuance of a series of temporary injunctions in lieu of a permanent injunction.’ " Dietz v. Dietz , 127 So.3d 1279, 1280 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (quoting Bacchus v. Bacchus , 108 So.3d 712, 716 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) ); see also § 741.30(5)(c), Fla. Stat. (authorizing the extension of a temporary injunction only when the final hearing is continued for good cause shown).
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REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions
Lewis, Wetherell, and Wolf, JJ., concur.