Council of Middletown Tp. v. Benham

56 Citing cases

  1. Nutter v. Dougherty

    595 Pa. 340 (Pa. 2007)   Cited 44 times
    Holding that ambiguity in the scope of a home-rule municipality's authority and the limitations imposed upon such authority must be resolved in the municipality's favor

    Preemption, the court emphasized, is the exception and not the rule. Id. (citing Council of Middletouni Township v. Benham, 514 Pa. 176, 523 A.2d 311, 315 (1987)). The Court observed that preemption does not result simply because the General Assembly legislates in the field; rather, the legislature must manifest its intent entirely to preempt that field.

  2. Mazzo v. Bd. of Pensions Retirement

    531 Pa. 78 (Pa. 1992)   Cited 20 times
    Invalidating ordinance that inserted additional requirement and prohibited reinstatement of pension benefits on conditions devised by state

    (Footnotes omitted). See also Council of Middletown Township v. Benham, 514 Pa. 176, 180-81, 523 A.2d 311, 313 (1987). It is clear that PEPFA contains no express provision addressing the question of whether municipal ordinances can provide for forfeiture of pension benefits upon terms different from those contained in the statute.

  3. Nutter v. Dougherty

    921 A.2d 44 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 2007)   Cited 11 times

    Moreover, courts have found entire fields of legislation to be preempted only when "the state has retained all regulatory and legislative power for itself and no local legislation is permitted." Council of Middletown Township v. Benham, 514 Pa. 176, 181, 523 A.2d 311, 313 (1987). See also Hydropress Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Township of Upper Mount Bethel, 575 Pa. 479, 836 A.2d 912 (2003) (plurality opinion) (stating that municipalities are presumed to have the power to legislate in a field regardless of how extensively the legislature has legislated in that field).

  4. Synagro-WWT, Inc. v. Rush Township

    299 F. Supp. 2d 410 (M.D. Pa. 2003)   Cited 3 times

    We add as a final note that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognizes that "the consequences of preemption are severe" and that it has "'found an intent to totally preempt local regulation in only three areas: alcoholic beverages, anthracite strip mining, and banking.'"Hydropress, 2003 WL 22799700, at *4 (quoting Council of Middletown Township v. Benham, 523 A.2d 311, 314 (Pa. 1987)). With this framework in mind, we proceed to analyze whether plaintiff rightly contends that the Ordinance is preempted by NMA, SWMA, and/or SFA.

  5. S & H Transp., Inc. v. City of York

    J-99-2018 (Pa. Jul. 17, 2019)   Cited 13 times
    Interpreting the language used in a local ordinance, rule, or regulation is a legal question for which our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary

    In interpreting both statutes and ordinances, we follow the principles set forth in the Statutory Construction Act ("SCA"), 1 Pa.C.S. ยงยง 1921-39. Williams v. City of Philadelphia, 188 A.3d 421, 428 (Pa. 2018); Council of Middletown Twp., Delaware County v. Benham, 523 A.2d 311, 315 (Pa. 1987). Likewise, as a general matter, we employ the interpretative principles of the SCA to construe a regulation implementing a legislative enactment.

  6. Hoffman Mining Co. v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Adams Twp.

    32 A.3d 587 (Pa. 2011)   Cited 52 times
    Observing that General Assembly has preempted field of regulation relative to alcoholic beverages, anthracite strip mining, and banking

    However, the mere fact that the General Assembly has enacted legislation in a field does not lead to the presumption that the state has precluded all local enactments in that field; rather, the General Assembly must clearly evidence its intent to preempt. Council of Middletown Township v. Benham, 514 Pa. 176, 523 A.2d 311, 313 (1987); see Mars Emergency Medical Services, Inc. v. Township of Adams, 559 Pa. 309, 740 A.2d 193, 196 (1999) (โ€œ[A]bsent a clear statement of legislative intent to preempt, state legislation will not generally preempt local legislation on the same issue.โ€). Such clarity is mandated because of the severity of the consequences of a determination of preemption: โ€œIf the General Assembly has preempted a field, the state has retained all regulatory and legislative power for itself and no local legislation in that area is permitted.โ€

  7. Hydropress v. Tp. of Upper Mt. Bethel

    575 Pa. 479 (Pa. 2003)   Cited 18 times
    Stating that municipalities are presumed to have the power to legislate in a field regardless of how extensively the legislature has legislated in that field

    "If the General Assembly has preempted a field, the state has retained all regulatory and legislative power for itself and no local legislation in that area is permitted." Council of Middletown Tp., Delaware County v. Benham, 523 A.2d 311, 313 (Pa. 1987). Recognizing the clarity with which an intent to preempt must be expressed by the Legislature and the significance of such a determination, "[w]e have found an intent to totally preempt local regulation in only three areas: alcoholic beverages, banking and anthracite strip mining."

  8. Phoebe Servs. v. City of Allentown

    262 A.3d 660 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 2021)   Cited 5 times
    In Phoebe Services, we concluded the HUP test was not violated where an "incentive pay plan [was] typical of other healthcare nonprofits, represent[ed] fair market value for the services provided, and [was] not directly tied to the financial status of the nonprofit" and "[t]he compensation scheme [was] designed to stay competitive within the market, and retain employees rather than lose the employees to competitors...." 262 A.3d at 671.

    When interpreting a municipal ordinance, this Court is guided by general rules of statutory construction. Council of Middletown Township v. Benham , 514 Pa. 176, 523 A.2d 311, 315 (1987). "[T]he object of all interpretation and construction of all statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention" of the governing body.

  9. Provident Mutual v. Tax Review Bd. of Phila

    658 A.2d 500 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 1995)   Cited 4 times
    In Provident Mutual Life Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania v. Tax Review Board of City of Philadelphia, 658 A.2d 500, 502 (1995), the Commonwealth Court held that `we have refuse [sic] to extend the preemption doctrine beyond the banking and liquor industries.... Either the statute must state on its face that local legislation is forbidden, on [sic] `indicate an intention on the part of the legislature that it should not be supplemented by municipal bodies.

    Provident Mutual also refers us to Liberty Bell Racing Association v. Philadelphia Tax Review Board, 86 Pa. Commw. 83, 483 A.2d 1063 (1984) (state legislation clearly indicates intent to preempt harness racing field as to local taxation as well as regulation). However, our Supreme Court has not recognized an intent to preempt local taxation of the insurance industry, Council of Middletown Township v. Benham, 514 Pa. 176, 523 A.2d 311 (1987), and, furthermore, we have distinguished the holding in Liberty Bell from other claimed preemptions on the ground that the harness Horse Racing Meeting Corporations Act, at issue there, created a scheme of taxation which specifically delineated which taxes could be imposed on harness racing. Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Murphy, 153 Pa. Commw. 338, 621 A.2d 1078 (1993) (no evidence that legislature intended that insurance companies be exempt from local taxation on transfers of real estate); City of Philadelphia v. Tax Review Board (Scott), 144 Pa.Commonwealth (Ct. 374, 601 A.2d 875 (1992) (local taxation of securities industry not preempted).

  10. Reimer v. Board of Sup'rs

    615 A.2d 938 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 1992)   Cited 3 times

    Act of June 22, 1937, P.L. 1987, as amended, 35 P. S. ยง 691.1 -691.1001. In Middletown Township v. Benham, 91 Pa. Commw. 186, 496 A.2d 1293 (1985), aff'd 514 Pa. 176, 523 A.2d 311 (1987), we considered an ordinance which required planned residential developments to be served by "public sanitary sewer systems." Because the ordinance sought "to control the type of sewage system, without reference to the state program which entirely embraces the determination of proper type," we held that the ordinance was void as preempted by state law.