"The evidentiary burden at this stage is rather modest: it is to demonstrate to the court that [P]laintiff's factual scenario is compatible with discriminatory intent — i.e., that discrimination could be a reason for the employer's action."Coulton v. University of Pennsylvania, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12459, 2006 WL 759701, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2006) (quotingMarzano v. Computer Science Corp., 91 F.3d 497, 508 (3d Cir. I 996) (emphasis in original)); see also Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 523 (3d Cir. 1993). To establish a prima facie case of race discrimination, Ms. Jackson must show that: (1) she is a member of a protected class, (2) she was qualified for the position, and that (3) she was subject to an adverse employment action (4) under circumstances that give rise to an inference of discrimination.

at *43 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 2008); see Coulton v. Univ. of Pa., No. 05-CV-1446, 2006 WL 759701, at *26 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 22, 2006) (“The Court finds that Plaintiff is not entitled to an inference of discrimination because the [employer] believed the allegations against him.”).

Jackson v. Lehigh Valley Physicians Grp., No. 08-cv-3043, 2010 WL 1630737, at *12 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 20, 2010) (quoting Coulton v. Univ. of Pa., No. 05-cv-1446, 2006 WL 759701, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2006), aff'd, 237 Fed.Appx. 741 (3d Cir. 2007)). Then, if a prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the defendant "to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for the adverse employment action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.

Nor is Mr. Yoho "entitled to an inference of discrimination" simply because BNY "believed the allegations against him," rather than accepting his denials. Coulton v. Univ. of Pennsylvania, No. 05-1446, 2006 WL 759701, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2006), aff'd, 237 F. App'x 741 (3d Cir. 2007). Mr. Yoho's "denial that he engaged in the conduct for which he was purportedly terminated is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact."

So long as the decisionmaker reasonably credited the allegations, an employee's denial is not enough to establish pretext." McCormick v. Allegheny Valley Sch., Civ. A. No. 06-3332, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8533 at *43 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 2008) (citing Coulton v. University of Pennsylvania, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12459, at *26 (E.D. Pa. 2006)). In McCormick, the court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment because plaintiff had failed to rebut the employer's legitimate non-discriminatory reason for plaintiff's termination.

(Defs.' Reply 20.) Defendants cite a district-court case and an unpublished Third Circuit case as support for this proposition. ( See id. (citing Goins v. EchoStar Comms. Corp., 148 F. App'x 96, 98 (3d Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (non-precedential); Coulton v. Univ. of Pa., No. 05-1446, 2006 WL 759701, at *7 n. 3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2006)).) Neither Plaintiff nor Defendants point to any Third Circuit authority on this issue.

(Id. ¶ 10.) "[T]he race of the individuals responsible for an adverse employment decision `is certainly relevant . . .'" Coulton v. Univ. of Pa., No. 05-1446, 2006 WL 759701, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2006) (quoting Iadimarco, 190 F.3d at 156). Where the person responsible for Plaintiff's termination was a member of Plaintiff's racial group, that fact weighs against an inference of discrimination.

See Sarullo v. United States Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 797 (3d Cir. 2003); Jones v. School Dist. of Phila., 198 F.3d at 410-11. After his termination, Plaintiff was replaced by another individual of Asian decent, and three of the seven Database Support Engineers who report to Ms. Yohe are Asian. Coulton v. Univ. of Pa., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12459, *19 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 22, 2006), aff'd 237 Fed. App'x 741 (3d Cir. 2007) (acknowledging that the replacement of the plaintiff by someone of the same race undercuts a claim of racial discrimination); see also Boice v. SEPTA, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74566, *35-36 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2007) (same); Burch v. WDAS AM/FM, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12290, *24-25 (E.D. Pa. July 1, 2002) (holding that plaintiff could not establish the fourth element of the prima facie case where he was replaced by a person of the same protected class and presented no evidence of racially discriminatory motive). Plaintiff offers no evidence suggesting an inference of racial discrimination and no evidence that other similarly situated individuals who were not in a protected class were treated more favorably, and therefore, the Court concludes, as a matter of law, that Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of race discrimination.

"The evidentiary burden at this stage is rather modest: it is to demonstrate to the court that plaintiff's factual scenario is compatible with discriminatory intent, i.e., that discrimination could be the reason for the employer's action." Coulton v. Univ. of Pennsylvania, 2006 WL 759705, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2006) (Padova, J.) (emphasis deleted) (quoting Marzano v. Computer Science Corp., 91 F.3d 497, 508 (3d Cir. 1996)). "[T]he prima facie test remains flexible and must be tailored to fit the specific context in which it is applied."

"The evidentiary burden at this stage is rather modest: it is to demonstrate to the court that [P]laintiff's factual scenario is compatible with discriminatory intent-i.e., that discrimination could be a reason for the employer's action." Coulton v. University of Pennsylvania, 2006 WL 759701, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2006) (quoting Marzano v. Computer Science Corp., 91 F.3d 497, 508 (3d Cir. 1996) (emphasis in original)). To establish a prima facie case of race discrimination, Mr. Ladd must show that: (1) he is a member of a protected class, (2) he was qualified for the position, and that (3) he was subject to an adverse employment action, (4) under circumstances that give rise to an inference of discrimination.