Preemption, the court emphasized, is the exception and not the rule. Id. (citing Council of Middletouni Township v. Benham, 514 Pa. 176, 523 A.2d 311, 315 (1987)). The Court observed that preemption does not result simply because the General Assembly legislates in the field; rather, the legislature must manifest its intent entirely to preempt that field.
(Footnotes omitted). See also Council of Middletown Township v. Benham, 514 Pa. 176, 180-81, 523 A.2d 311, 313 (1987). It is clear that PEPFA contains no express provision addressing the question of whether municipal ordinances can provide for forfeiture of pension benefits upon terms different from those contained in the statute.
Moreover, courts have found entire fields of legislation to be preempted only when "the state has retained all regulatory and legislative power for itself and no local legislation is permitted." Council of Middletown Township v. Benham, 514 Pa. 176, 181, 523 A.2d 311, 313 (1987). See also Hydropress Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Township of Upper Mount Bethel, 575 Pa. 479, 836 A.2d 912 (2003) (plurality opinion) (stating that municipalities are presumed to have the power to legislate in a field regardless of how extensively the legislature has legislated in that field).
We add as a final note that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognizes that "the consequences of preemption are severe" and that it has "'found an intent to totally preempt local regulation in only three areas: alcoholic beverages, anthracite strip mining, and banking.'"Hydropress, 2003 WL 22799700, at *4 (quoting Council of Middletown Township v. Benham, 523 A.2d 311, 314 (Pa. 1987)). With this framework in mind, we proceed to analyze whether plaintiff rightly contends that the Ordinance is preempted by NMA, SWMA, and/or SFA.
In interpreting both statutes and ordinances, we follow the principles set forth in the Statutory Construction Act ("SCA"), 1 Pa.C.S. ยงยง 1921-39. Williams v. City of Philadelphia, 188 A.3d 421, 428 (Pa. 2018); Council of Middletown Twp., Delaware County v. Benham, 523 A.2d 311, 315 (Pa. 1987). Likewise, as a general matter, we employ the interpretative principles of the SCA to construe a regulation implementing a legislative enactment.
However, the mere fact that the General Assembly has enacted legislation in a field does not lead to the presumption that the state has precluded all local enactments in that field; rather, the General Assembly must clearly evidence its intent to preempt. Council of Middletown Township v. Benham, 514 Pa. 176, 523 A.2d 311, 313 (1987); see Mars Emergency Medical Services, Inc. v. Township of Adams, 559 Pa. 309, 740 A.2d 193, 196 (1999) (โ[A]bsent a clear statement of legislative intent to preempt, state legislation will not generally preempt local legislation on the same issue.โ). Such clarity is mandated because of the severity of the consequences of a determination of preemption: โIf the General Assembly has preempted a field, the state has retained all regulatory and legislative power for itself and no local legislation in that area is permitted.โ
"If the General Assembly has preempted a field, the state has retained all regulatory and legislative power for itself and no local legislation in that area is permitted." Council of Middletown Tp., Delaware County v. Benham, 523 A.2d 311, 313 (Pa. 1987). Recognizing the clarity with which an intent to preempt must be expressed by the Legislature and the significance of such a determination, "[w]e have found an intent to totally preempt local regulation in only three areas: alcoholic beverages, banking and anthracite strip mining."
When interpreting a municipal ordinance, this Court is guided by general rules of statutory construction. Council of Middletown Township v. Benham , 514 Pa. 176, 523 A.2d 311, 315 (1987). "[T]he object of all interpretation and construction of all statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention" of the governing body.
Provident Mutual also refers us to Liberty Bell Racing Association v. Philadelphia Tax Review Board, 86 Pa. Commw. 83, 483 A.2d 1063 (1984) (state legislation clearly indicates intent to preempt harness racing field as to local taxation as well as regulation). However, our Supreme Court has not recognized an intent to preempt local taxation of the insurance industry, Council of Middletown Township v. Benham, 514 Pa. 176, 523 A.2d 311 (1987), and, furthermore, we have distinguished the holding in Liberty Bell from other claimed preemptions on the ground that the harness Horse Racing Meeting Corporations Act, at issue there, created a scheme of taxation which specifically delineated which taxes could be imposed on harness racing. Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Murphy, 153 Pa. Commw. 338, 621 A.2d 1078 (1993) (no evidence that legislature intended that insurance companies be exempt from local taxation on transfers of real estate); City of Philadelphia v. Tax Review Board (Scott), 144 Pa.Commonwealth (Ct. 374, 601 A.2d 875 (1992) (local taxation of securities industry not preempted).
Act of June 22, 1937, P.L. 1987, as amended, 35 P. S. ยง 691.1 -691.1001. In Middletown Township v. Benham, 91 Pa. Commw. 186, 496 A.2d 1293 (1985), aff'd 514 Pa. 176, 523 A.2d 311 (1987), we considered an ordinance which required planned residential developments to be served by "public sanitary sewer systems." Because the ordinance sought "to control the type of sewage system, without reference to the state program which entirely embraces the determination of proper type," we held that the ordinance was void as preempted by state law.